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Executive summary  
The mNutrition intervention in Ghana  
mNutrition is a global initiative supported by FCDO, managed by GSMA, and implemented by in-
country mobile network operators (MNOs) and third-party providers aimed at using mobile 
technology to improve the health and nutritional status of children and adults in low-income 
countries around the world. mNutrition is implemented through existing mAgri and mHealth 
initiatives in 12 countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The nutrition content 
aims to promote behaviour change around key farming practices and around dietary and child 
feeding practices that are likely to result in improved nutritional health within a household.  
Given the scale of the mNutrition service the decision was made to select two countries for 
inclusion in the evaluation: the mHealth service in Tanzania and the mAgri service in Ghana. The 
mNutrition service that is the focus of the evaluation in Ghana and this report is the VFC service. 
This was selected in consultation with GSMA and FCDO on the basis that it was one of the first of 
the mNutrition products to launch and had a strong partner with a proven platform. GSMA 
partnered with and funded the MNO Vodafone Ghana through the mNutrition challenge fund. 
Vodafone Ghana partnered with local provider Esoko to launch VFC, which was a rebranding of 
Esoko’s existing service with additional content provided. The service was a ‘bundled solution’, 
offering both agricultural and nutrition information through mobile voice and SMS services, in 
addition to free calls to other VFC members. The objective of this Vodafone service is to create 
and scale commercially sustainable mobile services that enable smallholder farmers to improve the 
nutritional status of their households and increase their productivity. The VFC service was paused 
in January 2019, when Vodafone’s contract with Esoko expired. 
Evaluation design 
The aim of the impact evaluation is to assess the impact, cost-effectiveness, and commercial 
viability of two services within the broader portfolio of the GSMA mNutrition programme. The 
evaluation is being conducted by a consortium of researchers from Gamos, IDS, and IFPRI. The 
team draws on a number of methods and interlinked components to gather evidence about the 
impact of the mNutrition intervention in Ghana, including a qualitative component, a quantitative 
component, and a business model and cost-effectiveness component. The evaluation was 
conducted in two regions of Ghana: the Central region and the Upper West region. 
In this report, we use the Osterwalder and Pigneur (O&P) canvas as a basis for the analysis. At the 
centre of the canvas is the value proposition (the product), which can then be divided into two: one 
half is customer facing (customer segments, channels, customer relationships, and revenue), while 
the other considers internal factors (partners, activities, resources, and investments). Given the 
changes that have taken place over time, this report focuses more on documenting the timeline 
and history of the product. The business model insights are intended to answer the key research 
question: ‘How commercially viable are the different business models being employed at country 
level?’ (They also aim to establish the models’ contribution to cost-effectiveness and the 
importance of continued private sector engagement.) 
The report is based on information collected from multiple sources, including qualitative interviews 
with stakeholders, commercial data provided by stakeholders, monitoring data, and alternative 
service providers. It also draws on data gathered by both the quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
components. The quantitative study implemented a randomised encouragement design to estimate 
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the causal impact of the VFC. The analysis highlights differences in outcomes across encouraged 
and comparison groups using data collected in the baseline and endline surveys. 
Review of the business model 
Value proposition – Despite high quality ratings levels, and high levels of self-reported behaviour 
change, the quantitative study found that use of VFC (at least once in 18 months) had minimal 
impact on the primary outcomes of household and women’s dietary diversity, agriculture 
production, or nutrition or farming knowledge. The most common self-reported behaviour changes 
were negotiating better prices, improving soil fertility, and timing of farming activities. VFC is more 
than a VAS (Value-Added Service): it is a bundle or customer plan, as it provides users with 
discounted tariffs and free calls to other VFC members. Sales agents could, therefore, sell VFC as 
a low-cost airtime product rather than as an agricultural VAS, which left some consumers confused 
over the identity of the product, and unaware of all its features.  
Customer segments – The lower uptake of the service by women may reflect gendered aspects 
of cultural and economic characteristics rather than any shortcomings in the design of the VFC 
bundle. 
Channels – Study results suggest that voice messages in the local language represent a better 
platform than SMS in English for delivering content, but this is a substantially more expensive 
medium. 
Customer relationships – Qualitative research indicates that people in rural areas with poor 
connectivity tend to feel ‘trapped’ in their choice of MNO by network coverage and signal 
availability. This suggests that there is little to be gained by investing in customer relationships, as 
this has little influence on customer retention. 
Revenue streams – Vodafone report that the Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) for the VFC 
base is GHS 2.5 per month. However, the quantitative study found much higher levels of 
expenditure: GHS 11 per month among women and GHS 27 per month among men (N.B. this is 
their entire expenditure, which will be spread across multiple SIMs.) Vodafone’s priorities have 
changed as it has shifted its priority from increasing its rural base to maximising the revenue 
generated by its rural base. It plans to do this by integrating a number of products based on 
different technologies. 
Indirect benefits – The VFC offer led to significant increases in the stickiness of the Vodafone 
network: VFC users were more likely to use Vodafone as their main network provider (primary 
SIM); rates were 9% higher among of both women and men. Given that 20% of women and 22% of 
men in the comparison group used a Vodafone SIM as their main SIM, this represents an increase 
of roughly 43%. 
Key resources – Vodafone found it difficult to justify allocating management resources to VFC. 
The VFC base was running at approximately 70,000 active subscribers, which represents less than 
1% of a total of 7.9 million mass market customers. 
Key activities – The last promotion undertaken by Vodafone was in autumn 2017.  
Key partnerships – The partnership relationship between Vodafone and Esoko was based on 
negotiated contracts. Several parties reported that the nature of the relationship deteriorated over 
the course of the project. 
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Cost structure and investment – Because of the three distinct phases in the VFC journey, it did 
not make sense to conduct any financial analysis based on actual costs. Instead, financial data 
provided by Vodafone and GSMA has been used to create a financial model, which has been used 
to model the financial viability of each of the three iterations. 
Exploring business models 
The VFC journey was not linear, so the financial model was used to provide commentary on the 
sustainability of different phases of the business model. The model was based on cost data 
provided by Vodafone to GSMA supplemented by data gathered through interviews. The analysis 
is based on a growth profile that achieves a subscriber base of 270,000 after four years. Internal 
rate of return (IRR) is used as the key metric.  
One of the premises of the mNutrition initiative was that the business models should be financially 
viable. This is often assumed to mean that farmers should pay for the service. For a while, VFC 
was offered as a free product. Financial modelling shows that this was not financially sustainable, 
at least not on the basis of the assumptions made about costs and the customer base. It also 
showed, for example, that financial performance was highly sensitive to ARPU, and could be 
attractive at rate of 3.5 GHS per subscriber per month (rather than 2.5 GHS).  
For a subscription model, based on the original subscriber price of GHS 2 per subscriber per 
month, 44% of revenue can be generated from subscription fees, which could give an attractive 
83% IRR on investment costs of £387,000. However, in practice Vodafone was not able to achieve 
these subscriber numbers at this subscription rate. At the reduced subscription rate of GHS 0.5 per 
subscriber per month, fee revenue drops to only 17%. Assuming that the amount passed on to the 
content provider was also GHS 0.5 per subscriber per month (i.e. 100% revenue share), the IRR 
on the investment drops to 29%. Given that revenue is dominated by ARPU, the financial 
performance is not highly sensitive to revenue share with the content provider. After reintroducing 
the subscription fee, the subscriber base fell to nearer 60,000, but the contribution margin1 of VFC 
was 64% – well within Vodafone’s target for the mass market segment (60–70%).  
The cost of sending SMS messages is the largest single component of operating costs. The model 
assumed a retail price of GHS 0.055 per SMS. However, a bulk SMS price might be more realistic, 
and the real cost to an MNO is likely to be lower still. Figure 1 shows that if the real cost of SMS 
messages is discounted, even the freemium model can show a reasonable rate of return. 
 
1 Contribution margin is total revenues minus variable costs, often expressed as a percentage of the revenues 
(contribution margin ratio). It represents the contribution of the product to overall profit.  
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Figure 1:  Sensitivity of IRR to SMS price (low subscription and freemium models) 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
As part of the baseline survey, the independent study team conducted a ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) 
game, which has been used to estimate potential subscriber numbers at different prices. On this 
basis, modelling indicates that a subscription model could be financially viable at a fee rate of GHS 
1 per month, reaching around 80% of the potential market, but also at a fee rate of GHS 2 per 
month, reaching only 50% of the potential market. This illustrates a potential for disconnect 
between commercial ways of working (aiming to maximise financial return) and donor ways of 
working (aiming to maximise social impact).  
Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
• VFC was offered under both subscription and freemium business models. Financial modelling 
shows that under certain circumstances, it is possible for both of these approaches to be 
financially viable. Key assumptions revolve around subscriber numbers, cost of SMS 
messages, and ARPU, each of which has implications for the sustainability of business models. 
In order to achieve subscriber numbers (of order 200,000) onboarding processes need to be 
addressed. Creating a simple product and a well-informed sales force are key.  
• SMS costs are the largest single component of cost of sales. Including an MNO partner that 
can cover these costs can help to make mobile phone-based information services more 
commercially viable. It may, therefore, be easier to make a financial case for an agricultural 
advisory service hosted by an MNO rather than a third-party content provider, given that it is 
not clear that MNOs allocate real costs to SMS messages sent, whereas a content provider will 
buy bulk SMS at a real cost. 
• Subscriber numbers for a mobile phone-based information service are crucial for commercial 
viability, but they have to be the right customers to maintain high retention rates. In a country 
the size of Ghana, the numbers required (of order 200,000) represents a large proportion of the 
potential rural market. Extensive marketing would be required to reach all of the potential 
market. More importantly, barriers to adoption of the service would need to be overcome, 
especially registration and profiling, and effective marketing by field agents trained and 
incentivised to sell the product and its features appropriately. 
• Business models need to be reviewed regularly. The original VFC strategy of increasing the 
rural base of new mobile subscribers may have been appropriate at the inception of VFC (6 
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years ago), but was not in a maturing market. VAS business models based on increased ARPU 
and reduced churn will struggle in underserved areas where people have no choice of network. 
• Although quality and satisfaction ratings were high among VFC users, as were self-reported 
levels of changed practices, the quantitative study found that changes were not significant 
enough to result in improvements in the primary outcomes. Nevertheless, farmers felt that 
mobile-based information on its own could still be useful. 
• Mobile based agricultural advisory services offer the promise of improving agricultural practice 
among low income farmers at low cost. However, the study highlights a number of ways in 
which scaled up SMS-based systems are not a good fit with this target group: 
 Each information delivery channel (e.g. SMS, OBD, IVR) has advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of cost, literacy, timing, permanent record, and so on. Hybrid 
approaches would be ideal, but financial sustainability is highly sensitive to the price of 
messages, making it difficult to take advantage of expensive, voice-based technologies.  
 Substantial parts of sub-Saharan Africa remain underserved in terms of mobile coverage. 
 Farmers lack the financial resources to implement changes to their agricultural practices. 
 Low income farmers are risk averse, making them reluctant to implement new practices, 
and making it more difficult to convince them to subscribe, especially without face to face 
support. 
 The process of onboarding is crucial; it needs to be simple and immediate. Providing a local 
presence to assist (e.g. through well informed agents) is expensive.  
 VFC offers a complex bundle of services that customers struggled to understand, especially 
when agents had a poor understanding of the product, tending to sell it as a SIM rather 
than a VAS package. 
 Information alone is not enough to enable famers to make substantial changes to their 
agricultural practice. 
 Financial sustainability is most challenging when serving customers with the lowest ARPU. 
• The mNutrition project provided an opportunity for companies such as Esoko to take a B2C 
model to scale by partnering with an MNO. The experience of VFC reveals some of the 
challenges encountered and the limited impact achieved (in terms of primary outcomes) with 
this approach. Further research is needed to find whether alternative B2B models (in which 
agricultural advisory companies partner with clients in the value chain) perform better. 
• Contracting in VAS providers (e.g. as Vodafone did with Esoko) enables an MNO to set up a 
service quickly and with minimal up-front costs. The drawback is that the MNO might then lack 
market understanding and expertise, making the product vulnerable to the partnership 
relationship. Contractual relationships, for example, provide little incentive to innovate. Future 
programmes should take time to understand the nature of partnerships, and ensure that a 
strong product development team is effective.  
• Mobile phone-based information services depend on multiple partnerships (including content 
and platform provider, and MNO). Effective partnerships depend on personalities. Partnerships 
must be agile in order to respond to changing markets. Support initiatives should include some 
form of future proofing to help mitigate changes that will occur over the duration of a 
programme. 
• Emerging digital Agritech companies offering diversified services that integrate financial 
services and data capability are providing more comprehensive packages of support for 
farmers, which may well result in significant improvements. This is consistent with trends in the 
telecoms market of growth in data usage and mobile money. However, barriers to adoption of 
these data driven services are higher (in terms of digital literacy), so they risk widening digital 
divides and leaving the poorest behind.  
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• The report argues that an agricultural advisory service such as VFC could be financially 
sustainable under certain circumstances. This then raises questions over the ethics of 
spending public money on services that result in financial benefits for the private sector. There 
would, therefore, be value in the donor community engaging in discussion on how commercial 
returns can be used to reimburse expenditure from public funds. 
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1 Introduction  
 mNutrition 
mNutrition was a global initiative supported by FCDO, managed by GSMA, and implemented by in-
country MNOs and third-party providers; it aimed to use mobile technology to improve the health 
and nutritional status of children and adults in the developing world. The potential to utilise mobile 
technology to change attitudes, knowledge, behaviours, and practices around health and 
agriculture for improved nutritional status has been recognised for some time, but to date there 
have been no rigorous evaluations of m-services at scale. A consortium of researchers from 
Gamos, IDS, and IFPRI were contracted to conduct a rigorous mixed-methods evaluation to 
estimate the impact of mNutrition on children and adults, and to understand how the context and 
the components of the mNutrition intervention shape its impact.  
mNutrition was implemented through existing mAgri and mHealth programmes in 12 countries 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The nutrition content aimed to increase knowledge 
and promote behaviour change around key farming decisions and practices and around maternal 
and other household practices that were likely to result in improved nutritional health within a 
household. The mNutrition initiative aimed to lead to the following changes in outcomes: (i) 
increased adoption of new nutrition-sensitive agriculture practices, improved agricultural 
productivity, and greater use of post-harvest technologies; (ii) improved nutrition practices around 
women during pregnancy, infant and young child feeding, and micronutrient supplementation of 
children at risk; and (iii) increased demand for nutrition and agriculture extension services.  
The evaluation design is expected to measure the impact, cost-effectiveness, and commercial 
viability of mNutrition, using mixed-methods. The evaluations were conducted on two programmes: 
Ghana mAgri (the focus of this report) and Tanzania mHealth. In order to satisfy the objectives of 
the Terms of Reference, the evaluation is composed of the following components.  
• A quantitative impact evaluation, employing a randomised encouragement design to 
determine the causal effect of the programme on dietary diversity, agricultural income, and 
production. A baseline survey occurred before the start of the encouragement activities, and an 
endline survey occurred 18 months later.  
• A qualitative impact evaluation, which consists of three qualitative data collection rounds (i.e. 
an initial exploratory qualitative study, in-depth case studies at midline, and rapid explanatory 
qualitative work after the quantitative endline survey data collection) and aims to provide an 
understanding of the context, underlying mechanisms of change, and the implementation 
process of mNutrition. 
• A business model and cost-effectiveness evaluation employing stakeholder interviews, 
commercial and end-user data, document analysis, and evidence from the quantitative and 
qualitative evaluations to generate a business model framework and estimate the wider 
imputed benefits from the VAS for the range of stakeholders involved.  
The mixed-method evaluation design will address the following research questions specified in the 
Terms of Reference (see Annex I): 
1. What are the impacts and cost-effectiveness of mobile phone-based nutrition and agriculture 
services on nutrition, health, and livelihood outcomes, especially among women, children, and 
the extreme poor? 
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2. How effective are mobile phone-based services in reaching, increasing the knowledge, and 
changing the behaviour of the specific target groups? 
3. Has the process of adapting globally agreed messages to local contexts led to content that is 
relevant to the needs of children, women, and poor farmers in their specific context? 
4. What factors make mobile phone-based services effective in promoting and achieving 
behaviour change (if observed), leading to improved nutrition and livelihood outcomes? 
5. How commercially viable are the different business models being employed at country level? 
6. What lessons can be learned about best practices in the design and implementation of mobile 
phone-based nutrition services to ensure (a) behaviour change and (b) continued private-
sector engagement in different countries? 
The primary target user of the evaluation results is FCDO, along with other key stakeholders 
including GSMA and its national members (including local MNOs implementing mNutrition 
services), national governments (in particular, the Ministry of Health and Agriculture), international 
agencies and donors, and community-level health and agriculture extension workers. The reports 
from the evaluation will be made publicly available on the IFPRI and IDS websites. 
 Research questions of the business modelling component 
mNutrition within the mAgri programme aimed to promote behaviour change around key farming 
decisions and practices by delivering nutrition information to farmers.2 The objective of mNutrition 
and mAgri was to create and scale commercially sustainable mobile services that enabled 
smallholder farmers to improve the nutritional status of their household and increase their 
productivity (see Annex A for GSMA’s theory of change of mAgri). The stated GSMA targets are 
the following (GSMA 2013): 
• At least 20% of registered households that act on information and advice report consuming at 
least four food groups on a daily basis for at least nine months of the year as a result of more 
diverse agricultural output, increased income, and/or behaviour change in terms of nutrition. 
• At least 50% of registered households that act on information and advice reporting a 25% 
increase in agricultural productivity. 
• At least 50% of registered households that act on information and advice reporting increases in 
agricultural income of 20%.  
In Ghana, mNutrition was implemented as part of the Vodafone mAgri mobile extension service 
called VFC. The service was a bundled solution offering agricultural and nutrition information via 
voice and SMS services in addition to free calls to other VFC members (details on the service are 
provided in Section 2). 
The business model and cost-effectiveness component of the evaluation is designed to contribute 
evidence to help answer the first of the broad research questions specified in the Terms of 
Reference (Annex I): 
• What are the impacts and cost-effectiveness of mobile phone-based nutrition services on 
nutrition, health, and livelihood outcomes, especially among women, children, and the extreme 
poor?  
The mNutrition intervention was externally evaluated in two countries. In Ghana, the intervention 
was implemented via an mAgriculture programme in which nutrition information has been 
 
2 For a detailed landscape analysis on the context for implementing mNutrition and mAgriculture programmes, see 
Barnett et al., (2016). 
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integrated with crop information as part of a package of agriculture support services. The target 
group was low-income farmers in rural areas throughout the country. In Tanzania, the research 
consortium was evaluating mNutrition within a broader mHealth programme that promotes 
behaviour change around maternal and early childhood health and nutrition. The Terms of 
Reference refer to the impacts and effectiveness of mobile phone-based services, so the scope of 
the evaluation is the mobile phone-based service as deployed under the mNutrition programme, 
rather than the incremental impact of support provided through the mNutrition programme. We are 
therefore assessing the business model of the VFC delivered with the mNutrition content.  
The intended audience for the business modelling endline report is FCDO, along with other 
organisations involved in mNutrition and mAgriculture programmes globally (including local MNOs 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mNutrition services), national 
governments, international agencies, and donors. 
 Purpose and scope of the business modelling endline report 
This report is a milestone in the evaluation study; it documents the journey of the VFC project in 
Ghana supported by GSMA (and FCDO) over the duration of the evaluation. The report is one of 
four endline deliverables. This report should be read in conjunction with the baseline business 
modelling report (Batchelor et al., 2017), the endline cost-effectiveness report (Batchelor et al., 
2019), and the quantitative endline report (Billings et al., forthcoming, 2020), which provide 
evidence of the impact of the access to the service on both primary and secondary outcomes. The 
qualitative endline report (Barnett et al., 2019)3 gives additional insights into consumer priorities 
and behaviours and how the service was used. The baseline business modelling report covered 
the initial data gathering stage (up to March 2017). At this point, the GSMA grant was coming to an 
end, and Vodafone was taking the opportunity to renegotiate the contract with Esoko, the main 
content supplier. 
 Organisation of the report 
Section 2 presents the background to the project. Section 3 discusses the evaluation design and in 
particular, the business modelling component. Section 4 describes the journey of the VFC, before 
these developments are mapped onto the business modelling canvas in Section 5. Section 6 
presents a financial model that analyses the sensitivity of the commercial sustainability to various 
key costs and revenue options. Section 7 takes a wider view and considers the changing context of 
Ghana, telecoms, agriculture, and technology. Section 8 considers the VFC in the context of other 
GSMA mAgri mNutrition projects. Section 9 presents a discussion of the findings of the business 
modelling before some conclusions and learnings are presented in Section 10. 
 
3 This qualitative research report is commonly referred to simply as the ‘qualitative research’ throughout this report. 
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2 The mNutrition intervention in Ghana 
 Context 
Nutrition: Ghana has achieved substantial progress in reducing malnutrition and is on course to 
achieve most of the World Health Assembly Global Nutrition Targets set for 2025 (Development 
Initiatives, 2018). Improvements have been seen in the reduction of stunting among children under 
five years of age, which fell from 28.1% in 2008 to 18.8% in 2014 (GSS et al., 2015). However, 
geographic disparities in nutritional status persist, with stunting prevalence at 22.2% in the Upper 
West region and 22% in the Central region – well above the national average and more than twice 
the rate in the Greater Accra region (GSS et al., 2015). Micronutrient deficiency is also a persistent 
challenge, with more than 35% of children under five years anaemic, and more than 20% vitamin A 
deficient (University of Ghana et al., 2017). 
Literacy: Adult literacy rates in rural Ghana are quite low, with only 41.7% of adults able to read or 
write in English or any Ghanaian language (Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 6). Among 
rural women, rates are even lower (31.4%). These low literacy rates have implications for the 
design of the VFC service and its ability to change the behaviour of illiterate subscribers with text 
content delivered by SMS. 
Mobile penetration: Use of mobile phones has increased dramatically in the last decade from 
19% of households owning a mobile phone in 2005/06 to 94% in 2016/17 (GLSS 7). While there is 
still some heterogeneity in mobile phone ownership by geographic location and poverty status, 
these gaps are narrowing quickly with 86.4% of households in the lowest wealth quintile owning a 
mobile phone (GLSS 7). The market for mobile services in Ghana is dominated by three MNOs. 
MTN is the largest with 49.08% of market share for voice subscriptions and 59.74% of market 
share for mobile data subscriptions. Airtel/Tigo holds 25.14% and 23.21% of market share for voice 
and data subscriptions, respectively, while Vodafone holds 23.97% and 16.09% of market share 
for voice and data subscriptions, respectively. Glo, a fourth MNO, covers less than 2% of the 
market share (Ghana National Communications Authority, 2018). 
Agriculture in Ghana: Agriculture accounts for 22.2% of national gross domestic product (GLSS 
7). A little over half (51.5%) of households in Ghana own or operate a farm. Farming is 
predominantly a rural activity, with 82.5% of rural households involved in agriculture, compared to 
only 26.6% of urban households. The proportion of females involved in agriculture is 41.2%, and 
there is virtually no difference in the gender balance between urban and rural areas (GLSS 6).  
Agriculture extension services are decentralised, but provision remains poor due to low capacity 
and limited funds (World Bank, 2017). In 2014 there were approximately 3,500 agriculture agents 
under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Dia et al., 2017). According to the Ghana 
Socioeconomic Panel Survey baseline report (2011), 51.7% of all households surveyed received 
agricultural advice from other households, and the proportion of households receiving agriculture 
extension advice through radio varied from 13.79% in the Northern region to 0.26% in the Greater 
Accra region. 
mAgri services: The widespread penetration of mobile phone use in Ghana has come with a 
proliferation of tech start-ups, several with an explicit agricultural focus (for example, Anitrack, 
Complete Farmer, Ghalani, Qualitrace, and TroTro Tractor, many of which have started since 
2014, when the project was conceptualised). The VFC, introduced in 2015, is one such mAgri 
service, described in greater detail in Section 2.2 of this report. Farmerline is a social enterprise 
company that develops information and communication technology (ICT) for rural famers. In 2013, 
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Farmerline launched the 399 Service in partnership with MTN, which connects farmers to financial 
services, information, and agricultural inputs. Agrocenta facilitates smallholder farmer trade with 
AgroTrade (a platform for farmer registrations, inventory management, logistics, and tracking) and 
provides financial services with AgroPay (a platform for digital payments, micro-lending, and crop 
insurance). Mobile services for livestock farmers include Cowtribe, which enables subscribers to 
schedule and receive veterinary treatment for livestock and track the health statistics of each 
animal, and Agro Innova, with software for poultry farmers including AkokoTakra for production 
management and AkokoMarket for connecting farmers to markets. A few services aim to support 
logistics, including Ghalani, a platform for farmers to organise group deliveries, and Truckr which 
allows farmers to book a truck on a mobile app to take products to market. Viamo, a global social 
enterprise with origins in Ghana, developed the 3-2-1 services, a mass communication tool used 
for the delivery of information-based services (including mHealth services) in a number of 
developing countries. In Ghana, the 3-2-1 Service was launched in April 2016 and delivers a range 
of services on the Vodafone network.  
More recently, large MNO companies are starting to roll out business-to-person services, whereby 
agribusinesses pay farmers via mobile money for the product or services rendered (Loukos and 
Javed, 2018). There is also a growing interest in apps that enable the urban population to invest in 
agriculture, either through the provision of finance and information services to farmers or by 
coordinating labour for urban landowners.  
 The VFC service 
The VFC was a mobile extension service delivering agricultural and nutrition information to farmers 
via recorded voice and SMS messaging and providing access to a call centre for agricultural 
advice. The objective of Vodafone’s mNutrition programme was to create and scale commercially 
sustainable mobile services that enable smallholder farmers to improve the nutritional status of 
their households and increase their productivity. Smallholder farmers with access to mobile 
telecommunications were the primary target for VFC enrolment. The service included access to a 
call centre for expert advice without airtime charges, free calls and SMS messaging to other VFC 
subscribers, and discounted calls and SMS messages to non-VFC subscribers, in addition to the 
following information-based services:  
Table 1: VFC information services 
 Delivery mode Frequency Language 
Local weather 
information 
SMS 3 messages per week English 
Local market price 
information 
SMS 1 message per week English 
Agricultural tips for 
selected crop 
Recorded voice 
message 
3 per month Local language 
Nutrition tips (for selected 
crop and general) 
Recorded voice 
message 
3 per month4 Local language 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
Key organisations involved in the VFC partnership are illustrated in Figure 2. The primary roles of 
each are: 
 
4 Initially, the VFC service sent one nutrition message per month, but this was increased to three nutrition messages per 
month in July 2017. 
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• Vodafone Ghana – lead partner, funding, marketing, and billing; 
• Esoko – main partner, content, platform, and helpline; 
• Cobalt – local UX design research; 
• Frog – global UX partner; 
• GSMA – co-funder, business intelligence, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) (provided via 
contract with the Agricultural Learning and Impacts Network [ALINe]), and consultancy; and 
• GAIN – global content partner. 
The contribution of the key partners to principal business activities are summarised in Table 2.  
Figure 2: Partners and other key players 
  
Source: GSMA (2016a). Reproduced with permission. 
Table 2: Summary of activities conducted by key VFC partners 
 Vodafone Esoko GSMA / GAIN 
Platform/network 
Operate network 
Billing customers 
Operate Esoko platform 
(distribute content) 
Product feedback from 
users 
Production  
Create content 
Aggregate and localise 
content continuously 
(weather and market 
prices) 
Update advisory and 
nutritional content 
Maintain call centre 
Create content 
Marketing 
Customer acquisition 
Customer retention 
Customer profiling Feedback from users 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
Esoko Ghana, a mobile phone-based rural information service, curated the message content and 
operated the platform to send tailored SMS and recorded voice messages to member farmers and 
also operated the Farmer Helpline call centre. Esoko developed the content for the crop-specific 
agricultural tips for 24 widely cultivated crops in Ghana. These tips covered recommended planting 
time and information on best practices for cultivation and harvest. Messages were sent according 
to planting cycles for specific crops and agro-climactic zones based on farmer profile information. 
Nutrition message content was developed by GAIN in 2015. GAIN created 312 crop-specific 
messages (13 messages per crop for the 24 Esoko-supported crops) with nutrition information on 
topics including food preparation, food hygiene, safety and storage, and processing. In 2017, the 
Grameen Foundation developed 26 additional nutrition messages focused on animal-sourced 
foods including eggs, dairy, fish, and meat. VFC subscribers received both general nutrition tips 
and crop-specific nutrition tips according to their profiled crop. Vodafone invested in the VFC 
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service with the aim of increasing penetration in rural Ghana through new subscriber acquisitions. 
The VFC service was launched in June 2015 promoted by Vodafone agents with a dedicated VFC 
SIM card. The monthly subscription fee for VFC was initially GHS 2 (US$ 0.45). However, the 
agent-led model resulted in slow acquisitions and difficulty retaining active usership of the service. 
By November 2016 there were approximately 130,000 registered members, but fewer than 20% 
were active (GSMA, 2017). In December 2016 Vodafone added existing rural Vodafone customers 
to the service, thus increasing the VFC subscription rate to over 200,000. In addition, Vodafone 
made a strong push to increase acquisitions by temporarily dropping the monthly subscription fee 
from October 2016 to June 2017. In June 2017, the monthly service fee was reinstated at GHS 0.5. 
Monthly fees are automatically deducted from the subscriber’s airtime balance when the balance is 
at least GHS 0.5. 
The VFC service was designed to offer customised information to farmers based on their selected 
preferences. Initially, each new member was profiled by a Vodafone agent at the time of 
registration, indicating their preference of location for weather and market price information, their 
preferred language for receiving recorded voice messages, and their preferred crop choice for 
agricultural tips and price information. It became apparent that much of the profiling data was not 
being collected by agents at the time of SIM registration. As a result, Esoko and Vodafone modified 
their strategy so that all profiling would be done through a follow-up call to new members by the 
VFC call centre after the SIM registration process was completed. However, when Vodafone 
suspended the monthly service fee and initiated a large push to increase the programme member 
base in late 2016, it was no longer feasible for Esoko to follow up with each new VFC member 
individually. Instead, new members were given default profile options based on their district of 
residence, receiving agri and nutrition tips on the crop most widely grown in that district and in the 
language most widely spoken. Farmers were able to request modifications to the profile options 
through the call centre, but this was not widely publicised. As a result, new members were less 
likely to have customised options and may therefore have received agricultural and nutrition tips for 
crops they did not cultivate.  
Due to the challenges in building and maintaining a wide subscription base for VFC, Vodafone 
designed a new service to better meet the needs of rural famers called the Connected Farmer, 
which includes financial services delivered through the Vodafone Cash platform such as a savings 
package, a crop insurance offer, and a platform for connecting farmers to agribusiness services, in 
addition to market information services available through VFC. This new offer was designed based 
on findings from market research conducted in 2018 that indicated that farmers are most interested 
in services with immediate financial benefits (e.g. access to finance) and far less interested in 
information-based services, even if the information is also intended to ultimately boost production 
and income. However, Vodafone planned to continue offering the VFC services to Connected 
Farmer members with the aim of building greater demand for such information over time. The 
Connected Farmer was supposed to be rolled out in August 2018, and Vodafone planned to 
migrate existing VFC members to the new Connected Farmer service when it was launched, 
although study farmers would continue receiving the basic VFC service to maintain consistency in 
the mNutrition evaluation intervention. However, the launch was delayed, and the Connected 
Farmer had not yet been initiated at the time this report was written.  
In January 2019, Vodafone discontinued their contract with Esoko to deliver recorded voice content 
for VFC, although they continued to operate the VFC helpline. IFPRI contracted Esoko directly to 
continue sending the content to study farmers from January through March 2019. There was a 
small interruption in the voice message service before Esoko resumed sending content to study 
farmers in the third week of January under the IFPRI contract. 
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3 Evaluation design 
 Study design 
This report is constructed from interviews with key stakeholders and a review of secondary data. A 
list of contacts made during the baseline collection can be found in Annex B. 
The study has used the O&P canvas for structuring insights into the business model (Osterwalder 
and Pigneur, 2010). Few business models in the 21st century are straightforward and simple. 
Production of a product, sales of the product, and revenue from that product are only a small 
section of the overall model. Revenues are often made on associated advertising, or on the value 
the product adds to the brand. The landscape report published as part of this study details some of 
the possibilities for MNOs (Barnett et al., 2016). 
In this report, we use the O&P canvas as a basis for the analysis. An introduction to the framework 
is given in Annex C. While this generally works well, we acknowledge that the canvas is good for 
taking a snapshot of a business model but in this report indicate that also documenting the timeline 
and history of the product is important. These business model insights are intended to answer the 
key research question: ‘How commercially viable are the different business models being 
employed at country level?’ (They also aim to establish the models’ contribution to cost-
effectiveness and the importance of continued private sector engagement.)  
In a development sector where public funds are increasingly under scrutiny for value for money, 
the roll-out of a public good via a private sector commercially sustainable mechanism is very 
attractive. The heart of the question is predicated on assuring that future actions taken by donors 
and private sector actors regarding similar products are informed and lessons are learned, in order 
to increase the chances of sustainability. Hence, while we try to use the O&P framework in an 
applied manner, there are times when we need to document the ‘backstory’ that led up to certain 
decisions. 
The aim of the baseline report was, therefore, to provide a detailed description of each of the 
building blocks of the business model canvas as at the beginning of the independent study. It also 
provided a review of operating experience since the beginning of the mNutrition project that may 
provide context for changes that have already taken place in the product design. This endline 
report builds on the baseline, bringing the canvas up to date. 
 Data collection methods 
Business models traditionally describe how a business is going to make a profit from a product or 
service, and identify the direct relationship between the two. They consider who the customers of 
the business are, why they will buy the product or service (the value proposition), and how the 
company is going to provide the product or service. On the financial side, a business model 
considers both revenues (and pricing) and costs. The role of VAS within MNOs is not always 
straightforward. There are imputed benefits, and these are recognised as important within the 
FCDO logframe for the whole GSMA programme. The challenge here, then, is to identify the broad 
business model, including the non-monetary benefits of the service to each stakeholder. 
Given the complexity of the partnerships involved in the mNutrition projects, Osterwalder and 
Pigneur’s (2010) inductive approach to business model generation has been used as a framework 
for the research. 
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This endline report is based on information collected from multiple sources: 
• qualitative interviews conducted with stakeholders and MNOs in Ghana; 
• commercial data provided by stakeholders and MNOs (or brokered by GSMA); 
• monitoring data gathered by ALINe (the M&E provider for the GSMA mAgri Programme); 
• data available in published literature; 
• government stakeholders and alternative service providers as a source of additional, 
unpublished information on costs and business models; 
• the quantitative component of the study, led by IFPRI (Billings et al., forthcoming, 2020); and 
• the qualitative component that focused on consumer perceptions, led by IDS (Barnett et al., 
2019). 
This component draws on data gathered by both the quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
components described in Section 1. The qualitative research employed multiple data collection 
tools to explore four thematic areas: 
1. Access, use, and attitudes toward and acceptability of mobile phone technology by male and 
female small-scale farmers. 
2. Barriers to and facilitators of the uptake of mobile phone-based messages by female and male 
small-scale farmers. 
3. Small-scale farmers’ information needs and current information-seeking behaviours related to 
agriculture and nutrition. 
4. Social, economic and environmental factors that may influence behaviour change related to 
agriculture and nutrition. 
Data collection tools included semi-structured in-depth interviews with farmers, key informant 
interviews, expert interviews and community member interviews, and focus group discussions. 
Field work was carried out in two clusters of three villages selected from two different regions – 
Upper West and Central Region. Details of the sampling strategy, participant numbers, and 
composition are described in Barnett et al., (2017). Findings from each of the qualitative research 
areas have contributed to the various building blocks described in Section 5. Findings relating to 
information needs, current sources of information, and barriers to uptake all affect the perceived 
value of the service. Patterns of handset ownership and access, poor network coverage, and 
literacy levels all inform the viability of the service, and SMS as a medium, in reaching target 
farmers. 
This report draws heavily on data analysis presented in Billings et al., (forthcoming, 2020). This 
analysis highlights differences in outcomes across encouraged and comparison groups using data 
collected in the baseline and endline surveys. Full details of the sampling design and the analytical 
approach can be found in the quantitative endline report, but it is important to understand what the 
two groups represent.  
To estimate the causal impact of the VFC product, IFPRI implemented a randomised 
encouragement design. The encouragement design does not restrict access to the VFC service 
(as with a control group in a randomised control trial), but instead works by randomly assigning 
some communities or households to receive additional marketing and promotion of the 
programme. Because the encouragement is randomly assigned, the variation in take-up of the 
service created by the encouragement is used to measure the causal impact of the programme as 
the difference in outcomes between encouraged and comparison communities at endline. The 
random assignment means that average differences in outcomes across the groups after the 
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intervention can be interpreted as being truly caused by, rather than simply correlated with, the 
interventions.  
The additional marketing and promotion to encourage take-up and continued use was informed by 
the qualitative study and includes a combination of price discounts and door-to-door marketing to 
households in selected communities throughout the evaluation period. During the door-to-door 
marketing, the product was promoted using a short advertisement script. Households in 
communities were randomly assigned to receive the encouragement. The experimental design 
included two refinements:  
• using ‘sales’ scripts that focused on the agriculture content of the product (Vodafone’s current 
script), or scripts that augmented the agriculture focus with additional information on nutrition; 
and 
• either a male or a female from the household was targeted to receive the advertisement scripts 
and a free subscription to VFC.  
Processing information  
Evaluation activities carried out by Gamos to inform the endline reports include: 
• Country visits to establish and maintain relationships with key stakeholders. Interviews 
conducted with key representatives of stakeholder institutions to gather additional data to 
populate the O&P framework. Ongoing communication and country visits undertaken to 
monitor developments in services and to track the commercial justification for changes. 
• Populating the O&P canvas with information gleaned from reports previously published under 
the mNutrition programmes (e.g. UX testing, case studies, rapid feedback surveys, etc.), as 
well as grey literature. 
• Working with IDS and IFPRI to contribute to the design of both qualitative and quantitative 
instruments (both baseline and endline) to incorporate indicators relating to non-financial 
attitudes of customers to services, and to MNOs in particular, such as customer satisfaction 
and brand loyalty. These instruments also explore attitudes toward alternative services offered 
by other providers, e.g. media, face-to-face extension, etc.  
• Interviews with alternative service providers to explore other business models (among 
alternative mobile services). 
• Analysing financial data with a view to creating a financial model to test key cost sensitivities. 
The process of enquiry and information collection was flexible and responsive to events on the 
ground, given that the partners and the service offerings were constantly evolving. Particularly 
portentous times occurred following the end of GSMA mNutrition grant contracts. Other times 
coincided with the publication of significant outputs from the research project that informed product 
review decisions. This component of the evaluation is based on opportunistic data gathering from 
key individuals such as representatives of the core partners and other partners to the project.  
 Ethical considerations and approval  
As an overall guiding principle, the research team sought to conduct themselves in a professional 
and ethical manner throughout the baseline phase of work, with strict respect for principles of 
integrity, honesty, confidentiality, voluntary participation, impartiality, and the avoidance of personal 
risk. These principles were informed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2010) Development Assistance Committee’s Quality Standards for Development 
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Evaluation and FCDO’s ‘Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation’, which will be followed for 
the duration of the evaluation. 
Overall, this component will draw on the qualitative and quantitative data collected in the other two 
components of the evaluation. Other data sources were stakeholder interviews with MNOs and 
data collection (commercial and monitoring data) from MNOs and other relevant organisations. 
Although most research participants were familiar with the mNutrition programme, and the principle 
of an independent evaluation, this component sought the informed consent of participants. This 
was achieved by emails and briefing documents describing the research. In particular, we 
described the relationship between the consortium, FCDO, and GSMA, in order to avoid any 
possibility of deception. Research activities with participants involved interviews only; there were 
no observational activities. 
While this evaluation component did not involve any primary data collection from human subjects 
at community/household level, ethical considerations are still considered important for all work 
carried out under this component. In particular, GSMA remains highly aware of the commercial 
sensitivities of their partner MNOs, so the issue of commercial confidentiality is very important for 
this area of work, given that it relies on the sharing of sensitive commercial data. Therefore, the 
Gamos team has paid specific attention to this issue as part of our ongoing work. 
The Gamos team is currently operating under the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) signed by 
GSMA and OPM during the inception phase of the project. Where relevant, stakeholder 
respondents were informed that an NDA with their trade association has been signed, and that the 
interview is bound by it. All the data being gathered fell within the scope of this agreement (e.g. 
development, business plans, marketing, operations, and finances), although there is a provision 
that such information should be designated as proprietary or confidential.5 
For the avoidance of doubt, all internal reports shared by Gamos were marked as confidential and 
were not to be circulated outside the evaluation team. Any outside reporting will not contain any 
detail that could be construed as proprietary or confidential information.  
All external reports were and will be shared with key research participants in early draft form in 
order to establish principles of trust and reciprocity. This has been done in order to ensure that 
participants will have an opportunity to confirm that their views have been reported accurately, and 
that publications do not breach their confidentiality requirements. 
As this component draws on qualitative and quantitative data collected through the other two 
workstreams, appropriate measures were taken to ensure that the shared data is anonymised and 
there is no risk of confidentiality breach. For the quantitative data, a unique household ID has been 
assigned to each household. This allows for following up with respondents as necessary without 
providing access to any personal information in the datasets that are made available for analysis. 
Similarly, all qualitative transcripts are anonymised, pseudonyms given, and any information that 
can lead to personal identification has been removed. 
 Limitations  
The methodology relied on the willingness of key stakeholders to share their data and their 
thoughts. In a commercial environment this is not always forthcoming, and a limitation of the report 
 
5 The agreement permits Gamos to share confidential information among the team if: (i) they need to know; (ii) they have 
entered into a confidentiality agreement; and (iii) they are not a competitor. 
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is that it relies on this shared data. Risks associated with this transfer of data have been mitigated 
as much as possible by clear communication and follow-up with stakeholders. The degree of 
engagement to date with stakeholders is reflected in the insights and level of data presented in the 
report. Changes in relationships and personnel (among all stakeholders) were the principal threats 
to the mitigation strategy.  
The risks associated with the evolving nature of the business model have been mitigated as much 
as possible by setting milestone data points, and the subsequent phases have informed the 
changes between baseline and endline. 
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4 Developments in the VFC 
 Vodafone Farmers Club (VFC) 
The VFC service was paused in January 2019, when Vodafone’s contract with Esoko expired. 
Prior to this there had been a series of changes to the VFC product, followed by a period of 
searching for ways to revise the farmers’ product.  
Default profiling was introduced in early 2017 as a means of providing a simplified registration 
process. Farmers were profiled based on the location where theywere registered (district level) and 
then received messages for crops that were dominant in that location. Farmers could then contact 
the call centre to provide more accurate profile details, but Esoko reported that a negligible number 
of subscribers had done so. If they were automatically profiled, they did not receive weather 
information. The system allocated them to a district on the basis of the cell tower through which 
they were registered onto VFC. The district is too large an area for weather, as weather in one part 
of the district may well be different to that in other parts of the district, so it was felt that supplying 
farmers with inaccurate information would be counterproductive. Market price information was still 
sent because this comprised prices from the main markets within the district. This meant that the 
majority of new subscribers were not receiving weather information.  
Farmers were entered into VFC in a two-stage process. First, Vodafone compiled a file of all 
subscribers both new and re-subscribed with basic registration information. Second, the file was 
sent to Esoko, which entered the subscriber details into its system. The files were previously sent 
to Esoko daily, but this was changed to a weekly transaction. This meant that new subscribers 
could wait up to a week before getting onto the Esoko system and receiving any information.  
Esoko research found that awareness of the product among users was poor, and some did not 
even want to be on the plan. This highlights shortcomings in the marketing of the product. No VFC 
field agents had been commissioned since the initial launch phase. This leaft the product to be sold 
by freelancers, who had minimal training on VFC and may have simply sold a VFC SIM because 
other SIMs were in short supply. In this case, members did not even learn about the package they 
are signed up for. The promotions ended in early 2017, partly as a consequence of these problems 
with freelancers.  
When it was clear that the original target of 400,000 subscribers would not be met, a revised target 
of 200,000 was negotiated with GSMA at the end of 2016. Among a range of measures taken to 
achieve this, the subscription fee of 2 GHS/month was temporarily dropped. When the subscription 
fee was reintroduced at a reduced rate of GHS 0.50 per month, VFC lost two-thirds of its 
subscribers, demonstrating a low level of WTP. Following this, and changes in management, 
Vodafone has been considering ways of improving the VFC product. Given that VFC has not 
increased the rural base as originally intended, priorities have changed toward improving the 
revenue potential of the rural base. 
Due to the challenges in building and maintaining a wide subscription base for VFC, Vodafone 
decided to bring one of its global services to Ghana to better meet the needs of rural famers. This 
is called the Connected Farmer, and it includes financial services delivered through the Vodafone 
Cash platform such as a savings package, a crop insurance offer, and a platform for connecting 
farmers to agribusiness services. This new offer was selected based on findings from market 
research conducted in 2018 that indicated farmers are most interested in services with immediate 
financial benefits (e.g. access to finance) and far less interested in information-based services, 
even if the information is also intended to ultimately boost production and income. However, 
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Vodafone planned to continue offering the VFC services to Connected Farmer members with the 
aim of building greater demand for such information over time. The Connected Farmer was 
supposed to be rolled out in 2018, and Vodafone planned to migrate existing VFC members to the 
new Connected Farmer service when it was launched, although study farmers would continue 
receiving the basic VFC service to maintain consistency in the mNutrition evaluation intervention. 
However, the launch was delayed, and the Connected Farmer had not yet been initiated at the 
time this report was written.  
The latest thinking was that value could be generated by bringing together a range of different 
services, currently hosted in different parts of the organisation: 
• 3-2-1 (run by Vodafone Foundation through Viamo); 
• Farmerline (run by Vodafone Business); 
• Fisherfolk (run by Vodafone Cash); and 
• VFC. 
There may be merit in each of these products retaining their own identify, so the main attraction is 
in merging the backend systems. This would also enable the upselling of products such as Easy 
Pension (run by People Pensions Trust), while the 3-2-1 service could be made free to VFC 
members. The ideas were discussed in March 2018, but even then Vodafone noted that the 
merger had been delayed due to staff shortages. The revised package, offering mobile money, 
savings, and insurance in addition to information services, call centre, and discounted calls, was 
scheduled for launch in August 2018. It was planned to organise major awareness-raising activities 
to coincide with Farmers’ Day in December 2018. Around March 2018, GSMA secured an 
assurance from Vodafone that VFC would be preserved as part of the revised agricultural market 
offering.  
However, at the end of 2018, plans for the Connected Farmer service were delayed further, and 
Vodafone was looking to the beginning of the next financial year – April 2019. It still had not 
confirmed if Esoko would be the content provider for the new service. One of the options being 
considered was to contract Esoko to manage the entire system. This would eliminate the need for 
parallel subscriber lists, which causes delays in registration and profiling, and results in a long 
lapse between farmers registering and receiving their first information message. However, after 
further staff changes in Vodafone, such plans appear to have been dropped.  
Note that Viamo, Farmerline, and Esoko all operate in the same space, offering similar services. 
This inevitably led to tensions in negotiating Esoko’s continued position as VFC content provider 
when Vodafone was at the same time negotiating with other providers. 
The VFC partners were keen to take up GSMA’s suggestion of commissioning a consultancy visit 
from Telenor Pakistan (the most successful of the projects supported under mNutrition) to 
stimulate ideas on ways in which VFC could be improved and adoption rates increased. Both 
Esoko and Vodafone were willing to share the costs, and the longer-term vision was to create a 
VFC 2.0. However, the visit did not take place, partly because changes in personnel at Vodafone 
meant that nobody pursued the idea.  
Esoko reported that VFC has reached a total of 350,000 subscribers, i.e. farmers who subscribed 
to VFC at some point in time. As at early March 2019, they reported only about 33,000 active 
subscribers, defined as those who are currently in a 30-day bundle (a mix of new subscribers and 
re-subscribers). Vodafone reported nearer 60,000 subscribers at the same time. The discrepancy 
is reported to be due to a large proportion of new subscribers who sign up (are added to Vodafone 
numbers), but then unsubscribe within a short period of time and are then absent from the Esoko 
numbers.  
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 Vodafone 
Vodafone Ghana has been through major changes over the duration of the study. At the very top, 
Yoland Cuba took over from Haris Broumidis as CEO in March 2016, and was then succeeded by 
Patricia Obo-Nai in April 2019. Vodafone Ghana has struggled with unprofitability since it acquired 
Ghana Telecom in 2008. 
Agnes Emefa Essah was appointed as Chief Marketing Officer in July 2014 and stepped down in 
March 2018. She was responsible for innovation, which includes VFC. The Commercial and 
Marketing Executive who originally supported VFC through the mNutrition programme processes 
reported to her, and he also moved on. He was replaced by the Value Segment Manager, who 
later passed on responsibility for VFC to the Product Manager.  
At the product level, the original Product Manager, who had previously worked at Esoko and was 
instrumental in brokering the partnership, left early on in the history of VFC. When the next Product 
Manager went on maternity leave, her replacement was not familiar with the procedures or history 
of the project, which caused further communication difficulties. 
Having established a relationship with Vodafone Ghana through the mNutrition programme, GSMA 
entered into exploratory discussions about engagement in forthcoming mAgri programmes. Early in 
2018, GSMA was conducting early-stage research into using mobile technology to digitise 
agricultural value chains and using data to create digital identities, which has since evolved into the 
AgriTech programme.6 Vodafone was involved in a short programme of field research that led to 
the eventual publication of a case study (Wasunna and Ngumi, 2019). The aspiration to digitise 
agricultural value chains aligned closely with emerging thinking on revising VFC. Internally, 
Vodafone even used the name Connected Farmer to refer to the revised VFC product, which was 
planned but never implemented. In sum, despite early enthusiasm from Vodafone, after key 
personnel moved on dialogue waned and ideas were not pursued.  
 Esoko 
Esoko was split into two companies in 2017. The baseline report described the Fasiba/Tulaa 
savings and loans platform, which held the promise of matching the most pressing needs among 
farmers identified by qualitative research. This was launched as Tulaa in Ghana in November 
2016. Around the same time as Tulaa was being developed, the team at Esoko realised that there 
was a commercial application for the platform that they had developed for farmer profiling as part 
of their longstanding market information service. This was developed as a survey application, and 
eventually launched under the Insyt brand.  
The two parts of the company separated in July 2017 when Tulaa was spun off as a separate 
entity, taking many of the Esoko staff with it. Miller-Wise (the ex-CEO) justified this on the basis of 
the two products having different customers and different business models: ‘The survey business 
is a pipeline business, while the m-commerce business is a platform model’.7 Later, she launched 
Tulaa in Kenya, where it has attracted funding and equity investment. However, the Tulaa 
operation in Ghana folded. At the time of writing the baseline report, Esoko and Vodafone were 
discussing ways of improving the VFC product and were excited about integrating the Tulaa 
savings and loans platform. These negotiations, however, faltered for a number of reasons.  
 
6 www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/agritech/ 
7 https://nextbillion.net/why-we-broke-up-the-company-a-former-ceo-of-m-agri-pioneer-esoko-explains/ 
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The company in Ghana retained the Esoko trading identity and continues to offer the survey 
product under the Insyt brand. They also continue to offer the market information system, bundled 
into other products.  
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5 Review of the business model  
This section summarises key observations made in the baseline report, supplemented with 
additional findings from the intervening period, as well as findings from both the qualitative and 
quantitative studies. An introduction to the canvas and a more detailed description of VFC, as it 
relates to the framework, are provided in Annex C.  
 Customer segments 
The primary target for VFC was articulated as 5 million smallholder farmers in Ghana, who account 
for 77% of the entire agricultural base in the country (GSMA, 2014). Three key segments were 
described, which are not mutually exclusive: 
• female farmers – estimated at 2.8 million (56% of the agricultural labour force); 
• semi-literate and illiterate smallholder farmers – estimated at 3.3 million (30% of the entire 
agricultural base is estimated to be illiterate), who also lack numerical skills; and 
• rural residents without access to mobile phones – estimated at 3.2 million. 
Migrating base customers (on other plans) onto VFC in late 2016 enabled Vodafone to reach the 
key performance indicators (KPIs). Initially this introduced a mix of non-farmer customers into the 
VFC base, which were then weeded out. 
Although the product was inclusive of women farmers, a number of factors make this difficult to 
achieve in practice. Mobile phone ownership is lower among women, men are more likely to adopt 
innovations, and literacy rates tend to be lower among women. Women were less likely to have 
used the service than men: 63% of men had used the service in the last 18 months compared with 
43% of women. This may reflect gendered aspects of cultural and economic characteristics rather 
than any shortcomings in the design of the VFC bundle.  For example, women were more likely to 
have had no access to a phone (32% of women who did not use the service, and 12% of men).  
Sharing of information between genders was uncommon. This implies that where women have no 
access to a phone, even if their husband signs up to VFC, they are not likely to access information. 
The study found that men usually shared with men while women shared with women, which is due 
to the cultural norm that adults who are married should not interact with the opposite sex. Women 
were more likely than men not to read the weather or market price information because they 
cannot read, and not to listen to voice messages because they do not have access to phones.  
Targeting rural residents without access to mobile phones assumes that there remains a potential 
customer base that still aspire to mobile ownership. However, the market in Ghana may be 
approaching saturation (Figure 3), and the qualitative research identified some resistance to mobile 
phone ownership, especially among the poor, who may feel subject to peer pressure yet can ill 
afford to pay for airtime (Barnett et al., 2017).  
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Figure 3: Mobile subscription rates per 100 people (Ghana)8 
 
Source: Authors’ own (updated 2019). 
 Value proposition 
The VFC bundle included the following components: 
• Weather information: three SMS messages in English with local weather information per 
week. ALINe (2016b) found weather to be the second most commonly used type of 
information.  
• Market price information: one SMS message in English with local market price information 
per week for a selected crop and selected market. ALINe found market prices to be the most 
commonly used type of information (ALINe, 2016b).  
• Agri and nutrition tips: one weekly recorded voice message in the selected local language 
with seasonal agricultural or nutrition tips (three agri tips and one nutrition tip per month) for the 
selected crop. Agri tips had limited appeal.  
• Access to Farmer Helpline call centre: free access to a call centre with advice available from 
an agricultural expert. Users mostly called the helpline for farming tips, and information from 
the call centre was felt to be most actionable. 
• Free community calling: free calls to other VFC users. 
• Discounted SMS and calls: to non-VFC members.  
 
Innovative features in the application distinguishing this from competitor services were: 
• a platform for peer-to-peer sharing and learning – free community calling; and 
• a more active engagement than just receiving voice and SMS calls – helpline, free calling to 
other farmers, mobile money transactions, and content tailored to crops/livestock and to 
location. 
 
Subscribers were, however, not fully aware of the features available within the VFC bundle. 
Different agencies marketed the VFC product differently, e.g. OSJ agency customers were more 
likely to be aware of the content elements of the product, whereas those signed up by Vodafone’s 
 
8 World Bank data. 
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below-the-line efforts were more likely to be aware of free and discounted calls. Many customers 
were unaware of any of the benefits of VFC. 
Surveys indicate that the most commonly reported behaviour change among users was 
negotiating a better price at markets. Other commonly reported changes included changing the 
way they keep their soil fertile and using weather information to change the timing of farming 
activities. 
Esoko identified that VFC was experiencing a high number of hang-ups of voice calls. A phone 
survey in November 2017 showed that most subscribers did not know about VFC and they did not 
want to be on the product. They also found that Vodafone’s deactivation code (9090) was not 
working. 
The quantitative study showed that making calls and texts to friends or family was by far the most 
frequently used function, with 24.6% of households using it every day. Note that it is not clear if 
these calls were made on the Closed User Group (CUG) or if they used airtime; however, the low 
airtime expenditure figures suggest intensive calling is likely to be on the CUG. Among the 
information-related push-type services, the agriculture and nutrition tips were most popular:  
• 73% listened to the agriculture and nutrition voice messages always or often; 
• 55.4% read the weather messages always or very often; 
• 54.2% read the market price messages always or often; and 
• 36.2% had used the call centre to speak with an agricultural expert.  
 
The main reasons for not listening to the tips (by outbound dialling (OBD) in local languages) were 
weak service and not having access to a phone. The main reason for not reading weather and 
market price information (by SMS in English) was not being able to read English. The main reason 
for not using the call centre was not knowing that it was available. Overall, these results suggest 
that voice messages in the local language was a better platform than SMS in English for delivering 
content. However, this is a substantially more expensive medium. 
Among those respondents who used each of the information services offered under VFC, the call 
centre was the most highly regarded. Tips on agriculture and nutrition were the next most popular, 
while weather and market prices were least valued (see Table 3). Even though farmers who used 
the call centre found the information to be very useful, among all users it was regarded as the least 
useful aspect of the service, and agriculture tips were most useful (see Table 4). The relatively low 
rankings given to weather, market prices, and nutrition tips suggest that farmers already have 
access to weather and market prices, and they are not interested in nutrition tips. Overall quality 
scores for all aspects of the services were good (Figure 4).  
Table 3:  Perceived value of information services 
Information service n Value of information Trust in information+ 
Call centre 234 96%** 94% 
Agriculture and nutrition tips 582 72%* 81% 
Weather  594 57%* 69% 
Market prices 576 51%* 64% 
* Always or very often found the information useful. 
** Found advice from the agriculture expert useful. 
+ Agrees that they trust and feel confident in information provided by VFC. 
Source:  Authors’ own, based on Billings et al. (forthcoming, 2020) 
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Table 4:  Most useful aspects of the VFC service (n=646) 
VFC feature Proportion who found it most useful 
Agriculture tips 55% 
Weather information 12% 
Market prices 10% 
Nutritional tips 8% 
Free calls 3% 
Discounted calls 3% 
Call centre 2% 
Other 8% 
Total 100% 
 
Source:  Authors’ own, based on Billings et al. (forthcoming, 2020) 
Figure 4:  Reported quality scores9, by gender 
   
Source: Billings et al., (forthcoming, 2020). 
The key metric used by the mNutrition M&E was behaviour change: did farmers change their 
behaviour as a result of receiving information through VFC? According to ALINe (2016b) found 
97% of users reported some kind of behaviour change. The figures obtained by the quantitative 
study are also high, but not quite so optimistic (e.g. 75% of respondents reported changed 
behaviour related to agriculture and nutrition tips). This can be explained by differences in the 
sample selection between the two survey techniques. 
 
9 On a scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high).  
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Respondents to the qualitative study felt VFC had helped them to increase their yields and improve 
their food storage and land preparation practices. However, the quantitative study found that use of 
VFC (at least once in 18 months) had minimal impact on the primary outcomes of household and 
women’s dietary diversity, agriculture production, or nutrition or farming knowledge. Findings from 
Barnett et al.,’s (2018) study confirm that information on agricultural tips, weather, and market 
prices was all regarded as useful, but actual benefits were aspirational: ‘they continue to use the 
VFC services with the hope that they can increase yields and reduce postharvest losses’.  
All of these positive metrics are at odds with the weak WTP for the service, which was evident 
when the subscription fee was reintroduced, and two-thirds of users left the service. It is likely that 
shifting prices confused customers, who had come to expect the service to be free after the 
subscription fee was temporarily dropped.  
 Channels 
The main channels through which customers come into contact with Vodafone are as follows: 
• Customer acquisition – enrolling in the club (SIM registration). There were originally three 
channels through which Vodafone acquired VFC members: 
 Agents – two agents were employed (one in the north, one in the south) to promote VFC by 
moving from village to village.  
 Freelancers – Vodafone employ around 3,000 individuals to go out into communities and 
promote Vodafone products in general, rather than only VFC. They represent the ‘business 
as usual’ acquisition vehicle. 
 There are also ‘retailers’ – these are stationary (e.g. a table at a market). There are 30,000 
of them, but most are in urban areas, so only relatively few in rural areas have been trained 
and equipped to sell VFC.  
The highest number of acquisitions were achieved by agents, followed by freelancers – few 
were brought on by retailers. The cost per acquisition is also highest for agents. 
• Registration or profiling – once enrolled, farmers need to enter details of their farming 
practice in order for the Esoko system to send them information tailored to their needs. VFC 
has struggled with the onboarding and profiling of farmers. Field agents did a poor job because 
incentives were based on the number of farmers signed up. Then an automated profiling 
process allocated a ‘typical’ profile based on the geographical location. Detailed profiling could 
then be done by farmers calling the call centre, Esoko calling farmers, or by the agents, but 
each of these had shortcomings. 
• Helpline – free access to agricultural experts in Esoko’s call centre. Farmers appreciated being 
able to speak to a real person. The qualitative research found that by the time of the endline 
study most were aware of the call centre, even though few actually used it.  
• Payment – airtime vendors and automated billing systems. VFC struggled with devising an 
effective payment mechanism. Initially, farmers had to make a payment each month (manual 
renewal), but dropout rates were high, and farmers did not understand the system well. An 
autorenewal service was introduced in late 2015, but again farmers did not understand the 
system and further tweaks were made. Farmers struggled to pay GHS 2 per month, not 
necessarily because it was too expensive but because they were not accustomed to the 
concept of paying a monthly subscription for a service (reinforced by the fact that 98% use 
prepaid mobiles). 
• The automated services themselves (voice and SMS messages). There are strong indications 
from the qualitative research that farmers prefer voice messages, preferably in local languages. 
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As most farmers are illiterate, information sent to the farmers via SMS text messages is unlikely 
to be read. 
 
The qualitative research found that farmers engage well with OBD voice messages in local dialect 
and that these were the most used feature of the VFC bundle. However, Esoko found that farmers 
were not listening to these messages. When conducting research to understand why not, they 
found that there were two groups of users: 
• Those who were not farmers – they found rural agents were simply giving customers VFC SIMs 
without checking they were farmers, or explaining the full features of the VFC bundle.  
• Farmers who wanted the information but for whom the timing was wrong, e.g. messages came 
through when they were out in the fields.  
 
The reach of the SMS-based services (weather and market prices) is limited as most farmers 
indicated that they cannot read or understand English. Those who do make use of the SMS 
services mostly depend on friends and family who are literate in English. Within a context of 
declining access to traditional sources of information such as government extension workers and 
radio, respondents to the qualitative study felt that mobile-based information on its own can still be 
useful. Note that even if text messaging is not regarded as the most important source of 
information, it can still play a part in behaviour change by reinforcing messages from other sources 
and providing supplementary information.  
The quantitative study found that only 50% of participants who had registered for the VFC service 
reported that someone in the household had actually used the service in the last 18 months.10 The 
main reason given for not using the services was losing or not using the SIM, followed by not 
having access to a phone. Other reasons included faulty phones and poor network connectivity.  
 Customer relationships 
The call centre facility offered a means of establishing personal relationships with customers. 
However, the endline quantitative study found that only 26% of VFC members called the call 
centre. Initial ideas of fostering personal relationships through local ambassadors did not 
materialise. Moreover, agents were transient and present only during the launch phase of the 
product, leaving freelancers and retailers, neither of whom were fully engaged with the VFC 
product.  
From early on in the VFC journey, Vodafone was aware that payment mechanisms were a 
problem. For example, in 2015 ALINe showed that most people who tried VFC but failed to re-
subscribe either did not know how to re-subscribe or were simply unaware of the need to do so 
(ALINe, 2015). An autorenewal system introduced in 2015 met with some success but research 
from 2016 showed that most users (62%) still did not know how to pay for the service (ALINe, 
2016a). 
Qualitative research indicates that people in rural areas with poor connectivity tend to feel ‘trapped’ 
in their choice of MNO by network coverage and signal availability. This suggests that there is little 
point in Vodafone investing in improving the customer relationship as it has little influence on 
customer retention. Despite this, the quantitative study found that VFC users were more likely to 
 
10 Under the encouragement design process, 91.5% of treatment households agreed to be registered and were given a 
VFC SIM. Uptake among this passively registered group will not be representative of the wider base of VFC customers. 
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use Vodafone as their main network provider (primary SIM) – an increase of 9% (for both women 
and men).  
 Revenue streams 
The original business model was built on generating direct revenue from both airtime and 
subscription fees. During the life of VFC, pricing models have changed. In October 2016, the 
subscription fee of GHS 2 per month was dropped to meet subscriber number targets. Then a 
subscription charge was reintroduced in June 2017, albeit at a much lower rate (GHS 0.50 per 
month).  
A WTP experiment was carried out as part of the baseline quantitative research (Billings et al., 
2017). This suggests that most farmers (over 85%) are willing to pay a small subscription fee (up to 
1 GHS/month), but that demand drops dramatically at prices beyond 1 GHS/month, such that only 
50% were willing to pay 2 GHS/month. Although these may seem like low subscription rates, they 
should be considered in the context of an ARPU for VFC users of only 2.5 GHS/month. 
Vodafone report ARPU for the VFC base as GHS 2.5 per month. However, the quantitative study 
found much higher levels of expenditure: GHS 11 per month among women and GHS 27 per 
month among men. Note that this is their entire expenditure, which will be spread across multiple 
SIMs.  
 Indirect benefits 
The primary aim of Vodafone was to increase its rural customer base by offering a low-cost, high-
value product to smallholder farmers who were not yet signed up with a mobile operator. The 
quantitative study does not provide any evidence that this strategy has been successful within the 
communities sampled.  
Nonetheless, the VFC offer led to significant increases in the stickiness of the Vodafone network: 
• VFC users were more likely to use Vodafone as their main network provider (primary SIM) – an 
increase of 9% (for both women and men). Given that 20% of women and 22% of men in the 
comparison group used a Vodafone SIM as their main SIM, this represents an increase of 
roughly 43%. 
• The proportion of phone numbers owned by an individual on the Vodafone network increased 
by 9.6 and 11.4 percentage points for women and men respectively. Given that the proportions 
of phone numbers on the Vodafone network were 20% among women and 22% among men in 
the comparison group, this represents an increase of roughly 50%. 
 
However, there is no evidence that SIM turnover is lower among VFC users: 77% of women and 
89% of men in the comparison group have had their SIM for over a year, and rates were similar 
among the encouragement group. The qualitative research confirmed that the majority of farmers 
own multiple SIMs, and deciding which SIM to use was based mostly on network availability. 
There is no evidence that the VFC led to any increase in ARPU. The VFC service did not increase 
usage in terms of making or receiving calls, sending or receiving text messages, or total amount 
spent on airtime.  
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Levels of customer satisfaction were generally high: 83% of women and 91% of men said that they 
were likely to recommend their main network provider to their friends or family. However, being 
offered the VFC service had no impact on this customer satisfaction metric among women, but 
significantly decreased satisfaction ratings among men.  
In terms of branding, the qualitative study found that notwithstanding complaints about poor 
network quality, users largely expressed positive sentiments concerning the Vodafone network, 
describing it as the one that cared for the needs of farmers and asserting that VFC has been 
beneficial to farmers. 
 Key resources 
The resources contributed to the product by each of the partners are summarised in Table 5. 
Table 5: Summary of resources brought by key VFC partners 
 Vodafone Esoko GSMA / GAIN and partners 
Physical 
Network 
infrastructure 
Billing systems 
Call centre 
Software platform 
 
Intellectual 
Brand 
Customer base 
Agricultural content database 
Experience of working with agri 
VAS 
Experienced staff 
Nutrition content 
Quality control processes 
Human 
Product 
development 
Experienced staff 
Marketing 
 
Expert network 
Software developers 
Network of market enumerators 
UX researchers 
Business intelligence 
Monitoring, evaluation, and 
learning  
Business consultancy 
Source:  Authors’ own 
The VFC partnership offered Esoko a route to scale because Vodafone offers nationwide reach 
(infrastructure), can push services to existing customers (customer base), and has systems that 
deal with billing, micro-payments and marketing (a network of 3,000 regional freelancers and up to 
30,000 point-of-sale agents; see Section 4). 
Esoko had a long track record of working with agri VAS, having set up Tradenet in Ghana over 10 
years ago. It provided the technology platform and a database of agricultural content as well as 
staff to manage the localisation of agriculture and nutrition tips. Esoko’s Expert Network proved to 
be a particularly valuable resource for quality control. Esoko also had a network of enumerators 
providing data on market prices from markets across Ghana. 
Vodafone found it difficult to justify allocating management resources to VFC. The VFC base was 
running at around 70,000 active subscribers, which represents less than 1% of a total of 7.9 million 
mass market customers. This made it impossible to justify a marketing budget, and with a team of 
five staff members, the manager could not justify allocating meaningful staff time to VFC. 
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 Key activities 
Key activities carried out by each of the partners are summarised in Table 6. 
Table 6: Summary of activities conducted by key VFC partners 
 Vodafone Esoko GSMA / GAIN 
Platform/network 
Operate network 
Billing customers 
Operate Esoko platform 
(distribute content) 
Continuous product 
feedback from users 
Production  
Create content 
Aggregate and localise 
content continuously 
(weather and market prices) 
Update advisory and 
nutritional content 
Maintain call centre 
Create content 
Marketing 
Customer acquisition 
Customer retention 
Customer profiling 
Continuous feedback 
from users 
Source:  Authors’ own 
Vodafone deals with customer acquisition and registering new SIMs. The Esoko platform requires 
farmers to be profiled. Data suggest that up to one-third of SIMs were not successfully registered. 
Then only one-third of VFC customers were successfully profiled by Esoko, which appears to be 
due to the two-stage (manual) process of porting numbers from Vodafone into the Esoko platform. 
Consumers also complain of poor network quality.  
Research highlighted a need for ongoing customer education, e.g. customers were not aware of 
how to pay their fees, nor of the functionalities available in the VFC bundle. 
Content creation (agriculture and nutrition tips) has been managed by GAIN in a two-part process 
of global and local content generation, with Esoko responsible for local content generation. CABI 
has pointed out that content cannot be regarded as a static commodity because, as local 
conditions change, it will go out of date. It will therefore be necessary to continually update content 
to address new challenges, changes in policy, advances in knowledge and technology, and so on.  
 Key partnerships 
Parties to the partnership model are illustrated in Figure 5. The nature of the relationships between 
different sets of partners are summarised in Table 7. 
Mobile phones, nutrition, and agriculture in Ghana: Business modelling endline report 
e-Pact  26 
Figure 5: Partners and other key players 
  
Source: GSMA (2016a). Reproduced with permission. 
Table 7: What parties give and get from partnership relationships 
Partnership Contribution of parties Type 
 First set of partners 
Second set of 
partners 
 
Vodafone – Esoko 
Vodafone: Reach, 
marketing (customer 
acquisition), billing 
Esoko: Agricultural 
expertise and database 
(content), content 
platform, content 
management 
Symbiotic, acquisition of 
resources; Vodafone want 
VAS, Esoko want scale 
Vodafone – GSMA Vodafone: project lead 
GSMA: funding, 
technical assistance 
Symbiotic: reduces risk to 
Vodafone of new product; VFC 
contributes to GSMA 
development strategy 
GSMA – GAIN 
GSMA: funding, project 
management 
GAIN: agricultural 
content expertise 
Symbiotic: open-access 
database fits GAIN mandate, 
and adds value to mNutrition 
project 
Esoko – Expert 
Network 
Esoko: financial 
compensation 
Network members: 
refine product (reduce 
risk), credibility 
Symbiotic: VFC contributes to 
members’ mandate to improve 
agriculture 
GSMA – Frog GSMA: funding Frog: design resources Contractual 
Vodafone – Cobalt Vodafone: funding 
Cobalt: design 
resources 
Contractual 
Vodafone – 
Agents 
Vodafone: funding 
Agents: marketing 
resources 
Contractual 
Source:  Authors’ own 
When VFC was launched, Esoko entered into a two-year contract with Vodafone. This was 
followed by a one year contract, which was then extended twice into early 2019. The contract was 
then not renewed, so the product was paused in January 2019. 
The partnership relationship between Vodafone and Esoko was a contractual one and was 
reported to have deteriorated over the course of the project, mainly due to personnel issues. 
Esoko has continued to deploy its core market information system in collaboration with other 
programmes in parallel with VFC. For example, the multi-donor-funded Agricultural Development 
and Value Chain Enhancement Project commissioned Esoko to disseminate market and weather 
information and agriculture tips to 20,000 farmers in Ghana.  
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 Cost structure 
Vodafone has shared the final financial report that was submitted to GSMA under their grant 
agreement. This has been used as a source of much of the cost data for the financial model 
described in Section 6.  
Voice messages sent out to farmers were well received (Barnett et al., 2018), but they are 
expensive. MNO charges are roughly GHS 1 per minute for voice messages, compared with GHS 
0.05 per SMS (i.e. 20 times the cost). All of these costs were covered by Vodafone. The cost of 
developing text for messages was covered by funding from GSMA through GAIN, but Esoko 
covered the cost of recordings for OBD messaging. 
The value of SMS messages delivered was the largest single cost component, when SMS 
messages were priced at the prevailing market rate for individual customers (GHS 0.055 per text). 
Even if bulk purchasing prices were used and these costs halved, they would still represent the 
largest single cost component.  
Esoko originally received GHS 1.50 per subscriber, but under the new contract this was reduced to 
GHS 0.40. There is a tiered payment structure, but these figures are rough averages. Vodafone 
considered various ways of making VFC more profitable, such as moving to an alternative content 
provider at lower cost, and recreating the mNutrition database internally.  
 Investment 
In addition to those costs directly associated with VFC (both operating and capital), FCDO and 
GSMA have invested in wider programmatic costs that have stimulated and supported this action. 
It is worth noting too that Esoko has a history of investments made over the years by the founder, 
equity investors, programme partners, and various donors.  
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6 Financial viability of business models 
 The VFC journey 
It can be argued that although VFC went through three pricing structure iterations, these 
represented only two distinct models. When first launched, the monthly subscription rate was 
relatively high at GHS 2 per month, and this revenue was shared more or less equally with Esoko, 
the content provider, under the sub-contract agreement. Toward the end of 2016, when the 
subscriber numbers were substantially short of the initial target of 400,000, negotiations with 
GSMA resulted in a revised target of 200,000 subscribers, which was achieved (among other 
measures) by eliminating the subscription fee altogether. A much-reduced subscription fee of GHS 
0.5 per month was then introduced, but under a revised contract agreement with Esoko in which 
almost all of this revenue was passed on to the content provider.  
The first and third iterations represent subscription models, with differing degrees of revenue share 
between the MNO and the content provider. The second iteration represents a freemium type 
model: customers were able to access the VFC features for free, but then had to pay for additional 
mobile phone services, i.e. airtime, which represents the revenue stream for Vodafone.  
These three distinct phases in the VFC journey resulted in an unusual profile of subscriber 
numbers11 (see Figure 6). A financial analysis based on actual costs has been carried out on each 
phase. Financial data provided by Vodafone and GSMA has been used to create a financial model, 
which has been used to model the financial viability of each of the three iterations. 
Figure 6:  Estimated profile of subscriber numbers (quarter 3, 2015 to quarter 4, 2018) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
 
 
11 This profile has been generated to reflect subscriber numbers reported by Vodafone at different points in time over the 
duration of the evaluation project.  
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 The financial model 
The model calculates two key metrics: net present value of investment in the product and the IRR. 
It is based on the cost structure and cost data provided by Vodafone to GSMA in the final financial 
return,12 supplemented by data gathered through interviews.  
Key to the model is the estimated profile of subscriber numbers. An analysis of subscriber number 
profiles among all agricultural projects within the mNutrition programme is presented in Section 8. 
This suggests that expenditure on customer acquisition activities during the early stages of product 
launch can achieve exponential growth during a rapid growth period. Thereafter, growth continues 
on a straight-line basis as the product enters a more mature phase. The following analysis is based 
on the profile presented in Figure 7, which results in a subscriber base of 270,000 after a four-year 
period. 
Figure 7:  Estimated subscriber numbers profile for four-year period 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
Cash flow is calculated from estimates of revenues and variable costs, which depend on the 
customer numbers profile, as well as fixed costs. Details of cost components and estimates based 
on financial records from VFC are presented in Annex D.  
Cash flow (Operating profit) = Revenue – Cost of sales – Fixed costs 
Revenue: 
• Subscription fees 
• Airtime expenditure  
Cost of sales: 
• Cost of SMS – nominal value to MNO of text messages sent to customers 
• Taxes and fees – any product is expected to contribute to group taxes 
• Content provider – revenue share of subscription fees with content provider 
• Call centre – contribution to cover cost of call centre operator (third party) 
• Cost of scratch cards – branded airtime scratch cards 
 
12 Internal document. 
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• Sales commission – paid to agents 
Fixed costs: 
• Product development – in-house UX design, M&E, and content curation 
• Marketing expenses – merchandising and field presence 
• Administration expenses – project management, support staff, and training 
This analysis considers the viability of the agricultural information product to the MNO. Therefore, it 
considers investment costs incurred in developing the product for roll-out in a specific country. The 
following investment costs have been included in the model (see Annex D): 
• technology – integration of content provider into operator network and SIM Application Toolkit 
(STK) set-up;  
• localisation of content – e.g. developing appropriate messages and seeking necessary 
approvals; and 
• support service provided by the mNutrition programme – e.g. formative evaluation and UX 
consultants. 
 Subscription model 
The country-specific investment costs outlined above total £387,000. Based on the original 
subscriber price of GHS 2 per subscriber per month, this gives a total projected revenue over a 
four-year product lifetime of £7.8 million, with 56% from airtime and 44% from subscription fees. 
The IRR on this investment would be an attractive 80%, but in practice Vodafone was not able to 
achieve these subscriber numbers at this subscription rate.  
At the reduced subscription rate of GHS 0.5 per subscriber per month, revenue drops to £5.2 
million, with only 17% raised from subscriptions. Assuming that the amount passed on to the 
content provider was also GHS 0.5 per subscriber per month (i.e. 100% revenue share), then the 
IRR on the investment drops to 22%. Given that revenue is dominated by ARPU, the financial 
performance is not highly sensitive to revenue share with the content provider. If the revenue share 
was 30%, for example, the IRR would increase only to 44%. However, this is valid only if a 
subscriber base of 270,000 can be achieved after four years. Since reintroducing the subscription 
fee, and reducing the amount paid to Esoko, the subscriber base has fallen to nearer 60,000. After 
the launch period, this level of demand demonstrates a positive contribution margin but has a 
negative cash flow over the four-year period, i.e. it is not sustainable. Figure 8 indicates that 
charging the reduced subscription rate (and paying 0.5 GHS per subscriber per month to Esoko) 
starts to become financially viable only if subscriber numbers of over 200,000 can be achieved. 
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Figure 8:  Sensitivity of IRR to subscriber numbers (low subscription rate) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
Note that at the end of 2018, with a reduced subscriber base of approximately 60,000, Vodafone 
reckoned that the contribution margin of VFC was 64%, which is well within the target range 
normally expected for the mass market segment (60–70%). Entering these assumptions into the 
model gives a contribution margin lower than that reported by Vodafone, indicating that the model 
is somewhat conservative.  
 Freemium model 
The country-specific investment remains at £387,000. With no subscription revenue, the airtime 
revenue drops to £4.3 million, resulting in an operating loss over a four-year lifetime. This appears 
to confirm that Vodafone was right to say that the content provider costs were not sustainable 
(based on the original contract price of GHS 0.85 per subscriber per month).  
The sensitivity analysis presented in Figure 9 suggests that if the revenue share to the content 
provider were reduced to around GHS 0.2 per subscriber per month, the investment might start to 
look attractive, given an assumed subscriber base of 270,000.  
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Figure 9:  Sensitivity of IRR to revenue share with content provider 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
A freemium model is driven by revenue generated from additional services, which is expenditure 
on airtime in this instance. The figures above are based on the reported ARPU of GHS 2.5 per 
month. However, this is for a particularly low-income segment of mass market customers. Figure 
10 suggests that financial viability is highly sensitive to ARPU, so if the product could attract a 
slightly higher status market segment with an ARPU of GHS 3.5 per month, this would be enough 
to make even a freemium model financially attractive. 
Figure 10:  Sensitivity of IRR to ARPU (freemium model) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
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 Sensitivity to cost of sales 
The relative weights of different components of operational expenditure are illustrated in Figure 11. 
These figures are based on assumptions representing the low subscription rate model, and show 
how operational expenditures are dominated by the cost to the MNO of sending SMS messages to 
subscribers. 
Figure 11:  Operational expenditures (summed over four-year lifetime) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
What is the real cost of sending an SMS? In a study on the impact of consumer consumption of 
network services (voice, SMS, and data) on network profitability, Blackburn et al., (2013) highlight 
a trend toward flat-rate pricing (as opposed to pay-as-you-go). They point out that one feature that 
makes this attractive to operators is that the cost of delivery is a small fraction of the retail price. 
Keshav (2009) concluded that the cost of sending an SMS message was likely to be less than 
0.003 USD/SMS, or 2% of the per unit price charged to pay-as-you-go customers. Lack of clarity 
on the true cost of sending an SMS message continues to plague development cost modelling. For 
example, in a study of an mHealth intervention in Tanzania, Mangaone et al., (2016) modelled 
scenarios using standard SMS charge rates (0.03 USD/SMS) along with reduced rates (0.02 
USD/SMS and 0.01 USD/SMS) representing negotiated bulk purchasing agreements.   
The analysis up to this point has been based on a figure of GHS 0.055 per SMS, which is the price 
that an individual customer would pay to send an SMS and is quoted by the MNO on their website; 
it can be interpreted as representing the opportunity cost to the MNO. However, given that the 
MNO is sending out messages to thousands of subscribers, it could be argued that a bulk SMS 
price would be more realistic: a figure of GHS 0.03 per SMS was quoted in the baseline report.  
Figure 12 shows how returns on the investment look much more attractive at this level of SMS 
price.  
Where an intervention purchases SMS messages, through a negotiated bulk purchase agreement, 
for example, the cost represents a real cost to the implementing agency. This is not the case with 
VFC, where the messages are sent by the mobile operator. The fact that Vodafone omitted the 
cost of sending SMS messages from its financial report to GSMA indicates that this action does not 
incur a real cost, which highlights the difficulty in attributing a meaningful cost to an operator of 
sending messages. If the real cost of SMS messages is discounted still further, even the freemium 
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model (with GHS 0.85 per subscriber per month paid to the content provider) can show a 
reasonable rate of return – see Figure 12. 
Figure 12:  Sensitivity of IRR to SMS price (low subscription and freemium models) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
 
 Understanding subscribers 
When the VFC product was first conceived, it was clearly targeted at low-income, small-scale 
farmers, inclusive of women. The product was intended as a vehicle for attracting the last 
remaining consumers without phones (the so-called ‘laggards’) to subscribe to the Vodafone 
network. The revenue generated by each new customer therefore represents additional revenue to 
Vodafone.  
When Vodafone revised the product in order to boost subscriber numbers toward the end of 2016, 
it not only removed the subscription fee (temporarily) but also relaxed the eligibility criteria. 
Eligibility was revised to include low-value customers from the existing Vodafone customer base. 
Near-dormant SIM cards received a blast SMS inviting these existing customers to change to the 
VFC product. However, it became apparent that many of these new subscribers were urban-based 
and data suggested they had signed up mainly to take advantage of the CUG free voice calls. 
From their behaviour, Vodafone concluded there were few farmers signing up to benefit from the 
content. It then improved the subscriber base by moving non-farmers to another more relevant 
tariff, and refined the criteria used to send invitations to existing users, which were made on a 
stronger geographical basis.  
This illustrates a potential threat to revenue by migrating existing customers from one product to 
another. If the new service offers additional features that are sufficiently attractive to command 
higher charges, then migrating customers to the new service would generate positive marginal 
revenue. However, if the charges associated with the new service are lower than those originally 
charged, then migrating customers will result in a negative marginal revenue. This is likely to have 
been the case when Vodafone invited existing customers to sign up for VFC because the VFC 
bundle included free group calls as well as discounted tariffs outside the group. This appears to be 
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consistent with figures provided by Vodafone – ARPU for the mass market segment as a whole 
runs at around GHS 3 per month, whereas ARPU for VFC was around GHS 2.5 per month. 
An attractive product can also persuade competing networks’ subscribers to migrate to Vodafone. 
In this instance, the ARPU of these new subscribers represents additional revenue to Vodafone, in 
much the same way as people who have signed up for a mobile phone account for the first time. 
It is not clear how many of the subscribers gained during the ‘freemium’ model stage were previous 
Vodafone customers and how many were attracted from other networks by the free service. Nor 
can we say what the ARPU of Vodafone customers was before and after they signed up for VFC. 
The discussion of the freemium model in Section 6.4 suggests that the product would lose money if 
the content provider fee was fixed at GHS 0.85 per subscriber per month. Any provision for a 
negative marginal revenue to account for those Vodafone customers who simply changed from 
one plan to VFC would make the financial performance worse still.  
The IRR calculated for the low subscription model was 22% (based on a fee of GHS 0.5 per 
month, with 100% revenue share with the content provider). However, Figure 13 suggests that this 
is highly sensitive to the issue of simply getting existing customers to swap plans. If even 10% of 
subscribers were to have swapped from existing plans, then the product appears to lose money, at 
least from a group perspective. 
Figure 13:  Sensitivity of IRR to existing customers transferring from other plans (low 
subscription model) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
By September 2016, the planned marketing activities targeting low-income smallholder farmers 
had attracted approximately 70,000 users. As a result of restructuring the product, relaxing the 
eligibility criteria, and inviting existing customers to join, membership peaked at around 240,000 in 
October 2016. The difference of approximately 150,000 users represents roughly 60% of the peak 
membership. These additional subscribers will have comprised: 
• first-time mobile phone subscribers; 
• customers migrating from other MNOs; and 
• existing Vodafone customers transferring from other plans.  
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Without knowing the percentage breakdown, it is not possible to model the financial viability of the 
low subscription model. However, if these new customers were spread evenly across the three 
categories, then the proportion of new subscribers brought on to the network would be 80%. The 
effect of swapping existing customers would then ruin the financial viability of the product (see 
Figure 13). 
 Strategy for Value-Added Service (VAS) 
The previous section outlined that the original purpose of VFC was to be a vehicle for getting first-
time mobile phone users onto the Vodafone network. In this respect, the concept was appropriate 
at the time, when substantial numbers of the population were not yet mobile phone users. 
Penetration rates have continued to rise steadily over the six years since VFC was conceived, but 
may now have reached such high levels that they are levelling out (see Figure 3 and Figure 20). 
The original strategy for VAS was, therefore, appropriate at a given point in time, and only 
appropriate for a given duration, until the potential market of underserved consumers diminished. 
This is discussed in more detail in Section 7.2. 
In a mature market, in which almost all potential subscribers are signed up with one MNO or 
another, the strategy of VAS is to encourage subscribers on other networks to transfer, and to 
encourage network subscribers to stay with the MNO that provides a valuable service rather than 
switching to competing networks. 
 Demand scenarios (price elasticity of demand) 
Introduction 
Up to this point, the analysis has been based on the growth of subscriber numbers represented in 
Figure 7, resulting in 270,000 subscribers at the end of the four-year period. It has already been 
explained that the actual history of VFC subscribers is difficult to use in any analysis because of 
the changing nature of the product and how it was marketed. Clearly, demand for any product will 
be sensitive to price, but it is not clear from subscriber figures achieved by other mAgri products 
supported by the mNutrition programme that it is the dominant factor in determining the uptake of 
mAgri services. The highest uptake was achieved by the Khushaal Zaminder service offered by 
Telenor, Pakistan as a free service (8.6 million). However, among the subscription services, the 
highest subscriber numbers were achieved by Krishi Sheba in Bangladesh (430,000) and Govi 
Mithuru in Sri Lanka (580,000), both of which charged customers around 50% more than the cost 
of the VFC subscription (based on the GHS 0.5 per month fee rate).  
This, in essence, confirms that the success of a product is due to a combination of factors behind 
customer acquisition. Success is due to a high product value proposition, adequate pricing, 
appropriate marketing strategy, and effective service design, all of which had shortcomings in the 
VFC offering. It also suggests that to make a successful product requires good product 
development practice and processes, as well as a strong team, adequate organisational structure, 
and smart incentives for all staff involved in rolling out the product. Based on the model created to 
represent the operating finances of the VFC, this section considers the price elasticity of demand 
and the implications for financial viability. 
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Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
As part of the baseline survey, the independent study team conducted a WTP game designed to 
explore potential levels of demand for the VFC product at difference price points. The results in 
Figure 14 suggest that demand would drop substantially if the product were priced above GHS 2 
per month, and that demand would be high below a price point of GHS 1 per month. 
Figure 14: Results from WTP experiment (IFPRI) 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
Size of the potential market 
VFC achieved 70,000 subscribers at the GHS 2 per month price point. The WTP chart suggests 
that at a price point of GHS 2 per month, uptake would be 50%; however, this can only be 50% of 
those farmers effectively ‘reached’ by the product, i.e. farmers who have never heard of the 
product cannot elect to pay for it. Combining these two figures implies that the ‘pool’ of farmers 
reached is 140,000. This seems unrealistically low, given that the product went on to gain nearly 
250,000 subscribers when the combination of marketing initiatives was introduced to boost 
numbers.  
Comparing VFC with other mAgri projects suggests that VFC had the worst performance in terms 
of percentage of target market achieved (4.8%, compared to around 30% for subscription products 
in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh). However, it also implies that the target market identified by VFC 
seems more ambitious than those for other countries. Expressed as a proportion of the total rural 
population in the country, the target markets for other countries ranged from 1.7% to 4.4%, but the 
figure set for Ghana was 11.4%. 
Interestingly, if 2% of the rural population were to be used as a guideline for the target market, this 
would be equivalent to 257,600 – almost exactly what was achieved at the peak demand. This is 
the figure for eligible target market size that has been used in the following analysis. 
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WTP and revenue 
Figure 15 shows how the number of subscribers would be expected to vary with the subscription 
fee rate, according to the WTP findings presented in Figure 14. The figure also illustrates how 
revenue would be maximised at a high fee rate of GHS 2 per month. However, this considers only 
the revenue generated from subscriptions – even given an ARPU as low as GHS 2.5 per month, 
the revenue from airtime would be the dominant share of total revenue. 
Figure 15:  Variation of subscriber numbers and revenue with subscription fee 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
Variation of financial viability with subscription fee rates 
The financial model has been used to estimate the IRR of a product at different subscription fee 
rates and corresponding levels of demand, as presented above in Figure 15. A limited number of 
price points have been taken, and similar subscriber growth profiles created for each. These 
profiles were created using a two-year (eight-quarter) rapid growth stage; an example is presented 
in Figure 16. The financial performance figures were calculated for a four-year period. 
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Figure 16:  Subscriber numbers growth profile used in model 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
The results presented in Figure 17 below show that total revenue would be stronger below the 
GHS 2 per month price point, peaking at a fee rate of GHS 1 per month. The financial performance 
(the IRR), on the other hand, drops off at fee rates below GHS 1 per month. This is because 
although the revenue remains relatively constant (airtime revenue increases with increasing 
subscriber numbers at lower fee rates), the cost of sales increases with increased subscriber 
numbers. Note that these figures are based on a constant content provider fee rate of GHS 0.5 per 
subscriber per month, and an SMS cost to the MNO of GHS 0.055 per SMS.  
This figure thus suggests that the product would be most attractive if offered at a fee rate between 
GHS 1 and GHS 2 per month.  
Figure 17: Financial performance with varying price and demand 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
Figure 17 highlights an interesting dilemma for operators considering a social VAS. Based on the 
assumptions used, the analysis suggests that from an MNO’s point of view, the service becomes 
most commercially attractive at a fee rate of GHS 2 per month (given a revenue share with the 
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content provider of 25%). However, at this rate, it is likely to be adopted by fewer customers than if 
it were marketed at a lower fee rate. For example, at GHS 2 per month, the analysis indicates that 
the number of subscribers would be only 55% of the number of subscribers that might adopt for a 
service priced at GHS 0.5 per month. This illustrates a potential conflict between the development 
benefit (maximising the impact on smallholder farmers) and the commercial benefit (maximising 
return on investment). 
The original marketing activities acquired 70,000 VFC members. Then, after the change in product 
and marketing to reach the 200,000 target, the number of subscribers returned to around 60,000 
after a subscription fee was reintroduced (at GHS 0.5 per month). This would seem to indicate that 
VFC commands a loyal following of around 70,000 farmers (exhibiting inelastic demand), even 
though there is a known monthly attrition. The financial model indicates that with this number of 
subscribers, it is not possible to make a positive return at any tariff fee rate below GHS 3 per 
month. Furthermore, it indicates that, given a content provider fee of GHS 0.5 per subscriber per 
month, the product will not make a positive return even if the cost of SMS messages is reduced to 
zero. 
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7 Changes in the mobile for agriculture market 
 Vodafone and telecoms in Ghana 
According to the latest figures published by the regulator, the total number of mobile subscriptions 
rose from 36 million in April 2017 to 41 million in December 2018.13 Over this period, the population 
has also increased, from 28.3 million to 29.5 million (representing a growth rate of 2.6% per year). 
The mobile market continues to mature, as the penetration rate increased from 127% to 139%, and 
National Communication Authority (NCA) figures show that the rate of growth of mobile subscribers 
continues to slow down: 
• January 2015 to January 2016  15.7% (numbers increased by 4.8 million) 
• January 2016 to January 2017  9.5% (numbers increased by 3.4 million)  
• April 2017 to April 2018   7.9% (numbers increased by 2.8 million)  
A substantial change took place in the Ghana telecoms market when Tigo merged with Airtel in 
November 2017. MTN continues to have the largest market share, and has increased this share 
from 47.2% (April 2017) to 49.1% (December 2018) (see Figure 18). The consolidation of the two 
brands resulted in a modest drop in the combined market share (26.6% in April 2017 to 25.1% in 
December 2018), but this is still enough to push Vodafone into third place, at 24% market share; 
note that this is exactly the same as the company’s share in April 2017.  
Figure 18: Market share of voice subscribers (April 2017 and December 2018, derived from 
NCA data) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
In 2016, 39% of the population of Ghana was under the age of 15.14 If they are considered to be 
economically inactive and highly unlikely to own a mobile phone, then figures more accurately 
represent a penetration rate of 228%, meaning that adults typically own more than two SIMs. This 
tends to reflect a mature market, but also hides uncompetitive market conditions, notably restricted 
network coverage in certain areas and off-net tariff premiums (i.e. it costs more to call someone on 
a different network). There also remain parts of the population that lack access to mobile 
 
13 https://nca.org.gh/industry-data-2/market-share-statistics-2/telecom-voice/ 
14 www.demographicdividend.org/country_highlights/ghana/ 
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communications, but the Ghana Investment Fund for Electronic Communications (GIFEC) is 
mandated with increasing the access of those currently unconnected in Ghana. It is a partnership 
between government, MNOs, and private investors that administers the country’s universal access 
fund. It has set itself a target of reaching 95% access to mobile services in rural communities by 
2019.15  
Mobile internet subscribers have also grown over the period from 21.6 million in April 2017 to 26.2 
million in December 2018. Expressed as a share of mobile subscribers, internet use has increased 
from 60% to 64% of mobile subscribers. However, as with mobile subscriptions, the rate of growth 
of internet users has reduced, from 16% growth between April 2016 and April 2017 to 4.1% growth 
between April 2017 and April 2018.  
MTN has increased its market share from 56% to 60% over the previous 20 months – see Figure 
19. During this period, Vodafone’s market share has remained more or less constant at 17%.  
Figure 19: Market share of data subscribers (April 2017 and December 2018) 
 
Source: Authors’ own (NCA data). 
There is an appetite among mobile internet service providers to develop the data market. For 
example, GIFEC has partnered with Vodafone and GSMA in a project to increase rural access to 
the mobile internet. The partnership is to be funded under the Connected Society Innovation Fund 
for Rural Connectivity.16 The purpose of the programme is to enable mobile network equipment 
suppliers to test innovative solutions to extend internet coverage to remote areas lacking 
infrastructure. Vodafone has also recently announced a partnership with Facebook to deploy low-
cost wi-fi hotspots across the country, with a focus on underserved and underprivileged 
communities.17 
 
15 https://gifec.gov.gh/ 
16 https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/press-release/gsma-vodafone-and-gifec-partner-to-deliver-connectivity-to-rural-
communities/ 
17 https://wifinowevents.com/news-and-blog/vodafone-ghana-teams-up-with-facebook-for-nationwide-public-wi-fi/ 
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 Trends in mAgri Innovations 
Technology and mobile business models 
Mobile data use is set to grow. GSMA (2019) predicts that mobile data consumption across sub-
Saharan Africa will multiply seven-fold by 2024 (from 1.1 to 8.5 GB per subscriber per month). 
Although 4G is growing and there is much interest in 5G, 3G internet connections are likely to 
remain the dominant technology for the medium term. Multiple features are driving data usage (see 
Annex E for further detail): 
• Over the top (OTT) services continues to grow. In 2017, 32% of adults in Ghana used social 
networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter (Pew Research Center 2018). Use grew by 
50% in the two years since 2015.  
• Increased revenue from data services can more than make up for any decline in voice revenue 
from OTT services (Esselaar and Stork, 2018).  
• Entertainment services. TVs are becoming more widespread and the affluent are spending 
more time watching TV and video on mobile devices. 
• Smartphone sales are on the rise. Smartphone ownership stood at around 35% of adults in 
2017, marginally above the median for sub-Saharan Africa (33%) (Pew Research Center, 
2018). GSMA estimates that the number of handsets will more than double from 2018 to 2025. 
These factors suggest that mobile data use is set to grow.  
 
When the VFC concept was put together in 2013, the primary aim of Vodafone was to increase its 
rural base by specifically targeting new mobile subscribers from rural areas. This strategy is valid in 
a growing market but not in a mature market. GSMA research suggests the number of mobile 
users may already have plateaued (see Figure 20). The VFC concept was, therefore, appropriate 
at a given time, and for a given duration, i.e. until most people who aspired to own a mobile phone 
were already signed up.  
Figure 20: Saturation of mobile phone market in Ghana 
 
 
Source: Hatt et al., (2017). 
Vodafone’s priorities have changed. As the market has changed, Vodafone has shifted its priority 
from increasing its rural base to maximising revenue generated by that rural base. It plans to do 
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this by integrating a number of products based on different technologies. The six years from 2013 
to the present date is a long time in the world of telecommunications.  
Perhaps the most transformational technology that has blossomed since the baseline report is 
mobile money. Adoption of mobile money accounts increased from 13% of Ghanaians in 2014 to 
39% in 2017 (World Bank Group, 2019). Mobile money has been instrumental in increasing 
financial inclusion from 41% in 2010 to 58% in 2015. The mAgri industry has picked up on the 
possibilities for digitising financial transactions throughout the value chain and for offering a range 
of financial services to farmers. MTN mobile money is the market leader in Ghana, with Vodafone 
trailing, as Vodafone Cash was only launched late in 2015. 
 Agriculture and technology 
VFC is an example of an mAgri product that provides farmers with access to agricultural 
information, although VFC itself is a bundle that offers more. Davis and Franzel (2018) concluded 
that mobile phone-based systems have a role to play in agricultural extension and advisory 
services and that they do indeed represent a low cost per farmer for information dissemination. 
However, they are not best suited as a primary source of information. They tend to be most useful 
where they reinforce more conventional face-to-face interventions.  
The qualitative research shows that farmers’ top priority was access to financial services, notably 
credit and, to some extent, insurance, which most commonly comes in the form of guaranteed 
price agreements between farmers and buyers. Most respondents also complained that financial 
limitations were a major barrier preventing them from implementing the advice they obtained from 
VFC. GSMA also identified access to markets and finance as key challenges (Palmer & Darabian, 
2017a), but concluded that, in 2014, financial solutions were not scalable. Instead, GSMA argued 
that information-based services would provide systems that could subsequently be built on. This 
has proved to be exactly the case for Tulaa and Esoko.  
Annex E describes some examples of innovative services that illustrate how emerging mAgri 
products are tending to integrate financial and data capability into a broader range of farmer 
support services that address different parts of the value chain. These include, for example, 
financial profiling and savings schemes for unbanked customers (Tulaa), crop and livestock 
insurance (ACRE Africa), online trading platforms (Agrotrade), and logistics (TruckR).  
A much more detailed and comprehensive overview of emerging products is available from CTA 
(2019). In this publication, CTA makes a distinction between ICT4Ag products such as Esoko, 
which were mostly information dissemination VAS deployed in partnership with MNOs, and the 
new landscape of D4Ag innovations that use digital technologies and data to transform practices 
across the agricultural value chain (further detail is presented in Annex E). 
CTA (2019) points out that D4Ag enterprises are increasingly diversifying their business models 
and bundling services from multiple categories. This is interesting as social impact investors are 
coming to the view that start-ups that provide multiple services are likely to be better investments. 
This is partly a consequence of the cost of customer acquisition among smallholder farming 
communities. A user base represents an asset of value, which can then be exploited by providing 
multiple services or products. Emerging opportunities within the value chain is an area where 
GSMA has already done a good deal of research and continues to work with MNOs and 
entrepreneurs through the AgriTech programme.18 
 
 
18 www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/agritech/ 
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8 VFC in the context of other mNutrition projects 
 Overview of mNutrition projects 
Billings et al., (forthcoming, 2020) conclude that VFC has had little effect on primary nutrition and 
agricultural outcomes: ‘Being offered the VFC service or having used it at least once has minimal 
impacts on household and women’s dietary diversity, agriculture production, or nutrition or farming 
knowledge.’ However, in terms of implementation, VFC has not been the most successful of the 
mAgri projects, so it is important not to judge the viability of the concept deployed under the 
mNutrition programme (i.e. of using mobile technology to support smallholder farmers) solely on 
findings from the study on VFC. The purpose of this section is, therefore, to put the performance 
and structure of VFC into the broader context of other similar products supported through the 
mNutrition programme. Learning points from all six of the agriculture solutions supported under the 
mNutrition initiative are summarised in the GSMA report by Palmer and Darabian (2017a), which 
has been used as the source of much of the detail in this section. This has been supplemented by 
information from the six individual case studies published by GSMA. The six products are: 
• VFC (Vodafone, Ghana) – free calls to members, advice on crops, weather, and market prices 
available in 10 languages via SMS and OBD; 70,000 active users (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 
2017c). 
• Govi Mithuru (Dialog, Sri Lanka) – agricultural advice on eight crops, nutrition, and home 
gardening, with a focus on reducing chemical inputs; 252,000 active users (Palmer, T. and 
Darabian, N. 2017d). 
• GP Krishi Sheba (GrameenPhone, Bangladesh) – agricultural advice on 16 crops plus livestock 
via OBD; 432,000 active users (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017e). 
• M’chikumbe (Airtel, Malawi) – information on 15 crops and Airtel Money via IVR and SMS; 
90,000 active users (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017f). 
• Khushaal Zaminder (Telenor, Pakistan) – messages on agriculture plus livestock and weather 
via OBD, SMS, and IVR; 2,465,000 active users (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017b). 
• Site Pyo (Ooredoo, Myanmar) – smartphone app providing access to information on 10 crops 
and weather, supported by SMS reminders; 38,000 active users (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 
2017g). 
Further detail of the partnerships involved in each product are presented in Annex F. The Annex 
also includes a comparative analysis of key aspects of the products, which is summarised in the 
following section.  
 Comparing key aspects of mNutrition products 
Responsibility for product development 
Krishi Sheba (Bangladesh), Site Pyo (Myanmar), and VFC (Ghana) all relied on strategic partners 
to drive product development. In contrast, in two of the more successful products (Govi Mithuru in 
Sri Lanka and Khushaal Zaminder in Pakistan), the MNO sourced product development expertise 
internally. This led GSMA to conclude that MNO ownership and strong product development teams 
are key to success when the service is MNO-led. Where product development is driven by a 
strategic partner, the nature of the relationship is key. 
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GSMA concluded that ‘dynamic, informative push messages increase users’ engagement’ (Palmer 
& Darabian 2017a). Two of the most successful products included specific provision for stylisation 
partners (Sync Solutions in Sri Lanka and Planet Beyond in Pakistan) to do just that. 
GSMA concluded that an agile and user-centric product development process is key to success. 
Esoko had technical expertise, infrastructure, and a long track record so VFC was the first of the 
projects to launch. However, the nature of the partnership meant that it subsequently proved to be 
resistant to change. 
Top-level leadership for mNutrition projects 
Continuity of vision and leadership is a key factor in driving a new product, and was lacking in VFC. 
Vodafone experienced a high degree of staff turnover at all levels (see Section 4.2). The first new 
CEO introduced drastic changes to the VFC business model (although there were multiple factors 
behind this decision – see Section 4). The VFC product was paused shortly before the CEO 
changed again. In contrast, Telenor’s CEO was convinced of the commercial viability of the 
agricultural sector in Pakistan, as he set up a dedicated mAgri business unit. 
Technology platforms 
In two of the more successful products (Govi Mithuru in Sri Lanka and Khushaal Zaminder in 
Pakistan), the technology partner had an existing relationship with the MNO prior to the mNutrition 
partnership. Vodafone had no previous partnership with Esoko, and Esoko was unique among 
technical platform partners in providing services to farmers under its own brand prior to the 
partnership with Vodafone. 
Customer acquisition 
Face-to-face contact is highly valued by famers, especially in terms of building trust, but on-the-
ground marketing activities were universally found to be prohibitively expensive. Three projects 
tried working with field partners (NGOs) to facilitate a field presence, but with limited success. VFC 
worked through field agents but struggled to find incentives that got them to adhere to complex 
onboarding processes.  
Almost all the products initially had difficulty with the registration and onboarding processes, 
especially around the profiling of farmers. They all went on to devise some form of single click 
registration (including VFC). UX research conducted by other operators found that it was important 
for the pathway from registration to accessing data to be a short as possible. However, VFC had a 
two-step registration process (invisible to the user) whereby Vodafone passed details of registered 
customers to Esoko, who then entered them into the information dissemination platform. 
Customers could, therefore, wait up to seven days before receiving information. 
Early stage subscriber growth trends show that most projects grew at a similar exponential rate, 
but VFC and M’chikumbe in Malawi grew at a much slower rate. Only Khushaal Zaminder in 
Pakistan came close to reaching the estimated target market, so is the only programme in which 
subscriber growth might be expected to be restricted by saturating the potential market.  
VFC appears to have been unique in specifically targeting new mobile subscribers from rural 
areas. Given this target market, low-cost methods such as OBD/SMS campaigns were not an 
option.  
VFC was a complex product. Other products only provided farmers with information (e.g. 
agriculture, livestock, and weather). Only VFC and M’chikumbe also provided users with market 
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prices. VFC was more than a VAS – it was a bundle or customer plan. This contributed to some 
confusion over the identity of the product, as sales agents could sell VFC as a low-cost airtime 
product rather than as an agricultural VAS. 
Commercial viability 
VFC was unique in targeting new, rural customers not yet on any network. This segment will tend 
to generate low ARPU, and have low churn rates given that rural communities typically have only 
one reliable network. Other MNOs demonstrated the effectiveness of products in increasing the 
stickiness of customers (reduced churn) and increasing rural revenue (higher ARPU). These 
metrics are key in multi-SIM markets where customers tend to swap SIMs between operators.  
Govi Mithuru (Sri Lanka) and Krishi Sheba (Bangladesh) were justified in financial terms 
(breakeven and payback period), whereas free/freemium services such as M’chikumbe (Malawi), 
Khushaal Zaminder (Pakistan), and Site Pyo (Myanmar) were justified in terms of indirect benefits 
(ARPU and churn). The successful piloting of advertising by Khushaal Zaminder illustrated 
potential for monetising a rural customer base. 
mNutrition and capacity building 
Vodafone highlighted the UX work of Cobalt and Frog (funded by the mNutrition project) as being 
of particular value, and has since contracted in this kind of expertise to assist with the development 
of other products. Dialog in Sri Lanka has used product development and UX research 
methodologies introduced under the mNutrition programme to develop further products, using a 
mix of in-house and bought-in expertise. Telenor Pakistan internalised the mNutrition techniques 
and set up a dedicated design studio. 
The Advanced Analytics team within Telenor’s Business Intelligence team used innovative data-
modelling techniques to devise improved marketing methods.19 They created a model to identify 
existing Telenor customers likely to sign up to Khushaal Zaminder. They then launched an 
OBD/SMS marketing campaign targeting these customers, and found the conversion rate 
improved from 1% to over 5%. 
 
 
 
19 www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/country/pakistan/telenor-pakistan-uses-data-science-and-analytics-to-boost-
mAgri-uptake/ 
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9 Discussion 
 Sustainable business models 
For a while, VFC was offered as a free product. Financial modelling shows that this was not 
financially sustainable, at least not on the basis of the assumptions made about costs and the 
customer base. However, it also showed that financial performance was highly sensitive to ARPU 
from this base. This suggests that if the product could be marketed to a slightly higher status 
market segment (with higher ARPU), this would be enough to make even a freemium model 
financially attractive. 
The subscription model did not work at a subscription rate of GHS 2 per month because subscriber 
numbers were too low. There are multiple reasons behind this, relating not only to WTP but also to 
problems with marketing through agents and freelancers, and with registration and onboarding. At 
this subscription level, 44% of revenue was generated from fees. However, even at a lower 
subscription rate (GHS 0.50 per month), the subscriber numbers were similar, at around 60,000, 
while fees generated only 17% of revenue. The service was not financially viable under these 
conditions either.  
The level of subscriber numbers at the lower fee rate was similar to the number achieved at the 
higher rate. This is due to multiple effects, such as customer confusion over pricing, mis-selling by 
agents, problems with onboarding, payment mechanisms, etc. However, what if higher subscriber 
numbers could be achieved? Estimates have been made of a potential rural market of 260,000 and 
combined with results from a WTP experiment, as well as assuming that all of the potential market 
can be ‘reached’ so they can make an informed decision to subscribe or not. Modelling indicates 
that a subscription model could be financially viable at a fee rate of GHS 1 per month, reaching 
around 80% of the potential market. There is another peak in financial return at a fee rate of GHS 2 
per month, but due to the elasticity of demand predicted by the WTP experiment the product would 
only be taken up by 50% of the potential market. This illustrates a potential for disconnect between 
commercial ways of working (maximising financial return) and donor ways of working (maximising 
social impact). 
One of the premises of the mNutrition programme was that business models should be financially 
viable. This is often assumed by the casual observer to mean that farmers should pay for the 
service, and there is a view that offering farmers information for free is not sustainable. Experience 
from the mNutrition programme suggests this is not necessarily the case. For example, Khushaal 
Zaminder (Telenor, Pakistan) and Site Pyo (Ooredoo, Myanmar) both offered the product for free. 
Khushaal Zaminder in particular has been hugely successful and prompted the development of 
further agricultural services. Certainly, GSMA throughout the programme has been fully aware that 
free services can be financially viable through indirect benefits to the MNO. Three business models 
can be seen: 
• Offering an advisory product where farmers pay for the service can be financially viable (e.g. 
Dialog Sri Lanka). 
• Offering an advisory product as a freemium offering can be financially viable. If adequate scale 
can be reached, revenue generated by upselling (airtime) can more than cover costs.  
• Using a multi-sided platform, Khushaal Zaminder ran a pilot that demonstrated how the Telenor 
platform could be used to generate revenue on a B2B basis by selling advertising services to 
an agribusiness. 
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The cost of sending SMS messages is the largest single component of operating costs, which 
raises the question: ‘What is the real cost of sending an SMS?’ Where a content provider sends 
messages to a client base, it will bulk buy SMS from an MNO at a known cost. Vodafone covered 
the cost of messages sent by Esoko, but there is no evidence that Vodafone actually allocated a 
cost internally to these messages. Modelling confirms that if message costs can be discounted, 
even a freemium model can be financially attractive.  
 Achieving changed behaviour 
All advisory and extension services aim to help farmers adopt improved practices. GSMA mAgri’s 
ToC explicitly acknowledges there is a sub-ToC that needs to take place between farmers 
accessing information through VFC and the adoption of improved practices (agricultural, nutritional, 
post-harvest, and marketing): ‘In all cases adoption is assumed to require changes in knowledge 
and attitude’ (see Figure 21).  
In the baseline report, it was felt that the CUG offering free calls to other farmers would be a highly 
valued component of the VFC bundle that would appeal to famers, and more importantly provide a 
platform for peer-to-peer information exchange. It was felt that enabling farmers to share and 
discuss information and to share experiences and opinions would reinforce knowledge and 
strengthen intent to implement recommendations in the messages, which would in turn enhance 
behaviour change. However, this optimism does not seem to have been justified. In fact, only 3% 
of users felt that being able to make free calls was the most useful aspects of the bundle. It is not 
entirely clear why take-up of this feature has been so weak, but anecdotal evidence suggests that 
farmers do not want to confer beyond their local networks. Fellow farmers whose opinion they 
value and who they choose to discuss farming matters with are farmers in their local community, 
who they meet regularly, so they have no need to use the phone.  
There is evidence that once farmers have experience of VFC, they like it: quality and satisfaction 
ratings are high, suggesting that, given a satisfactory payment mechanism, resubscription rates 
should be high. Therefore, from a business model point of view, it is the decision to subscribe to 
the service that is of greatest interest – how to get farmers to sign up. This is explored in Annex G, 
which focuses on whether motivation and behaviour change theory can help explain low levels of 
WTP. The argument looks at the role of social referents shaping the intention to sign up. Emerging, 
data-intensive service providers typically enter into an agreement with a third-party institution, such 
as an agricultural input supplier or off-taker, which wishes to engage with a defined target group of 
farmers. Even though the partner institution typically pays for the service (the B2Bmodel), the 
farmer still has to sign up for the service to receive information and messages via his or her mobile 
phone. The key difference is that involving these institutions increases the locus of social referents 
relevant to the farmer’s decision to adopt the mobile service. Under the VFC model, the adoption 
decision rests entirely with the individual. All the risk associated with implementing changes in 
agricultural practice (and paying fees) is taken by the individual farmer, and all the benefits are 
enjoyed by the farmer. When a third party is integrated into the model, then costs, risks, and 
benefits tend to become shared. By lowering perceived risk barriers (outcome attitudes), engaging 
farmers in a relationship (subjective norms), and endorsing a service (perceived behavioural 
control beliefs), engaging agribusiness actors can ease the progress of farmers to the ‘Action’ 
stage of signing up for mAgri services.  
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 Product development 
GSMA has concluded that strong product development is key to success: ‘Successful services 
require a robust product team, including a core team of dedicated staff and cross-functional links to 
other departments’ (Palmer and Darabian, 2017a). This reflects learnings from the weak product 
development of VFC. The small team in Vodafone had cross-functional support within Vodafone, at 
least for the duration of the grant period, but it lacked internal UX expertise, agricultural expertise, 
and content platform resources. These were resourced through contractual-type partnerships. In 
principle, the partnership had all the right resources, but challenges with communications made it 
difficult to make progress. 
The contractual relationship with Esoko provided little incentive to innovate (and take risks). 
Multiple staff changes meant that Vodafone lacked a clear vision for the development of the 
product and the locus of decision making authority kept changing. Shifting responsibilities for VFC, 
changing priorities, poor performance of VFC, a lack of expertise within Vodafone, and a 
confrontational partnership all contributed to the lack of development of the VFC product and the 
failure to make progress with the Connected Farmer product. Given the level of changes that have 
taken place at Vodafone, even if it had set up an internal group to drive product development, it is 
by no means certain that this would have survived the various restructuring initiatives. 
The developments that have taken place at both of the key partners in the VFC service have been 
remarkable. Vodafone experienced multiple changes of management at the most senior level, at 
the level of managers with responsibility for VFC, and at the level of product managers. This led to 
a lack of continuity of ideas discussed with partners to develop the VFC product, to the point where 
the product has been dropped. Esoko also experienced changes at the top, with Hillary Miller-Wise 
taking over as CEO in October 2015, well after VFC had been conceived. The company then split, 
before Miller-Wise left to run the Kenyan spin-off company in mid-2017. The two resulting 
companies identified new products to pursue but in the end, the core market information service 
remained a component part of both sets of offerings. Nevertheless, the splitting of the company, 
including the dividing up of the staff, and the subsequent demise of the Tulaa Ghana operation, 
must all have taken their toll on senior management and staff alike.  
GSMA has concluded that an agile and user-centric product development process is key to 
success. There are examples of ways in which the product has been adapted to address issues 
arising from field research. For example, additional capacity was installed at Esoko to help ensure 
that OBD messages were received at appropriate times of the day; an autorenewal mechanism 
was introduced for the payment of subscriptions; and an automatic profiling system was introduced 
to streamline the registration process. However, some fundamental flaws in the product remained 
unresolved. For example, the Vodafone and Esoko registration systems were not integrated, 
leading to unacceptable delays in customers receiving information; an inappropriate set of 
incentives meant agents were selling VFC SIMs to anybody; the automatic profiling solution meant 
farmers were not receiving weather information; and SMS messages in English were poorly 
received. The failure to address these issues reflects the lack of a strong product development 
team and a lack of commitment by Vodafone. The contractual nature of the partnership with Esoko 
moderated any incentive for innovation. 
When Vodafone won the Challenge Fund award, VFC may well have appeared to have strong 
partners with all the skills needed for agile product development. In practice, key personnel moved 
on and the residual levels of interest and the contractual nature of relationships led to an inability to 
mobilise these skills. A further finding is that although the original VFC concept, based on a 
strategy of acquiring new phone users, may have been appropriate at the time of the inception of 
VFC, it appears no longer appropriate. For example, the study has found that VFC has failed to 
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increase mobile penetration (even though the financial performance of VFC customers is 
acceptable). It can be argued that plans for the Connected Farmer product are a response to this, 
but it has yet to be implemented.  
 Advisory services 
All of the agriculture projects supported under the mNutrition programme were advisory services, 
based around the dissemination of information (relating to both agriculture and nutrition). Since the 
programme was conceived, the mobile industry has moved on, with possibly the most significant 
development being the growth in mobile money. Ghana is the fastest-growing mobile money 
market in Africa20 (2017 data). This has opened up opportunities for innovation in digitising the 
value chain (enabling transactions) and extending financial services to smallholder farmers 
previously excluded from formal financial institutions. These are the kinds of services that meet the 
needs that farmers articulated as their priorities right from the beginning of the study. Given that 
farmers said they were unable to implement the advice because of lack of financial resources, 
access to these kinds of services is likely to overcome barriers to the increased adoption of 
improved practices. However, such digital services (D4Ag, as coined by CTA) risk opening up a 
further digital divide, leaving behind the poorest farmers who are not digitally literate and who are 
least able to adapt to, and benefit from, digital services.  
Within advisory services, there are options for the best way to get messages to farmers. VFC relied 
on SMS for weather and market price information, and this study has highlighted the shortcomings 
of this approach in reaching illiterate farmers. Disseminating agricultural and nutrition tips via OBD 
has been much more successful and better received by farmers, primarily because it overcomes 
literacy barriers, but the timing is crucial. The downside of OBD is that it is still a ‘push’ service, the 
timing of which is determined not only by the scheduling of the sending agency but also the 
capacity of the technology (some Esoko messages were sent several hours after scheduling 
because of congestion on the E1 line). Farmers will not pick up messages if they are delivered at 
an inconvenient time. This therefore leaves ‘pull’ type services, such as IVR, which can be voice 
driven. The disadvantage of pull services is that they are passive, and users can easily get out of 
the habit of searching for information. GSMA concludes that a hybrid of push and pull services is 
best. SMS is much cheaper than voice-based services. Financial modelling has shown how 
financial performance is highly sensitive to the price allocated by the MNO to messages. If an MNO 
can justify discounting the price allocated to voice messages, this would help build the case for 
more effective hybrid advisory services.  
 Revisiting the Theory of Change 
Findings from the study have been mapped onto GSMA’s original Theory of Change (Figure 21). 
This section presents a brief commentary on the different parts of the ToC; more detail is available 
in Annex A.  
 
20 https://qz.com/africa/1662059/ghana-is-africas-fastest-growing-mobile-money-market/ 
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Figure 21:  GSMA mNutrition ToC for mAgri  
 
Source: GSMA (2016). Reproduced with permission. 
 
Customer journey (Access) 
VFC struggled with the earlier steps in this sequence. Promotional activities to raise awareness 
were expensive, and low cost methods such as blast SMS were not applicable when targeting new 
users not on the Vodafone network. Onboarding was a challenge, and both users and agents often 
failed to complete the registration process. Technical shortcomings and poorly integrated systems 
meant that trial users had a poor experience. However, users expressed high levels of quality 
ratings and customer satisfaction, and more recent data suggests low attrition rates.  
Adoption (behaviour change) 
Evidence from the study suggests VFC has achieved only weak behaviour change among users. 
The only significant change found by the quantitative study was an increase in the consumption of 
dairy foods at the household level. Although self-reported levels of changes in on-farm practices 
were high (75%), the quantitative study found no evidence. Neither did it find any effect on 
knowledge relating to post-harvest techniques. The study found no evidence of farmers increasing 
revenue.  
Benefits realised 
The quantitative study found no evidence of changes to the key metrics of dietary diversity. Neither 
did it find any evidence of increased yields or profits. 
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Benefits to MNO  
Once enrolled, repeat users were willing to pay for the service. There was no evidence that VFC 
achieved VAS benefits of reduced churn or upselling of other products (increased ARPU). 
 The Independent Study 
Annex H presents some reflections on the methodology of the independent evaluation and how it 
relates to the implementation of mNutrition projects. It addresses the diversity of stakeholders 
engaged, the short product timescales required of the industry, and the variety of projects 
supported under mNutrition.  
Telecommunications is a dynamic and rapidly evolving industry. During the five-year duration of 
the programme, there have been changes in leadership and structure within the commercial 
organisations involved in the VFC partnership. This has inevitably led to changes in priorities. For 
example, once the champion of a product moves on, then the next responsible person is unlikely to 
exhibit the same degree of commitment and vision, preferring instead to pursue their own priorities.  
The timescales of the evaluation have extended beyond the period of support offered by the GSMA 
mNutrition project in order to allow the intervention to take hold and make an impact. However, 
stakeholders’ commitment (and interest) in the product tends to wane after it is no longer being 
actively supported and they no longer have any obligations to the grantor. This can manifest itself 
in a reluctance to invest further time in the form of interviews and discussions, for example, but it 
can also have structural implications, e.g. cost data is not collected and disaggregated in the same 
detail that it was for the purposes of reporting under the GSMA mNutrition project. 
MNOs tend to have poor institutional memory. This is not only a result of high staff turnover but 
because customer call data (call detail records) are stored only for a finite period of time, so if they 
are not analysed on a regular basis, that understanding is lost. 
Although Vodafone and Esoko both expressed positive intent to share various data, this has not 
been forthcoming. GSMA has, however, been fully supportive in securing permission from 
Vodafone to share the final mNutrition Financial Report. Esoko has also shared subscriber 
numbers. However, commercially sensitive cost information within the sub-contract agreement has 
not been shared in detail. Despite expressions of positive intent to share, the reality of commercial 
sensitivities makes it difficult for businesses to share financial data. 
Information on costs and performance became even more sensitive when the MNO was 
considering different options and talking to potential competitors to provide sub-contract services. It 
was around this time that the independent study team organised the in-country information 
dissemination event. Concerns were subsequently expressed at having invited competitors to the 
event. This highlights a disconnect between commercial ways of working and donor-funded ways 
of working, which are focused on sharing public goods. GSMA is open and transparent regarding 
its experience of working with mNutrition projects and has published widely.  
During the inception phase of the evaluation study, the particular projects to be studied needed to 
be identified. This was done in consultation with GSMA, relying heavily on its knowledge of 
partners and products. VFC appeared to be a good choice because it had established partners, a 
proven platform, and was one of the earliest projects to be rolled out. However, with the benefit of 
hindsight, lessons have been learned about the importance of product development, MNO 
expertise, and other institutional factors, and GSMA has published these lessons learned (Palmer 
and Darabian, 2017a). GSMA is now of the opinion that VFC is not one of the better implemented 
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projects, and can show how it measures up against the lessons learned. Nevertheless, given the 
cost of an intensive impact evaluation, this choice needs to be made.  
Findings from the study do not, therefore, necessarily reflect the performance of other mAgri 
projects. They were all designed as agriculture and nutrition advisory services, but the industry has 
moved on to innovate around financial and transactional services. These are likely to lead to 
greater impact because they enable farmers to overcome more pressing barriers associated with 
buying, selling, saving, insurance, logistics, etc. However, it is noted that they are likely to open up 
a digital divide, risking leaving behind the poorest farmers, who are not digitally literate.  
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10 Conclusions 
 The future for advisory services 
Although the trajectory of the mobile market is clearly heading in the direction of data and 
increased internet use, the fact remains that substantial parts of sub-Saharan Africa are 
underserved in terms of mobile coverage. Even in areas with coverage, the signal can be patchy 
and often only a single network is available, which limits people’s access to services. Although 
universal access funds are addressing these issues (GIFEC’s activities in this regard have been 
mentioned in Section 7.1), progress is slow. Communication features available over voice networks 
(e.g. SMS, USSD, IVR, and OBD) are, therefore, likely to continue to be the channels of choice for 
reaching the poorest parts of a country for the time being. Having said that, these channels are a 
poor fit with low-status consumers. Literacy is a major limitation. Large proportions of smallholder 
farmers cannot read SMS messages because they may not be familiar with the languages used in 
messages or may not be able to read in their own language. Accessing information systems also 
requires literacy and digital literacy skills for navigating menus and interactive SMS exchanges, 
which can be done much more intuitively using icons on smartphones.  
The growth of mobile money in Ghana has been a game changer. Farmers’ top priority is access to 
financial services, and emerging agricultural services are employing innovative approaches to 
meet this demand. Emerging services typically integrate financial services into a broader range of 
farmer support services addressing the value chain. Mobile money has also been key to unlocking 
the potential for transactional services that enable farmers to conduct value chain activities with 
greater ease (e.g. buying and selling). 
Growth in data revenues is driven by demand for social media apps and entertainment (music and 
video) as well as falling smartphone handset prices. Digital data collection and analytics mean that 
mobile-enabled services can move beyond providing knowledge to farmers (as with traditional 
agricultural extension) and provide them with tools to enable them to participate better in economic 
activities. 
 Viability of the VFC service 
The VFC system reached a total of 350,000 subscribers21 (as at March 2018). However, why have 
so many failed to re-subscribe on a regular basis? All the evidence from multiple research activities 
indicates that users are positively disposed to the service – quality ratings are high, the agriculture 
tips are regarded as useful, and the information is highly trusted – so it appears that the content 
aspect of the service is not at fault. This leaves the onboarding, information delivery, and payments 
parts of the customer journey. The subscription fee was reintroduced at a much lower rate using an 
autoenrollment process and the qualitative study did not reveal any particular complaints about 
this. GSMA identified creating the shortest pathway from registering to getting information as one 
aspect of good practice, but revisions to the VFC onboarding process meant that it could take over 
a week for a subscriber to receive information from Esoko. Therefore, it seems most likely that the 
onboarding process thus remains the weakest link (including marketing). 
Vodafone was not geared to develop content. Rather than investing in internal agricultural VAS 
capacity, Vodafone bought in this expertise from a third party. This offered advantages in terms of 
speed, capital cost, and flexibility. Esoko had agricultural experts, an agricultural information 
 
21 This is the total number of farmers who had accessed the service at any point in time, i.e. it does not represent the 
number of subscribers on the system at any single point in time, which will be lower.  
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database, and a tried and tested platform, so VFC was the first of the mNutrition products to 
launch. Sub-contracting the service meant it could be set up quickly, and Vodafone had the option 
to change the offering by switching or adding contractors. Upfront costs were minimised by utilising 
Esoko’s expertise and platform. On the other hand, the approach meant Vodafone was less 
invested in the product, and lacked a detailed understanding of farmers as consumers. Even if 
Vodafone had set up an internal unit, it may not have survived the changes and restructuring that 
have taken place in Vodafone.  
It is not enough to provide market prices alone. Farm products are marketed through a complex 
web of middlemen in the value chain, and farmers generally have low levels of leverage even 
though they may know the ‘right’ price. This is especially true for the poorest farmers as they are 
more likely to sell at the farm gate where there is no competition between off-takers. They also 
tend to have an urgent need for cash, which further reduces their negotiating power.  
VFC offered a complex bundle of services. Customers may have struggled to understand a 
complex product, especially when agents had a poor understanding of the product and tended to 
sell it as a SIM rather than a VAS package. A product that is both a SIM and a VAS serves two 
potential purposes, which led to perverse incentives among agents and left some customers 
confused (i.e. unaware of VFC features). 
 Achieving social impact 
Among VFC users, quality and satisfaction ratings were high, as were self-reported levels of 
changed practices, yet the quantitative study found that use of VFC had minimal impact on the 
primary outcomes.22 The types of changes implemented at the household level have not, therefore, 
been significant enough to result in changes in the primary outcomes. 
mNutrition was predicated on the reach of mobile services as an effective source of information (on 
agriculture and nutrition). Given a context of declining access to traditional channels of 
communication of information, notably agricultural extension workers and radio, it potentially 
offered a low-cost mechanism for reaching farmers. The promise of reach has not been realised in 
Ghana with VFC, as discussed in the report, but GSMA case studies indicate that this promise has 
indeed been realised by other services in other countries, notably the Khushaal Zaminder service 
offered by Telenor, Pakistan. The evaluation studies shed some light on how effective mobile 
services can be as sources of agricultural information. Among farmers who used VFC, utility 
ratings were high (72% found agriculture and nutrition tips to be useful) and self-reported changes 
in agricultural practice were high (75% reported changing their behaviour based on agriculture and 
nutrition tips). Yet the changes implemented were not significant enough to result in improvements 
in the primary outcomes. Behaviour change is a complex process and the influence of a short 
voice message clearly does not compare with that of a face-to-face visit by an extension worker. 
Nevertheless, information is a prerequisite for behavioural change and given that extension 
workers are increasingly scarce, farmers felt that mobile-based information on its own could still be 
useful.  
All of the agriculture projects supported under the mNutrition programme were advisory services, 
based around the dissemination of information (relating to both agriculture and nutrition). The 
growth in the mobile money market has opened up opportunities for innovations in digitising the 
value chain (enabling transactions) and extending financial services to smallholder farmers 
previously excluded from formal financial institutions. These are more likely to result in substantive 
impacts, as farmers have consistently cited the lack of financial resources as their main limitation. 
 
22 Household and women’s dietary diversity, agriculture production, and nutrition and farming knowledge.  
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However, as noted above, digital services risk opening up a further digital divide. Programmes 
promoting digital literacy and literacy (see Mozilla’s Web Literacy framework23) could help mitigate 
the gap. 
It is very difficult to support the poorest smallholder farmers. The analysis has identified a number 
of features of mobile services (both advisory and transactional) that effectively exclude this group: 
• SMS-based services are largely inaccessible to illiterate farmers; 
• they lack the financial resources to implement changes to their agricultural practices (and tend 
to be risk averse); 
• emerging data-driven digital services are inaccessible to digitally illiterate farmers (and often 
those unable to afford smartphones); and 
• it is difficult to justify offering a freemium model to customers with the lowest ARPU. 
 Validity of the business model 
Six years from the inception of the VFC concept to the present date is a long time in the world of 
telecommunications. The original aim of Vodafone was to increase its rural base by specifically 
targeting new mobile subscribers from rural areas. As the market has matured, the number of 
potential customers who aspire to phone ownership has diminished. Despite being highly regarded 
by users of the service, the bundle does not appear to have a sufficiently sustained attraction to 
encourage people to continue to sign up with Vodafone (or any other operator for that matter). The 
quantitative study found that levels of mobile ownership and access were no higher among the 
encouragement communities. The strategy may have been appropriate at a given time, but only for 
a given duration. Vodafone has since shifted its priority to maximising the revenue generated by its 
rural base. 
Nor is there any evidence that ARPU is higher among VFC users. GSMA has demonstrated higher 
ARPU among advisory service users in a number of other mNutrition projects. This reflects 
Vodafone’s strategy of using VFC to expand its rural base. There are two effects: first, airtime is 
offered at a discounted rate; and second, remote rural consumers will have the lowest ARPU. 
Vodafone reported that VFC ARPU is lower than that of the mass base altogether. A normal VAS 
strategy aims to increase ARPU and reduce churn, but this is not relevant in underserved areas 
where people have no choice of network.  
The quantitative study did, however, generate some evidence of VFC yielding indirect benefits in 
terms of stickiness of the Vodafone network. VFC users were more likely to use Vodafone as their 
main network provider (primary SIM). VFC users were 43% more likely to use a Vodafone SIM 
than respondents in the comparison group, 20% of whom used a Vodafone SIM as their main SIM. 
During the study, VFC was offered under two business models: 
• Freemium (free access to information and CUG calls, with upselling of airtime): Financial 
modelling shows that this was not financially sustainable, but if the product could be marketed 
to a slightly higher status market segment (with higher ARPU), this would be enough to make a 
freemium model financially attractive. 
• Subscription: Financial modelling shows that this was not financially sustainable at the 
subscriber levels achieved.  
 
23 https://mozilla.github.io/content/web-lit-whitepaper/     
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The cost of sending SMS messages is the largest single component of operating costs, but it is not 
clear that Vodafone accounted internally for the cost of messages. Modelling suggests that if 
messages costs can be discounted, even a freemium model can be financially attractive.  
Price elasticity of demand predicts that more farmers will sign up to a low-cost product, but as 
subscriber numbers go up, so do the cost of sales, making the product less financially attractive. 
This again illustrates the potential disconnect between commercial and donor ways of working. 
Customer acquisition can be expensive. VFC initially spent a lot of money on targeted marketing, 
e.g. roadshows. Along with most of the other mNutrition projects, Vodafone found this proved too 
expensive. An MNO partner provides access to its agent network to sign people up. However, 
agents had limited capacity (i.e. they did not fully understand the VFC bundle) and the incentives 
were inadequately structured, but VFC could not tailor incentives because agents were under a 
group contract. Self-registration was greatly simplified with the introduction of an automated 
profiling process, but without detailed profiling, weather services were withheld. VFC failed to find 
an effective one-click registration process.  
The main market for companies offering agricultural advisory services has typically been 
institutional clients engaged at some point in the value chain, e.g. government agencies or agro-
input suppliers (B2B business model). Some have also made services available to individual 
farmers (a business-to-customer (B2C) business model). The mNutrition project provided an 
opportunity for companies such as Esoko to take the B2C model to scale by partnering with an 
MNO. The experience of VFC highlights some of the challenges encountered and the limited 
impact achieved (primary outcomes).  
 The evaluation approach 
The short timescales involved in developing mobile VAS products mean that formative evaluations 
need tight feedback loops to inform product design. The implementing partner would ideally collect 
and retain key data for longer. In the future this could be a more explicit part of any grant 
agreement, although it is recognised that commercial parties will typically build trust in each other 
over the implementation of the intervention. 
The VFC project cannot be regarded as representative of all of the mAgri projects supported under 
the mNutrition programme. To conduct a rigorous study of all six mAgri projects would be 
prohibitively expensive, so just two projects were selected. Selecting a single project for detailed 
evaluation is something of a lottery. While VFC appeared to be a good choice because it was one 
of the earlier projects to be rolled out, had strong partners, and a proven platform, GSMA is now of 
the opinion that this was not one of the better implemented projects. The recent history of the key 
partners is remarkable. Esoko split into two companies, splitting staff resources, and each setting 
about developing new products (still in the mAgri market). Vodafone Ghana had two changes of 
CEO in the duration of the independent study, changes at director level, staff changes at senior 
management level, and changes in product manager, as well as a major group restructuring. 
These events also set VFC apart from other projects within the mNutrition portfolio.  
VFC struggled to obtain viable numbers due to the changes in offering to the customers, and 
problems with its onboarding processes. Even in the absence of viable numbers, however, there 
were elements of commercial sustainability, e.g. the satisfactory contribution margin and some 
indirect benefits such as the use of Vodafone as the main SIM. The business model could be made 
more attractive if the structural factors were more consistent with GSMA-defined good practice. 
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Annex A Revisiting the Theory of Change 
The objective of mAgri projects under mNutrition was to create and scale commercially sustainable 
mobile advisory services that enable smallholder farmers to improve the nutritional status of their 
household and increase their productivity. The expected linkages between exposure to information 
via mobiles, through adoption of improved practices, to improved nutrition and farm income are 
illustrated in Figure 22. 
This section maps some of the findings from the study onto the Theory of Change (ToC), which 
has been used as a framework for summarising some of the key findings from the study. It should 
be stressed that the ratings awarded here do not necessarily reflect on the validity of the ToC itself, 
which is felt to be robust and comprehensive. Rather, the ratings highlight context and events from 
the VFC journey and how they have affected the progression of changes encapsulated in the ToC. 
Other projects from within the portfolio of mNutrition agriculture projects will have performed much 
better.  
The narrative is presented in the form of the following tables, each of which addresses different 
parts of the ToC. 
Figure 22:  GSMA mNutrition ToC for mAgri  
 
Source: GSMA (2016). Reproduced with permission. 
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Table 8:  Customer journey (access)  
Step Rating Comment 
Potential users 
are aware of 
services  
Customer acquisition costs are high. Low-cost marketing methods, such as 
blast SMS, are not applicable to potential users that are not yet on the 
Vodafone network (the primary target was new rural users). 
Potential users 
register for the 
service 
 
From the beginning it was recognised that onboarding was a complex task, 
which is why agents were commissioned at the launch. It was subsequently 
confirmed that potential users often failed to complete the registration 
process, but agents also failed to complete the process because incentives 
were not in place. VFC had limited flexibility to explore incentives because 
agents’ contracts covered multiple products. 
Registered 
users trial the 
service 
 
Two-thirds of VFC SIMs were registered (by Vodafone), and only one-third 
were successfully profiled on the Esoko platform. This indicates there were 
technical shortcomings on both platforms. Systems were poorly integrated, 
so a two-stage registration process was required. Vodafone sent a list of 
subscriber numbers to Esoko once a week. This led to delays in trial users 
receiving data – GSMA identified a short pathway to accessing data as a key 
success factor.  
Users value the 
service because 
of the 
results/benefits 
it generates  
Both qualitative and quantitative studies generated evidence that users 
regard the service highly, in terms of quality ratings, value ascribed to 
information, and trust in information. They also found high levels of self-
reported behaviour change (changes in farming and nutrition practice), which 
is consistent with M&E findings. However, these findings are at odds with the 
overall conclusions from the quantitative study that exposure to VFC has no 
effect on the primary outcomes (dietary diversity, agricultural yields, and 
profits). 
Repeat users 
 
M&E research found that, during the early stages of the product, the attrition 
rate was 88% (i.e. only 12% of trial users renewed their subscription). More 
recent data (after the subscription fee was reintroduced) showed that the 
attrition rate had fallen dramatically, to roughly 5%. This indicates that the 
content side of the product does have traction and is a good fit with farmers. 
Solutions need to be found for other aspects of the product (such as 
marketing, onboarding, and payment mechanisms). 
Source:  Authors’ own 
Key: 
 
Step fully realised 
 
Step partially realised 
 
Step not realised 
 
Insufficient information 
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Table 9:  Adoption (behaviour change) 
Step 
(adoption) 
Step 
(Results) 
Rating Comment 
Registered 
users trial 
the service 
Repeat use * 
Behaviour change is a complex process – expecting trial users to 
change behaviour after minimal engagement with content is 
unreasonable. It is only repeat users that are likely to adopt 
improved practices.  
Improved 
nutritional 
practices 
 
 
The only change in nutrition-related behaviour found by the 
quantitative study was an increase in the consumption of dairy 
foods at the household level.  
There is anecdotal evidence from the qualitative study that users 
introduced new foods into their diets, and that they improved their 
hygiene practices (e.g. not eating old food). It is not clear how 
widespread these changes in behaviour were. 
Improved 
on-farm 
practices 
Increased 
productivity, 
quality, and 
diversity of 
produce 
 
Self-reported levels of changed behaviour were high (75%). Areas 
mentioned included sowing, land preparation, and fertilisers 
(preparation and correct application). No mention was made 
specifically of diversification or nutrient-rich crops (from the ToC). 
The quantitative study found no evidence of crop diversification.  
Improved 
post-harvest 
and storage 
practices 
Reduced 
post-
harvest 
losses 
 
The quantitative study tested knowledge on a number of post-
harvest techniques; no effects were found. 
Messages on food preservation were positively mentioned as a 
motivating factor in using the service.  
Improved 
marketing 
practices 
Better 
prices 
 
50% of respondents self-reported making changes to their 
marketing practices, but there was no evidence of increased 
revenue. Even if smallholder farmers were informed about 
prevailing prices at local markets, they lacked leverage to realise 
higher prices. The poorest farmers sell at the farm gate, where 
there is no competition and they tend to sell because they need 
cash urgently, further weakening their bargaining power. They also 
lack transport facilities to access new markets, and are not 
sufficiently well networked together to aggregate products for 
transporting or selling to wholesalers. 
* This is regarded as a rather trivial observation given that the line on the ToC chart could easily have been drawn from 
the ‘Repeat users’ box, and it does not really have any bearing on the fundamental sense of the ToC, so no rating has 
been given.  
Source:  Authors’ own 
‘Access to mobile money services […] operates as a catalyst in achieving results along the impact’ 
is framed as a high-level enabling feature of the ToC. In hindsight, this was a prescient provision, 
as access to financial services (and credit in particular) has been consistently articulated by 
farmers as their priority need. Despite both Vodafone and Esoko stating an intention to integrate 
financial services (loans) and transactional services (buying/selling) into VFC, this has not 
materialised. Given that farmers said they were unable to implement advice because of a lack of 
financial resources, it seems likely that farmers might well have been able to adopt more 
substantial changes to their agricultural practices had they been able to access credit. This, in turn, 
may have led to measurable changes in outcomes. 
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Table 10:  Benefits realised 
Step  Impact Rating Comment 
Improvements 
in consumption 
(quantity, 
quality, 
diversity) 
Improved 
nutrition 
 
The quantitative study found no evidence of changes to the key 
metrics of dietary diversity. It did find increased consumption of 
dairy foods. 
Purchase more 
nutritious food 
(quantity, 
quality, 
diversity) 
 
 
The quantitative study explored the consumption of foods rather 
than purchases. 
 
Increased on-
farm income 
 
 
The quantitative study found no evidence of increased yields or 
profits. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
Table 11:  Benefits to MNO 
Step Rating Comment 
Increased WTP 
for the service 
 
Low attrition rate (around 5%) indicates repeat users are willing to pay (at a 
reduced fee rate of GHS 0.5 per month). The more pertinent challenge is to 
enhance WTP at Step 2 of the Access pathway (i.e. persuade new users to 
subscribe). Experience from other mNutrition projects suggests WTP need 
not necessarily be a problem if fees are low enough. 
Reduced churn 
rate / increased 
acquisition of 
customers 
 
These are separate issues. Poor coverage in rural areas means that 
consumers often have no choice of network, so churn rates tend to be low 
among rural customers (e.g. 1% in rural Malawi). The indirect benefit of 
reduced churn diminishes where this is the case.  
Opportunity to 
sell more mobile 
products to 
customers 
 
The VFC was intended to attract new mobile consumers to sign up with 
Vodafone. The quantitative study was conducted in areas where 79% of men 
and 50% of women owned a mobile, so there was some potential to acquire 
new customers; however, results showed no evidence of this effect. 
Users motivate 
others to 
subscribe to the 
service  
This was an aspiration articulated by Vodafone, especially in terms of 
integrating mobile money offerings, but ideas for an improved VFC product 
never materialised. A VAS typically enables upselling (mostly of airtime) by 
keeping the SIM in the handset. However, this basic opportunity was 
diminished in VFC as the bundle included free calls within the CUG, and 
discounted calls outside.  
 
Source:  Authors’ own 
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Annex C Review of the business model  
C.1 The O&P framework 
The O&P framework is commonly used as a framework or canvas for describing a business model.   
Businesses rarely have a simple model of selling a product and gaining revenue from that product.  
A simple income versus expenditure model is thus insufficient to describe the business. Instead, a 
product might enhance the brand of a company, or enhance the overall experience of the 
consumer, causing them to buy other associated goods or services. This idea was at the very heart 
of the submission of GSMA to FCDO. The GSMA mNutrition logical framework discusses indirect 
benefits or imputed benefits, which are described in Section 5.6. 
In order to map the various components of the business model and to capture these indirect or 
imputed effects (beneficial or otherwise), we use the O&P canvas. The nine elements (or building 
blocks) of the canvas form the basis of our analysis below. Note that we have amended the 
framework slightly by splitting the ‘Revenue’ building block into two components, considering cash 
generated and imputed benefits separately. We have also split ‘Costs’ into two, considering 
operating costs and previous investments separately. This has been proposed because of the 
importance of indirect costs to VAS business models, and because some of the key resources 
brought to partnerships have benefited from prior investments. Figure 23 presents a generic 
overview of the framework, i.e. the descriptions and example questions illustrate how the 
framework is applied to business models in general, so not all are directly relevant or applicable to 
the VFC service. 
Figure 23: Building blocks in the canvas (derived from Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
 
 
 
Customer
Relationships
Value Proposition
Key Activities
Key Partners
Investment
Channels
Imputed 
Benefits
Customers
Key Resources
Costs Product 
Revenue 
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Table 12: Description of the building blocks in the canvas 
Canvas building block Description Example questions 
Customers 
Customer segments 
The business model should define 
different groups of people or 
organisations to reach and serve. 
Distinct segments will have 
common needs, behaviours, or 
other attributes. The business 
model should be designed around a 
strong understanding of customer 
needs.  
For whom are we creating 
value? 
Who are our most important 
customers? 
Channels 
How a company communicates with 
customer segments. Channels are 
customer touch points that shape 
the customer experience, e.g. 
communication, distribution, and 
sales.  
How are we reaching customer 
segments? 
How do they want to be 
reached? 
Which ones work best and are 
most cost-efficient? 
Customer relationships 
The types of relationships a 
company establishes with specific 
customer segments. Relationships 
may be driven by various 
motivations, e.g. customer 
acquisition, customer retention, and 
boosting sales. 
What type of relationship does 
each of our customer segments 
expect us to establish with 
them? 
How costly are they? 
How are they integrated with the 
rest of our business model? 
Offering 
Value propositions 
The bundle of products and 
services that create value for a 
specific customer segment by 
satisfying a need or helping solve a 
problem. Value propositions may be 
innovative (disruptive) or similar to 
others, but with added features.  
What value do we deliver to the 
customer? 
Which of our customers’ 
problems are we helping to 
solve? 
Which needs are we satisfying? 
Business operations 
Key resources 
Those assets required to make the 
business model work. Resources 
that allow an enterprise to create 
and offer the value proposition, to 
reach markets, to maintain 
relationships, and to generate 
revenues. They can be physical, 
financial, intellectual, or human.  
What key resources do value 
propositions require? 
 
Key activities 
Things a company must do to 
makes its business model work. 
The activities required to create and 
offer the value proposition, reach 
markets, maintain relationships, 
and generate revenues.  
What activities do our value 
propositions require? 
Key partnerships 
The network of suppliers and 
partners that make the business 
model work. Companies forge 
partnerships for many reasons, e.g. 
to reduce risk, acquire resources, 
etc.  
Who are our key partners? 
Who are our key suppliers? 
Which key resources are we 
acquiring from partners? 
Which key activities do partners 
perform? 
Finances 
Revenue streams 
The cash generated from each 
customer segment. Revenue 
streams will depend on what 
customers are willing to pay. 
Revenue streams can be either 
one-off payments, or recurring 
For what value are customers 
willing to pay? 
How are they currently paying? 
How would they prefer to pay? 
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Canvas building block Description Example questions 
revenues. Each revenue stream 
may have different pricing 
mechanisms.  
How much does each revenue 
stream contribute to overall 
revenues? 
Cost structure 
Costs incurred to operate the 
business model. Creating and 
delivering value, maintaining 
customer relationships, and 
generating revenue all incur costs.  
What are the most important 
costs inherent in our business 
model? 
Which key resources are most 
expensive? 
Which key activities are most 
expensive? 
Investment 
Number of investors, type of 
investors, and commitments made 
to investors. These will influence 
acceptable profit margins, and may 
affect cash flow.  
Who has invested in the 
company? 
What kind of returns are 
expected? 
And over what timescales? 
Indirect benefits 
Ways in which the service can 
benefit the company other than by 
direct revenue generation.  
How does the service increase 
acquisition and loyalty? 
Does the service boost other 
sales? 
How does the service improve 
brand image? 
Source: Authors, generated from Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010). 
 
The baseline analysis is summarised in Figure 24.  
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Figure 24: Summary of canvas (baseline) 
 
Source: Authors’ own.  
 
 
Partners CustomersValue PropositionActivities
Resources Channels
Customer Relationships
Investment Costs Product Revenue Indirect Benefit
The grant application 
targeted the 5 million 
smallholder farmers in 
Ghana, the various 
activities have refined the 
understanding of the 
customer segmentation.  
User experience field studies 
conducted by frog design 
developed an archetype 
typology; noting that 
“competent optimists”, “local 
helpers” and “agri-
businessmen” will adopt the 
product first. 
The service provides several 
elements of value. Content 
provision has been a focus of 
the wider mNutrition 
programme, and VFC has 
benefitted from a localisation 
process of the global content.  
However, the value 
proposition also includes free 
voice minutes within the 
closed user group.  Early 
feedback suggested this was 
not so important to farmers, 
but seems to have become 
more important.  
Information on the weather 
and markets is important to 
users, and information 
provided by the call centre is 
highly valued among those 
who have used it. 
Agents – teams move from 
village to village.     
Freelancers – VF employ 3,000 to 
promote VF products - ‘business 
as usual’ acquisition vehicle. 
‘Retailers’ – e.g. at the 
market). There are 30,000 of 
them, mostly urban so trained 
to sell VFC. 
Both Vodafone and Esoko 
branding. 
Esoko handle the call centre.  
People in rural areas with poor 
connectivity tend to feel 
‘trapped’ in their choice of 
MNO – Customer Relationships 
not so important. 
While the service initially had a 
monthly charge, this was 
temporarily removed in order to 
increase uptake. The 
subscription fee was is 
reintroduced in June 2017.  
Much is made of the changes in 
Average Revenue Per User 
(ARPU) and reduction of churn 
(customer moving to another 
provider).  While the data to 
perform this kind of analysis 
has yet to be made available by 
Vodafone. 
Physical – network, billing systems, 
tech platform, call centre. 
Intellectual – content dbase, agri 
staff, quality control processes, 
brand, customer base.  
Human – product development, 
marketing, software developers, 
expert network, UX researchers, 
Business intelligence, MEL.  
I 
In 
Operating mobile network, 
operating tech delivery platform -
consumers complain of poor 
network quality, and many VFC 
customers were not receiving 
content.  
Vodafone contracted local user 
experience (UX) research partner. 
Vodafone Ghana – lead 
partner, funding, marketing 
and billing;  
Esoko – main partner, 
content, platform, helpline;  
Cobalt – local UX design 
research;  
frog – global UX partner;  
GSMA – co-fund, business 
intelligence, consultancy;  
GAIN – global content 
partner;  
ALINe – global monitoring, 
evaluation and learning 
(MEL) partner. 
Cost of SMS messages 
(messages plus Esoko 
scheduling) accounts for over one 
third of costs, and support 
provided by the mNutrition 
programme for product 
development accounts for oughly 
20% of costs.I 
In 
DFID and GSMA have invested 
in the wider programme costs 
that stimulated and supported 
VFC. 
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C.2 Customer segments 
Review of baseline 
The primary target for VFC was articulated as 5 million smallholder farmers in Ghana, who account 
for 77% of the entire agricultural base in the country (GSMA, 2014). Three key segments were 
described, which are not mutually exclusive: 
• female farmers – estimated at 2.8 million (56% of the agricultural labour force); 
• semi-literate and illiterate smallholder farmers – estimated at 3.3 million (30% of the entire 
agricultural base is estimated to be illiterate), who also lack numerical skills; and 
• rural residents without access to mobile phones – estimated at 3.2 million. 
Migrating base customers (on other plans) onto VFC in late 2016 enabled Vodafone to reach the 
key performance indicators (KPIs), but introduced a mix of non-farmer customers into the VFC 
base. Nevertheless, Vodafone was keen to retain the integrity of the original concept, which is to 
support farmers, so they then started weeding out ineligible subscribers. These were evident from 
inappropriate behaviour, particularly exclusive use of the CUG – bona fide customers will also 
make some use of calls outside the group. 
Although the product was inclusive of women farmers, a number of factors make this difficult to 
achieve in practice. Qualitative research confirms that mobile phone ownership is lower among 
women, but it also found that men were not willing to share phones with their spouses. Also, men 
typically adopted innovations more rapidly than women (Ragasa, 2012), while literacy rates tend to 
be lower among women – which poses an additional barrier to SMS text-based services. 
Targeting rural residents without access to mobile phones assumes that there remains a potential 
customer base that still aspires to mobile ownership. Published subscription rates (see Figure 25) 
suggest that the market in Ghana may be saturated (although, on the other hand, a one-year dip 
does not necessarily reflect a long-term trend). The qualitative research also identified some 
resistance to mobile phone ownership, especially among the poor, who may feel subject to peer 
pressure yet can ill afford to pay for airtime (Barnett et al., 2017).  
Figure 25: Mobile subscription rates per 100 people (Ghana)24 
 
Source: Authors’ own (updated 2019). 
 
24 World Bank data. 
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VFC did try to engage with local champions or ambassadors – influential local people who are well 
respected within their communities. They were intended to promote VFC among target groups of 
farmers and rural communities. However, incentive schemes failed, and the concept was not 
pursued. 
Endline update 
The quantitative study found that 68% of households in the encouragement group registered for 
the service (1,297 households). Of these, 49.8% had actually used the service in the last 18 
months (646 households).25 However, women were less likely to have used the service than men: 
63% of men had used the service in the last 18 months compared with 43% of women. Among 
both men and women, the main reason for not using the service was losing or not using the SIM. 
However, having no access to a phone was more commonly given as a reason by women than by 
men (by 32% of women who did not use the service, and 12% of men). This suggests that lower 
uptake of the service by women may reflect gendered aspects of cultural and economic 
characteristics rather than any shortcomings in the design of the VFC bundle.  
The qualitative study found that sharing of information between genders was uncommon. This 
implies that where women have no access to a phone, even if their husband signs up to VFC, they 
are not likely to access information. The study found that men usually share with men while women 
share with women, which is due to the cultural norm that adults who are married should not interact 
with the opposite sex. Some husbands indicated, though, that they do share information with their 
spouses. Sharing of information within farming communities more generally can also be 
constrained by gendered norms. For example, a woman may be unable to share with men 
because it is believed a woman cannot know more about farming than a man.  
Similarly, women are more likely than men not to read the weather or market price information 
because they cannot read, and not to listen to voice messages because they do not have access 
to phones. Both of these findings simply confirm the well-documented barriers faced by women in 
accessing mobile services, and especially text-based services that require users to be literate.  
The baseline report describes the farmer archetypes constructed by Frog design (an external 
agency contracted by GSMA to support projects with UX), which served as a useful framework for 
discussing uptake and adoption, e.g. they identified certain archetypes likely to be early adopters. 
However, there is no evidence that customer acquisition activities specifically targeted distinct 
groups (or archetypes) of farmers. 
C.3 Value proposition 
Review of baseline 
The VFC bundle includes the following components: 
• Weather information: three SMS messages in English with local weather information per 
week. ALINe (2016b) found weather to be the second most commonly used type of 
information. Farmers did not mention weather forecasts as one of their information needs 
relating to agriculture during the qualitative research, although determining the best time for 
harvesting and planting was a high priority, which suggests that farmers were generally 
 
25 Under the encouragement design process, 91.5% of treatment households agreed to be registered and were given a 
VFC SIM. Uptake among this passively registered group will not be representative of the wider base of VFC customers. 
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satisfied with existing sources of weather information. Even so, farmers might value 
confirmation through VFC weather information. 
• Market price information: one SMS message in English with local market price information 
per week for a selected crop and selected market. ALINe found market prices to be the most 
commonly used type of information (ALINe, 2016b). Qualitative research suggest that the value 
of market price information depends on geographical location (access to a variety of markets) 
and the type of farmer. For example, it is of limited value to ‘Trapped’ farmers (one of the Frog 
design archetypes), as they lack bargaining power with farm gate traders, and are likely to 
have an urgent need for cash. ‘Competent Optimists’ (another archetype) are able to seek out 
new markets, or to store goods to sell when prices rise, and so can make good use of price 
information. ‘Agri-businessmen’ are most likely to grow cash crops, for which prices are set by 
the government, so this service is of limited value for them.  
• Agri and nutrition tips: one weekly recorded voice message in the selected local language 
with seasonal agricultural or nutrition tips (three agri tips and one nutrition tip per month) for the 
selected crop. Agri tips had limited appeal. This is particularly disappointing given the level of 
effort that the mNutrition programme invested in developing and localising content. However, 
the endline research found that once farmers had used the service for an extended period of 
time, the agriculture and nutrition tips were the most frequently accessed information (see 
below). Quantitative research found that government extension workers were the most 
important source of agricultural information in Upper West district, and the second most 
important source (second to spouses) in Central Region (Billings et al., 2017). Information on 
nutrition was not perceived as a priority by farmers and most farmers had never actively looked 
for information about nutrition. 
• Access to Farmer Helpline call centre: free access to a call centre with advice available from 
an agricultural expert. Users mostly called the helpline for farming tips, and information from 
the call centre was felt to be most actionable. 
• Free community calling: free calls to other VFC users. Vodafone marketing felt that free calls 
were the main selling point for the product and may have contributed to the low value placed 
on the content elements: ‘The popularity of the free group calling detracts from the total value 
proposition of the product’ (GSMA, 2016). In practice, free calls are capped at 600 minutes per 
month, but few users get near this cap; they estimate the average is less than 300 minutes. 
• Discounted SMS and calls to non-VFC members. The Vodafone Ghana website simply offers 
‘competitive call rates’. Vodafone explained that they have increased the discounted voice call 
tariffs from GHS 5 (to the same network) or 9 (to a different network, known as off-net calls) per 
minute to GHS 9/11 per minute. This is still a good offer, as most MNOs offer GHS 12–13 per 
minute for off-net calls, and Vodafone’s normal tariff is GHS 11/13 per minute. 
Innovative features in the application distinguishing this from competitor services were: 
• a platform for peer-to-peer sharing and learning – free community calling; and 
• a more active engagement than just receiving voice and SMS calls – helpline, free calling to 
other farmers, mobile money transactions, and content tailored to crops/livestock and to 
location. 
The original VFC design included a facility to use mobile money to complete transactions, which 
would have been innovative at the time, but was dropped from the implemented product.  
Subscribers were, however, not fully aware of the features available within the VFC bundle. 
Subscribers signed up by the OSJ agency were much more likely to be aware of the content 
elements of the product, whereas those signed up by Vodafone’s below-the-line efforts were more 
likely to be aware of free and discounted calls. This highlights how the different agencies marketed 
the VFC product differently, illustrating the crucial role played by channels in educating customers 
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and establishing the value proposition. More worrying still is the proportion of users (roughly one-
third) signed up by both agencies that were unaware of any of the benefits of VFC. 
Endline update 
The Esoko contract with Vodafone was signed in June 2017 and the new contract added two 
additional nutrition messages/month, which started in July 2017: 
• agri tips are sent in weeks 1, 2, and 3 each month; and 
• nutrition tips are sent in weeks 2, 3, and 4 each month. 
Surveys indicate that the most commonly reported behaviour change among users was 
negotiating a better price at markets (note that this was both in regard to selling produce and 
buying to feed their household). Other commonly reported changes included changing the way 
they keep their soil fertile and using weather information to change the timing of farming activities. 
Esoko identified that VFC was experiencing a high number of hang-ups of voice calls. It therefore 
undertook a phone survey in November 2017 (target sample size of 1,500) but was unable to get 
the desired sample size because its E1 line (32 channels) was congested; Vodafone had not 
scaled up this capacity during the programme. The call centre uses the same channels and 
inbound calls also get disturbed. Findings from the limited number of interviews conducted showed 
that most subscribers did not know about VFC and they did not want to be on the product. They 
also found that Vodafone’s deactivation code (9090) was not working. 
The quantitative study showed that making calls and texts to friends or family was by far the most 
frequently used function, with 24.6% of households using it every day. Note that it is not clear if 
these calls were made on the CUG or if they used airtime; however, the low airtime expenditure 
figures suggest intensive calling is likely to be on the CUG. Among the information-related push-
type services, the agriculture and nutrition tips were most popular:  
• 73% listened to the agriculture and nutrition voice messages always or often; 
• 55.4% read the weather messages always or very often; 
• 54.2% read the market price messages always or often; and 
• 36.2% had used the call centre to speak with an agricultural expert.  
The main reasons for not listening to the tips (by outbound dialling (OBD) in local languages) were 
weak service and not having access to a phone. The main reason for not reading weather and 
market price information (by SMS in English) was not being able to read or not knowing English. 
The main reason for not using the call centre was not knowing that it was available, followed by 
believing they would be charged for the service. 
Overall, these results suggest that voice messages in the local language was a better platform 
than SMS in English for delivering content. However, this is a substantially more expensive 
medium. 
Among those respondents who used each of the information services offered under VFC, the call 
centre was the most highly regarded, both in terms of the value of and trust in the information. 
Indeed, 96% ‘found advice from the agricultural expert useful’ and 94% agreed that they trusted 
and felt confident in advice provided by VFC. Tips on agriculture and nutrition were the next most 
popular, while weather and market prices were least valued (see Table 13). Note that there is a 
very strong correlation between the two indicators of trust and value.  
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The quantitative survey also asked active VFC users a more general question on the value offered 
by features of the bundle. Even though farmers who used the call centre found the information to 
be very useful (as discussed above), among all users it was regarded as the least useful aspect of 
the service (see Table 14). This discrepancy is due to more than the dilution effect; almost all 
farmers rated the value of tips at around 70%, while one-third of farmers used the call centre and 
nearly all regarded it as valuable. On this basis, the utility ratio might be expected to be around 2,26 
but figures from Table 14 suggest a ratio closer to 25 (55% / 2%). This seems to indicate that there 
is something especially attractive to farmers about the agriculture tips. The relatively low rankings 
given to weather, market prices, and nutrition tips are consistent with the finding from the baseline 
report that farmers already have access to sources of information on weather and market prices, 
and they are not interested in nutrition tips.  
In that light, to find 8% of users ranking nutrition tips as the most useful aspect of the service is 
perhaps surprising. The majority of respondents in the qualitative study reported having introduced 
some changes into their nutrition and eating habits, e.g. adding eggs, beans, or pears to their 
meals, eating vegetables, etc. They also now avoid eating late at night, particularly heavy foods 
such as fufu. In addition, they are also more aware of health hazards, such as cracked eggs and 
food that has been stored for a long time.  
Table 13:  Perceived value of information services 
Information service n Value of information Trust in information+ 
Call centre 234 96%** 94% 
Agriculture and nutrition tips 582 72%* 81% 
Weather  594 57%* 69% 
Market prices 576 51%* 64% 
* Always or very often found the information useful. 
** Found advice from the agriculture expert useful. 
+ Agrees that they trust and feel confident in information provided by VFC. 
Source:  Authors’ own, based on Billings et al. (forthcoming, 2020) 
 
Table 14:  Most useful aspects of the VFC service (n=646) 
VFC feature Proportion who found it most useful 
Agriculture tips 55% 
Weather information 12% 
Market prices 10% 
Nutritional tips 8% 
Free calls 3% 
Discounted calls 3% 
Call centre 2% 
Other 8% 
Total 100% 
Source:  Authors’ own, based on Billings et al. (2020, forthcoming)  
 
The key metric used by the mNutrition M&E was behaviour change: did farmers change their 
behaviour as a result of receiving information through VFC? According to ALINe (2016b), they did: 
 
26 (100% * 70%) / (33% * 100%). 
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its ‘Outcome Fieldwork survey (sample of 28 face-to-face interviews) confirmed the finding from 
their earlier Outcome Survey (sample of 420 phone interviews) that around 97% of users reported 
some kind of behaviour change arising from use of VFC’. Respondents to the qualitative study felt 
VFC had helped them to increase their yields and improve their food storage and land preparation 
practices – information on sowing, pruning, fertiliser application, and the use of pesticides 
represents examples that led to changes in farming outcomes.  
The figures obtained by the quantitative study are also high, but not quite so optimistic (see Table 
15). This can be explained by differences in the sample selection between the two survey 
techniques. IFPRI solicited responses to the question from all users in the random sample, 
whereas the self-selecting nature of ALINe’s sample (users who agreed to take part in a phone 
survey) may have resulted in a slight bias toward those who were more positively disposed toward 
the service. Either way, self-reported levels of behaviour change are high.  
Despite high quality ratings, and high levels of self-reported behaviour change, the quantitative 
study found that use of VFC (at least once in 18 months) had minimal impact on the primary 
outcomes of household and women’s dietary diversity, agriculture production, or nutrition or 
farming knowledge. Findings from Barnett et al.,’s (2018) study confirm that information on 
agricultural tips, weather, and market prices was all regarded as useful, but actual benefits were 
aspirational: ‘they continue to use the VFC services with the hope that they can increase yields and 
reduce postharvest losses’. On the other hand, it also says that ‘[m]ost respondents opined that 
they have benefitted immensely from the VFC advice, which have ultimately improved their yields 
and health of their families’ (Participatory Development Associates, 2019).  
Table 15:  Perception of information services leading to changed behaviour 
Information service n 
Proportion who reported 
changed behaviour 
Agriculture and nutrition tips 582 75% 
Weather  594 65% 
Market prices 576 50% 
 
Source:  Authors’ own, based on Billings et al. (forthcoming, 2020) 
 
Figure 26 shows that women rated the quality of the service more highly than men. Ratings were 
on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being very low and 10 being very high. The average score for 
respondent’s overall experience with the VFC service was 7 for women and 6.8 for men.  
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Figure 26:  Reported quality scores27, by gender 
   
Source: Billings et al., (forthcoming, 2020). 
All of these positive metrics are at odds with the weak WTP for the service, which was evident 
when the subscription fee was reintroduced, and two-thirds of users left the service. It is likely that 
shifting prices confused customers, who had come to expect the service to be free after the 
subscription fee was temporarily dropped.  
C.4 Channels 
Review of baseline 
The main channels through which customers come into contact with Vodafone are as follows: 
• Customer acquisition – enrolling in the club (SIM registration). There were originally three 
channels through which Vodafone acquired VFC members: 
 Agents – agents were employed during the launch of the product. They followed a schedule 
of moving from village to village. Vodafone contracted two organisations to promote VFC 
(only) – one in the north, one in the south. Teams of 12 with a bus moved a roadshow from 
community to community. Customers’ understanding of the VFC value proposition (and lack 
thereof) was strongly influenced by the performance of the agents who signed them up.  
 Freelancers – Vodafone employ around 3,000 individuals to go out into communities and 
promote Vodafone products in general, rather than only VFC. Agents serving rural areas 
are trained in VFC and if they engage an eligible farmer, they can sell the VFC package. 
They represent the ‘business as usual’ acquisition vehicle. 
 
27 On a scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high).  
Mobile phones, nutrition, and agriculture in Ghana: Business modelling endline report 
e-Pact 79 
 There are also ‘retailers’ – these are stationary (e.g. a table at a market). There are 30,000 
of them, but most are in urban areas, so only relatively few in rural areas have been trained 
and equipped to sell VFC.  
The highest number of acquisitions were achieved by agents, followed by freelancers – few 
were brought on by retailers. All three types work on commission, although agents’ commission 
is higher because their costs are higher, as a result of them going to more remote locations. 
The cost per acquisition is also highest for agents. 
• Registration or profiling – once enrolled, farmers need to enter details of their farming 
practice in order for the Esoko system to send them information tailored to their needs. VFC 
has struggled with the onboarding and profiling of farmers. Field agents were expected to 
profile farmers onto the Esoko system at the same time as they signed them up to VFC, but 
they were incentivised by the number of farmers signed up, and because the profiling process 
was time-consuming it was therefore often skipped. An automated profiling process was thus 
adopted, whereby farmers were allocated a ‘typical’ profile based on the crops most commonly 
grown in their geographical location. Thereafter, there were three possible methods of profiling, 
each of which had shortcomings: 
 Farmer calls Esoko call centre – fieldwork indicates that farmers are not aware that they 
can amend their farming profiles (GSMA, 2017). 
 Esoko calls farmers – restricted by the capacity of the call centre. 
 Agent does the profiling – effective incentive schemes were never found, and renegotiating 
incentives was problematic as Vodafone’s contracts with the agencies covered multiple 
products. 
• Helpline – free access to agricultural experts in Esoko’s call centre. Farmers appreciated being 
able to speak to a real person. The midline qualitative research found that only a few VFC 
members were aware of the centre and even fewer knew that they could consult the centre free 
of charge, but by the time of the endline study most were aware of the call centre, even though 
few actually used it.  
• Payment – airtime vendors and automated billing systems. VFC struggled with devising an 
effective payment mechanism. Initially, farmers had to make a payment each month (manual 
renewal), but dropout rates were high, and farmers did not understand the system well. An 
autorenewal service was introduced in late 2015, but again farmers did not understand the 
system and complained of the service eating their money. The autorenewal system initially 
dropped many customers who did not have sufficient airtime balance on the day their 
subscription was due, so the rules were relaxed to give farmers a 90-day window in which to 
pay their subscription before being removed from the system. Farmers struggled to pay GHS 2 
per month, not necessarily because it was too expensive but because they were not 
accustomed to the concept of paying a monthly subscription for a service (reinforced by the 
fact that 98% use prepaid mobiles). 
• The automated services themselves (voice and SMS messages). There are strong indications 
from the qualitative research that farmers prefer voice messages, preferably in local languages. 
As most farmers are illiterate, information sent to the farmers via SMS text messages is unlikely 
to be read. 
Endline update 
The qualitative research found that farmers engage well with OBD voice messages and that these 
were the most used feature of the VFC bundle, which is consistent with the findings from the 
quantitative study presented in Section 5.2. The recorded messages are in local dialects, which 
farmers easily relate to and understand. However, Esoko found that farmers were not listening to 
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these messages. When conducting research to understand why not, they found that there were 
two groups of users: 
• Those who were not farmers – they found rural agents were simply giving customers VFC SIMs 
without checking they were farmers, or explaining the full features of the VFC bundle. This is a 
problem with incentivisation, as agents get a commission for selling VFC SIMs and have to 
achieve targets, which they will do by any means. 
• Farmers who wanted the information but for whom the timing was wrong, e.g. messages came 
through when they were out in the fields. This has (at least partly) been caused by limited 
capacity in the system. Messages may be scheduled to go out at 08.00, but the last messages 
may be despatched at 15.00. This has subsequently been addressed as additional E1 lines are 
installed. 
The reach of the SMS-based services (weather and market prices) is limited as most farmers 
indicated that they cannot read or understand English. Those who do make use of the SMS 
services mostly depend on friends and family who are literate in English. The baseline quantitative 
study showed that government extension workers were clearly regarded as the most important 
source of information for crop production (see Figure 27) and at that time, text messaging was 
hardly recognised at all. However, respondents to the qualitative study revealed that, in practice, 
access to agricultural extension workers is rare. Radio has commonly been used as a low-cost 
channel for extension, but radio audiences are in decline as people switch to TV and mobile media. 
The Ghana Socioeconomic Panel Survey baseline report (2011) found that a maximum of 14% of 
households received agricultural extension advice through the radio (Northern region). Given this 
context of declining access to traditional sources of information, respondents to the qualitative 
study felt that mobile-based information on its own can still be useful. Note that even if text 
messaging is not regarded as the most important source of information, it can still play a part in 
behaviour change by reinforcing messages from other sources, and providing supplementary 
information.  
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Figure 27:  Source of information on crop production, by region  
 
Source: Billings et al., (2018). 
The quantitative study found that only 50% of participants who had registered for the VFC service 
reported that someone in the household had actually used the service in the last 18 months.28 The 
main reason given for not using the services is losing or not using the SIM, followed by not having 
access to a phone; faulty phones and poor network connectivity were other reasons mentioned, 
albeit less often. Women were more likely to complain of not being able to access a phone; the 
qualitative research shed more light on the multiple reasons behind this: 
• Although women largely signed up for VFC, it is men (i.e. husbands) who usually receive the 
messages. This stems from the fact that some households operate a single phone that is held 
or controlled by men. 
• Some men claimed they have signed up as members of VFC even though it was their wife’s 
name that appeared on the list for sampling.  
• A few women reported that their handsets were damaged, so they use the VFC SIM card in 
their husband’s phone. 
• Customer acquisition activities were not specifically designed to attract women, nor to address 
the specific needs of women.  
 
28 Under the encouragement design process, 91.5% of treatment households agreed to be registered and were given a 
VFC SIM. Uptake among this passively registered group will not be representative of the wider base of VFC customers. 
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C.5 Customer relationships 
Review of baseline 
VFC is branded as a club. The VFC offering is exclusive in that Vodafone has been fastidious in 
ensuring that it is only made available to farmers in rural areas; membership entitles farmers to call 
other members for free, which is a real benefit. Initial ideas of fostering personal relationships 
through local ambassadors did not materialise. Moreover, agents were transient and present only 
during the launch phase of the product, leaving freelancers and retailers, neither of whom were 
fully engaged with the VFC product. When Vodafone offered the product to existing customers, 
they changed their intended customer relationship into one that was simply appropriate to 
acquiring new customers, based on blast SMS messages, for example.  
The call centre facility offered a means of establishing personal relationships with customers. 
However, the endline quantitative study found that only 26% of VFC members called the call 
centre. Esoko at the time had 10 people in their call centre. The growth of users led to an 
increasing number of ‘unsuccessful’ calls (GSMA, 2016a) and the workload increased when the 
call centre was required to call customers in order to complete their profile. 
From early on in the VFC journey, Vodafone was aware that payment mechanisms were a 
problem. For example, in 2015 ALINe showed that most people who tried VFC but failed to re-
subscribe either did not know how to re-subscribe or were simply unaware of the need to do so 
(ALINe, 2015). In an attempt to improve resubscription rates, an autorenewal system was 
introduced in late 2015 with some success: ‘An auto-renewal process was created for new users 
from November 2015 which led to an increase in users paying for the product from 4% of the user 
base in September to 12% in March 2016’ (GSMA, 2016a). However, ALINe’s subsequent rapid 
feedback research showed that, in early 2016, most users (62%) still did not know how to pay for 
the service (ALINe, 2016a). 
Qualitative research indicates that people in rural areas with poor connectivity tend to feel ‘trapped’ 
in their choice of MNO by network coverage and signal availability. This suggests that there is little 
point in Vodafone investing in improving the customer relationship as it has little influence on 
customer retention. However, the qualitative sample was limited in scope, and the quantitative 
component reports that, in their sample, VFC users were more likely to use Vodafone as their main 
network provider (primary SIM) – an increase of 9% (for both women and men).  
C.6 Revenue streams 
Review of baseline 
The original business model was built on a hybrid approach, generating revenue from both selling 
airtime (discounted airtime tariffs) and from subscription fees. Calls within the CUG (to other VFC 
members) are nominally free. In fact, there is a cap on the number of free minutes (600 minutes 
per month) and any calls in excess of this amount are charged at the discounted rate, but most 
users are nowhere near this limit.  
During the life of VFC, pricing models have changed. In October 2016, the subscription fee of GHS 
2 per month was dropped in the interests of attracting higher subscriber numbers in order to meet 
targets. Then a subscription charge was reintroduced in June 2017, albeit at a much lower rate 
(GHS 0.50 per month). This rate was set to cover the cost of delivering the bundle of messages to 
customers. 
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A WTP experiment was carried out as part of the baseline quantitative research (Billings et al., 
2017). This suggests that most farmers (over 85%) are willing to pay a small subscription fee (up to 
1 GHS/month), but that demand drops dramatically at prices beyond 1 GHS/month, such that only 
50% were willing to pay 2 GHS/month. Although these may seem like low subscription rates, they 
should be considered in the context of an ARPU for VFC users of only 2.5 GHS/month. 
Furthermore, farmers are accustomed to getting information for free. Weather information is freely 
available on the radio and television, and farmers do not expect to pay either government 
extension workers or agricultural input suppliers for advice. 
Endline update 
Vodafone report ARPU for the VFC base as GHS 2.5 per month. However, the quantitative study 
found much higher levels of expenditure: GHS 11 per month among women and GHS 27 per 
month among men. Note that this is their entire expenditure, which will be spread across multiple 
SIMs.  
C.7 Indirect benefits 
Review of baseline 
Key indirect benefits to Vodafone are customer loyalty (reduced churn) and increased ARPU. 
Vodafone has not investigated these metrics, despite encouragement from GSMA and the study 
team. The qualitative research, conducted in areas with multiple network coverage, giving 
consumers an effective choice, confirmed that the majority of farmers own multiple SIMs. Deciding 
which SIM to use was found to be based on a number of factors, most important of which was 
network availability, but also cost, especially important given that operators charge a high premium 
for off-net calls, and special offers, promotions, and bonuses. 
The qualitative research highlighted an issue of loyalty whereby people stick with the first operator 
that they signed up to. However, this is a negative reluctance to change, based on the ‘cost’ to the 
customer associated with changing to a new number. 
Endline update 
The primary aim of Vodafone was to increase its rural customer base by offering a low-cost, high-
value product to smallholder farmers who were not yet signed up with a mobile operator. The 
quantitative study does not provide any evidence that this strategy has been successful within the 
communities sampled. Levels of phone ownership were 79% and 50% among men and women 
respectively, and levels of access to a phone were 89% and 83% among men and women 
respectively. Levels of ownership and access were no higher among the encouragement 
communities. 
Nonetheless, the VFC offer led to significant increases in the stickiness of the Vodafone network: 
• VFC users were more likely to use Vodafone as their main network provider (primary SIM) – an 
increase of 9% (for both women and men). Given that 20% of women and 22% of men in the 
comparison group used a Vodafone SIM as their main SIM, this represents an increase of 
roughly 43%. 
Mobile phones, nutrition, and agriculture in Ghana: Business modelling endline report 
e-Pact 84 
• The proportion of phone numbers owned by an individual on the Vodafone network increased 
by 9.6 and 11.4 percentage points for women and men respectively. Given that the proportions 
of phone numbers on the Vodafone network were 20% among women and 22% among men in 
the comparison group, this represents an increase of roughly 50%. 
However, there is no evidence that SIM turnover is lower among VFC users: 77% of women and 
89% of men in the comparison group have had their SIM for over a year, and rates were similar 
among the encouragement group. These high rates are consistent with previous findings that rural 
consumers tend to be ‘trapped’ by poor network coverage, so churn rates tend to be low among 
rural communities. Note that the dominant network provider in both communities was MTN, used 
as the main network provider by 67% of respondents.29 
There is no evidence that the VFC led to any increase in ARPU. Average expenditure across all 
mobile phones was GHS 11 per month among women and GHS 27 per month among men. The 
VFC service did not increase usage in terms of making or receiving calls, sending or receiving text 
messages, or total amount spent on airtime.  
In fact, it was found that respondents using VFC (both men and women) were less likely to send 
mobile money. A total of 21% of men and 7% of women in the control group had sent mobile 
money (in the last 14 days), but rates were lower among VFC users (by 28% and 18% among 
female and male users respectively). This may be consistent with the midline qualitative findings 
that respondents felt that a shortfall of the VFC service was not providing access to other Vodafone 
services such as Vodafone Cash (Barnett et al., 2019). This could, however, be a 
misunderstanding. Any Vodafone user has access to Vodafone Cash but Vodafone’s rural 
presence for mobile money services is limited comparing to MTN, entailing lower mobile money 
use. Since there are no VFC functions that require the use of mobile money, respondents could 
have believed that they had no access to Vodafone Cash. That said, the endline qualitative study 
found that respondents were not aware of the Vodafone Cash services (Upper West region). This 
represents a missed opportunity, as not only is access to financial services a priority among 
farmers but not explicitly including access to Vodafone Cash via the VFC product represents a loss 
of revenue.  
Levels of customer satisfaction were generally high: 83% of women and 91% of men said that they 
were likely to recommend their main network provider to their friends or family. However, being 
offered the VFC service had no impact on this customer satisfaction metric among women, but 
significantly decreased satisfaction ratings among men.  
In terms of branding, the qualitative study found that notwithstanding complaints about poor 
network quality, users largely expressed positive sentiments concerning the Vodafone network, 
describing it as the one that cared for the needs of farmers and asserting that VFC has been 
beneficial to farmers. 
C.8 Key resources 
Review of baseline 
The resources contributed to the product by each of the partners are summarised in Table 16. 
 
29 This is consistent with the number of VFC users, which was 646, equivalent to 34% of the encouragement sample.  
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Table 16: Summary of resources brought by key VFC partners 
 Vodafone Esoko GSMA / GAIN and partners 
Physical 
Network 
infrastructure 
Billing systems 
Call centre 
Software platform 
 
Intellectual 
Brand 
Customer base 
Agricultural content database 
Experience of working with 
agri VAS 
Experienced staff 
Nutrition content 
Quality control processes 
Human 
Product 
development 
Experienced staff 
Marketing 
 
Expert network 
Software developers 
Network of market 
enumerators 
UX researchers 
Business intelligence 
Monitoring, evaluation, and 
learning  
Business consultancy 
 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
The VFC partnership offers Esoko a route to scale because Vodafone offers nationwide reach 
(infrastructure), can push services to existing customers (customer base), and has systems that 
deal with billing and micro-payments. Because VFC is more than a third-party VAS, and is branded 
as a Vodafone product, the MNO also brings marketing and product development skills. Vodafone 
has a nationwide network of 3,000 regional freelancers and up to 30,000 point-of-sale agents (see 
Section 4). 
Esoko has a long track record of working with agri VAS, having set up Tradenet in Ghana over 10 
years ago. It provides the technology platform for disseminating information and market prices, and 
has developed a database of locally relevant agricultural content that it brings to the partnership, 
but which remains its intellectual property. It has agriculturalists who fulfilled the role of the local 
content partner (LCP) and employed a nutritionist to manage the integration of nutrition tips. Esoko 
also had quality control and data validation processes in place, including an Expert Network, which 
proved to be a particularly valuable resource. Esoko has a network of 35 enumerators, covering 43 
markets across Ghana, who provide data on market prices. 
Endline update 
Vodafone found it difficult to justify allocating management resources to VFC. The VFC base was 
running at around 70,000 active subscribers, which represents less than 1% of a total of 7.9 million 
mass market customers. This made it impossible to justify a marketing budget, and with a team of 
five staff members, the manager could not justify allocating meaningful staff time to VFC. 
The proposed merging of various rural focused products (VFC, 3-2-1, Farmerline, Fisherfolk, and 
Vodafone Cash) was delayed due to staff shortages.  
C.9 Key activities 
Review of baseline 
Key activities carried out by each of the partners are summarised in Table 17. 
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Table 17: Summary of activities conducted by key VFC partners 
 Vodafone Esoko GSMA / GAIN 
Platform/network 
Operate network 
Billing customers 
Operate Esoko 
platform (distribute 
content) 
Continuous product 
feedback from users 
Production  
Create content 
Aggregate and 
localise content 
continuously 
(weather and market 
prices) 
Update advisory and 
nutritional content 
Maintain call centre 
Create content 
Marketing 
Customer acquisition 
Customer retention 
Customer profiling 
Continuous feedback 
from users 
 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
Vodafone operates the mobile network and Esoko operates the content platform; however, 
problems appear to arise with the interface between the two. Only one-third of VFC customers 
were successfully profiled by Esoko, which appears to be due to the two-stage (manual) process of 
porting numbers from Vodafone into the Esoko platform. Consumers also complain of poor network 
quality.  
Vodafone deals with customer acquisition and registering new SIMs. The Esoko platform requires 
profiling of farmers, but the mechanism for doing this has changed in response to difficulties. Data 
suggest that up to one-third of SIMs were not successfully registered and that Esoko cannot profile 
customers that are not registered on the Vodafone network. Data also suggest that Esoko has 
been able to profile only half of registered SIMs. 
Research highlights a need for ongoing customer education. Resubscription rates have been low 
because customers were not aware of how to pay their fees. Also, customers were not aware of 
the functionalities available in the VFC bundle. 
Content creation (agriculture and nutrition tips) has been managed by GAIN in a two-part process 
of global and local content generation, with Esoko responsible for local content generation. CABI 
has pointed out that content cannot be regarded as a static commodity because, as local 
conditions change, it will go out of date. It will therefore be necessary to continually update content 
to address new challenges, changes in policy, advances in knowledge and technology, and so on.  
Endline update 
The last promotion carried out by Vodafone was in autumn 2017.  
C.10 Key partnerships 
Review of baseline 
Parties to the partnership model are illustrated in Figure 28. The nature of the relationships 
between different sets of partners are summarised in Table 18, and the primary roles of each are: 
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• Vodafone Ghana – lead partner, funding, marketing, and billing 
• Esoko – main partner, content, platform, and helpline 
• Cobalt – local UX design research 
• Frog – global UX partner 
• GSMA – co-funder, business intelligence, M&E (provided via contract with ALINe), and 
consultancy 
• GAIN – global content partner 
Figure 28: Partners and other key players 
  
Source: GSMA (2016a). Reproduced with permission. 
Table 18: What parties give and get from partnership relationships 
Partnership Contribution of parties Type 
 First set of partners 
Second set of 
partners 
 
Vodafone – 
Esoko 
Vodafone: Reach, 
marketing (customer 
acquisition), billing 
Esoko: Agricultural 
expertise and 
database (content), 
content platform, 
content management 
Symbiotic, acquisition of 
resources; Vodafone want 
VAS, Esoko want scale 
Vodafone – 
GSMA 
Vodafone: project 
lead 
GSMA: funding, 
technical assistance 
Symbiotic: reduces risk to 
Vodafone of new product; 
VFC contributes to GSMA 
development strategy 
GSMA – GAIN 
GSMA: funding, 
project management 
GAIN: agricultural 
content expertise 
Symbiotic: open-access 
database fits GAIN 
mandate, and adds value to 
mNutrition project 
Esoko – Expert 
Network 
Esoko: financial 
compensation 
Network members: 
refine product 
(reduce risk), 
credibility 
Symbiotic: VFC contributes 
to members’ mandate to 
improve agriculture 
GSMA – Frog GSMA: funding 
Frog: design 
resources 
Contractual 
Vodafone – 
Cobalt 
Vodafone: funding 
Cobalt: design 
resources 
Contractual 
Vodafone – 
Agents 
Vodafone: funding 
Agents: marketing 
resources 
Contractual 
 
Source:  Authors’ own 
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Vodafone has explored additional options for customer acquisition, including partnering with local 
champions and large corporate customers. After preliminary discussions failed to establish how 
this could be done, however, the idea was dropped. This experience suggests that the 
transactional cost of negotiating with third parties such as commercial institutions, farmers’ 
organisations, NGOs, etc. can be too high. It may not even be possible to establish relationships 
with institutions that are reluctant to, or even prohibited from, aligning with one MNO. 
Endline update 
When VFC was launched, Esoko entered into a two-year contract with Vodafone. However, when 
the new CEO (Yoland Cuba) joined Vodafone Ghana in March 2016, she introduced a policy that 
contracts should last no more than one year. The renegotiated contract started in June 2017, and 
expired in May 2018. This was then extended for a further three months to August, and then a 
further six-month extension was agreed. The contract was then not renewed, so the product was 
paused in January 2019. 
The partnership relationship between Vodafone and Esoko was always a contractual one and, as 
such, was based on intense commercial negotiations. Several parties reported that the nature of 
the relationship deteriorated over the course of the project. Some said that the change was initially 
triggered by the departure of the original product manager early on in the history of VFC. Another 
difficulty was the departure of another product manager on maternity leave – her replacement was 
not familiar with procedures or the history of the project.  
Esoko has continued to deploy its core market information system in collaboration with other 
programmes in parallel with VFC. For example, the multi-donor-funded Agricultural Development 
and Value Chain Enhancement Project commissioned Esoko to disseminate market and weather 
information and agriculture tips to 20,000 farmers in Ghana.  
C.11 Cost structure 
Review of baseline 
The baseline report presented set-up and ongoing costs covering a two-year period, mainly 
derived from the grant application, costs reported by the content providers, and GSMA. Now that 
more detail has been provided, these costs have been superseded by a more comprehensive and 
rigorous analysis presented in Section 6.  
The original analysis pointed out that the value of SMS messages delivered was the largest single 
cost component, when SMS messages were priced at the prevailing market rate for individual 
customers (GHS 0.055 per text). Even if bulk purchasing prices were used and these costs halved, 
they would still represent the largest single cost component.  
Endline update 
Vodafone has shared the final financial report that was submitted to GSMA under their grant 
agreement. This has been used as a source of much of the cost data for the financial model 
described in Section 6. Unfortunately, Vodafone was unable to provide similar data for subsequent 
years because it was no longer obliged to compile the information for GSMA, and VFC no longer 
had any time allocated by the accountant from Finance. 
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Voice messages sent out to farmers were well received (Barnett et al., 2018), but they are 
expensive. Esoko had previously used SMS to send messages, but as part of the VFC project it 
ported messages on agriculture tips from SMS to OBD to accommodate illiterate users. Esoko did 
not bear any additional costs as, under the VFC product, Vodafone met the cost of all messages. 
However, if this had not been the case, MNO charges are roughly GHS 1 per minute for voice 
messages, compared with GHS 0.05 per SMS (i.e. 20 times the cost) – such a difference would 
have a substantial impact on the viability of an information dissemination service. The cost of 
recording messages (in multiple languages) also adds up. Under the mNutrition programme, 
developing the words (text) for messages was covered by funding from GSMA through GAIN, but 
Esoko covered the cost of recordings. 
Esoko originally received GHS 1.50 per subscriber, but under the new contract this was reduced to 
GHS 0.40. There is a tiered payment structure, but these figures are rough averages. Esoko noted 
that the price is below that charged for other projects, but acknowledged that Vodafone was not 
making any profit from the partnership. At the same time, even at the lower rates, Vodafone was 
still of the view that this did not represent value for money and considered various ideas to make it 
more profitable, such as moving to an alternative content provider. Another idea mooted was to 
take the mNutrition database (publicly available) and recreate it internally.  
MNOs pay a number of taxes and fees at the company level.30 If a product designer designs a 
service that will generate GHS 2 per month from each subscriber, the Finance department will 
make a claim on part of this revenue to contribute to these overheads, meaning that the product 
owner will benefit from less than GHS 2 per month. The Finance department deals with calculating 
these contributions, but these were not assessed for the purposes of the VFC financial report to 
GSMA. 
C.12 Investment 
Review of baseline 
In addition to those costs directly associated with VFC (both operating and capital), FCDO and 
GSMA have invested in wider programmatic costs that have stimulated and supported this action. 
It is worth noting too that Esoko has a history of investments made over the years by the founder, 
equity investors, programme partners, and various donors.  
 
 
 
30 www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Mobile-taxes-and-fees-A-toolkit-of-principles-and-
evidence_fullreport-FINAL1.pdf 
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Annex D Cost data utilised for the financial model 
Capital expenditure 
Item 
Estimate 
(GBP) 
Source Description 
Vodafone investment 
Funding for integration and 
technology upgrade (content 
provider) 
25,000  
VFC financial 
report 
Actuals: 23,300 
STK set-up 10,000  
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 6,786 
Localisation of content 85,000  CABI budget  
Half of all LCP payments 
allocated to Ghana (it has both 
mAgri and mHealth projects) 
Staff costs (Global Content 
Partner) 
30,000  CABI budget  
Half of all LCP payments 
allocated to Ghana 
Direct costs 9,000  CABI budget  
Half of all LCP payments 
allocated to Ghana 
mNutrition programme (country specific) 
Product development 
Formative evaluation 
(international) 
78,000  
GSMA 
communications 
See average country breakdown 
below 
UX expert and design 
consultants 
150,000  
GSMA 
communications 
See average country breakdown 
below 
mNutrition programme (global) 
Global content development 
Global content partners 250,000  CABI budget  255,910 (per country programme) 
Programme management 
Business intelligence and 
programme management 
(GSMA) 
550,000  
GSMA 
communications 
See average country breakdown 
below 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
GSMA mAgri total project budget average per country:31 £1,422,550. 
Breakdown of above cost per country (using Ghana specifics where available):    
• M&E/business intelligence £78,000 
• UX     £148,600 
• Global content   £255,910 (from CABI budget for Ghana) 
• Local content   £123,698 (from CABI budget for Ghana) 
• Grant amount (VF)  £262,500 
The remainder covers GSMA contributions to business intelligence and programme management: 
£553,843.  
 
31 Personal communication. 
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Operational expenditure 
The following estimates assume that the subscriber base was acquired over an eight-month rapid 
growth period.  
Item 
Estimate 
(GBP) 
Unit Source Description 
Fixed costs 
Product development 
UX expert 4,000 
GBP/qtr in 
rapid growth 
stage 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 19,373 (deliverable 
payments). Budget 25594 in 
four instalments.  
Actuals: 12,480 (UX peak 
salary). Budget: 10,969. 
Total: 31,853 
UX expert (T&S) 200 
GBP/qtr in 
rapid growth 
stage 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 1,321 (single claim) 
UX Misc (data, 
airtime and 
smartphone, 
feature phone, 
dongle) 
200 
GBP/qtr in 
rapid growth 
stage 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: total of  1,273 over 
eight quarters 
User testing 0 
GBP/qtr in 
rapid growth 
stage 
VFC Financial 
report 
No actual expenditure 
Project M&E 3,000 
At launch 
then 50% 
during rapid 
growth 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 6,462, budget was for 
21,755 over seven quarters. 
Grant application was 1,500 per 
quarter 
Content curation 
(LCP) 
34,000 
GBP/year 
(after launch) 
Esoko 
Sustainability Plan 
Lump sum estimate for keeping 
content up to date 
Marketing expenses 
Marketing events 5,000 
GBP/qtr in 
rapid growth 
stage 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 38,707 spent in three 
quarters (Budget was for 
149,909 in six instalments).  
Local radio slots 
and production 
15,000 
GBP/year 
during rapid 
growth stage 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 26,634 spent in two 
instalments  
SIM branding and 
customisation 
14,000 Launch only 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 13,938 spent in first 
year 
Ambassador 
merchandising / 
Sales activation 
48,000 
At launch 
then 50% 
during rapid 
growth 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 211,070. Approx. 
200,000 over two years, drops 
to approx. 22,000/quarter in 
second year 
Administration expenses 
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Item 
Estimate 
(GBP) 
Unit Source Description 
Working group 
travel 
2,000 
GBP/qtr in 
rapid growth 
stage 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 15,688 over first seven 
quarters 
Staff cost: PM 3,000 
GBP/qtr 
rapid growth 
stage, then 
50% 
VFC Financial 
report 
Timesheet: 60 day/qtr at 
£50/day 
Support staff 5,000 
GBP/qtr 
rapid growth 
stage, then 
50% 
VFC Financial 
report, interviews 
Personnel listed in timesheet, 
levels of effort from interviews, 
our estimates of charge rates 
Training 1,000 GBP/qtr 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actuals: 2,016 spent in two 
quarters; budget was 8,227 over 
eight quarters 
Variable costs (cost of sales) 
Cost of SMS 5.5 GH p/SMS Website 
Prevailing market rate for 
individual customers 
Taxes and fees 1.5 % of revenue   
Content provider 0.46 
GBP/qtr/subs
criber 
Interviews 
Original contract paid around 
GHS 0.85 per subscriber per 
month to Esoko. Based on 
original subscription of GHS 2 
per month, this is a 42.5% 
revenue share 
Call centre 0.02 
GBP/qtr/subs
criber 
VFC Financial 
report 
Call centre costs are listed as 
variable cost. Average of actuals 
cost over four quarters = 0.143 
GBP/subscriber/qtr but this 
gives unrealistically high costs. 
Use budget average of 34,454, 
equivalent to average of 0.022 
GBP/sub/qtr 
Cost of 
scratchcards 
0.007 
GBP/qtr/subs
criber 
VFC Financial 
report 
Budget figures are consistently 
based on 0.007 GBP/subs/qtr. 
Actuals are higher; average is 
0.015 
Sales commission 0.15 
GBP/qtr/subs
criber 
VFC Financial 
report 
Actual expenditure averages out 
at 0.15 over a six-quarter period. 
Budget values give average of 
0.18 
 
Source:  Authors’ own 
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Annex E Mobile Technology Developments and Agriculture 
E.1 Technology and mobile business models 
Mobile data use is set to grow. GSMA (2019) predicts that mobile data consumption across sub-
Saharan Africa will multiply seven-fold by 2024 (from 1.1 to 8.5 GB per subscriber per month). 
Although 4G is growing and there is much interest in 5G, 3G internet connections are likely to 
remain the dominant technology for the medium term (see Figure 29).  
 
Figure 29: Breakdown of mobile internet connections by technology 
 
 
Source: GSMA (2019). 
Vodafone Ghana’s partnership with Facebook highlights the growing influence of over-the-top 
(OTT) services on telecommunications markets; currently, 32% of adults in Ghana use social 
networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter (Pew Research Center, 2018), and usage grew 
50% in the two years since 2015. Furthermore, Esselaar and Stork (2018) argue that with data-
driven business models, increased revenue from data services can more than make up for any 
decline in voice revenue from OTT services. They present financial data from MTN Ghana as an 
example of a data-centric business model. Figure 30 shows how data has generated an increasing 
share of total revenue, to the point where it is likely to generate more revenue than traditional voice 
and SMS communication.  
Entertainment services drive a good deal of growth in data use. While televisions become more 
widespread (e.g. demand for solar home systems is often driven by affordable LEC televisions; see 
Global Partnership on Output Based Aid, 2016), the affluent are spending more time watching TV 
and video on mobile devices.32 This trend toward increased access to TV and video is an important 
feature of the changing media landscape in sub-Saharan Africa, and may well have implications for 
agricultural extension services.  
 
32 www.ipsos.com/en/how-digital-driving-media-growth-africa 
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Figure 30: Breakdown of revenue by service (MTN Ghana)  
 
Source: Authors’ own (data from Esselaar and Stork, 2018). 
Smartphone ownership is a key barrier to extending access to mobile internet services. In Ghana, 
smartphone ownership stood at around 35% of adults in 2017, which is marginally above the 
median for sub-Saharan Africa (33%). Smartphone sales are on the rise; GSMA estimates that the 
number of handsets will more than double between 2018 and 2025. Adoption of smartphones in 
remote rural areas is likely to be relatively slow, not only because of poor data network coverage 
but also because of the relatively poor battery life offered by cheap smartphones. Access to a 
smartphone alone is not enough to get people onto the internet. Although 35% of adults had 
smartphones (in 2017), only 30% used the internet, and even then, many will use free wi-fi spots 
rather than purchasing data bundles. Nevertheless, the falling price of smartphones will continue to 
strengthen access to data services. For example, MTN has ambitious plans for selling a $20 ‘smart 
feature’ phone that uses the KaiOS operating system to create a smartphone UX providing access 
to Google and social media apps.33  
Data services will be instrumental to overcoming literacy barriers, as well as to providing a richer 
information dissemination experience in the form of, for example, video. It is likely, therefore, that 
the reach and efficacy of mobile agricultural services targeting the poorest farmers will improve 
once they can be delivered via smartphones. However, the poor network coverage discussed in 
Section 5 suggests that this is unlikely to be the case within the medium term and, in the 
meantime, voice-based features (e.g. Interactive Voice Response (IVR), OBD, the call centre, etc.) 
are likely to be the most effective media for engaging with smallholder farmers.  
There are several indications that Ghana’s mobile market is maturing. Section 7 describes how the 
rate of growth of subscribers has slowed since 2015, adults typically have more than two SIMs, 
and 64% of mobile subscribers use mobile data. Although there remain parts of the country that 
are underserved, steps are being taken to provide coverage to the most remote communities and, 
as mentioned earlier, GIFEC has adopted a target of reaching 95% access to mobile services in 
rural communities during 2019.  
When the VFC concept was put together in 2013, the primary aim of Vodafone was to increase its 
rural base by specifically targeting new mobile subscribers from rural areas. This strategy is valid in 
a growing market where there remains a sufficiently attractive number of potential customers who 
 
33 www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/telecoms-and-technology/2018-11-14-mtn-to-offer-entry-level-smartphones-
costing-20/ 
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have not yet signed up with an MNO (the ‘laggards’). However, this potential diminishes in a 
mature market. GSMA research suggests that the proportion of the population that will not sign up 
for a mobile subscription will bottom out at around one-third of the population after around 2017 
(see Figure 31). In this case, MNOs compete to retain existing customers and to persuade 
customers on competing networks to switch. The VFC concept was, therefore, appropriate at a 
given time, when a substantial part of the population were not yet mobile phone users. The 
strategy was also appropriate only for a given duration, until the people who aspired to own a 
mobile phone but were not registered had done so.  
In a mature market, in which almost all potential subscribers are signed up with one MNO or 
another, the strategy of VAS is to encourage subscribers on other networks to transfer and to 
encourage network subscribers to stay with the MNO that provides a valuable service rather than 
switch to competing networks.  
Figure 31: Saturation of mobile phone market in Ghana 
 
 
Source: Hatt et al., (2017). 
Vodafone’s priorities have changed. As the market has changed, Vodafone has shifted its priority 
from increasing its rural base to maximising revenue generated by that rural base. It plans to do 
this by integrating a number of products based on different technologies. The six years from 2013 
to the present date is a long time in the world of telecommunications.  
Perhaps the most transformational technology that has blossomed since the baseline report is 
mobile money. Adoption of mobile money accounts increased from 13% of Ghanaians in 2014 to 
39% in 2017 (World Bank Group, 2019). Mobile money has been instrumental in increasing 
financial inclusion from 41% in 2010 to 58% in 2015. It is also interesting to note that the largest 
part of this increase is due to the efforts of non-bank financial institutions such as microfinance 
institutions and credit unions, which have deployed solutions based on mobile money platforms. 
The mAgri industry has also picked up on the possibilities for digitising financial transactions 
throughout the value chain and for offering a range of financial services to farmers. MTN mobile 
money is the market leader in Ghana, with Vodafone trailing, as Vodafone Cash was only launched 
late in 2015. 
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E.2 Agriculture and technology 
Farmers, information, and needs 
VFC is an example of an mAgri product that provided farmers with access to agricultural 
information through mobile channels, although VFC itself is a bundle that offers more. These 
services held the potential to complement the faltering reach of traditional agricultural extension 
and advisory services by reaching large numbers of farmers at a much lower cost. They relied on 
complex partnerships that reflected the pluralistic nature of agricultural extension and advisory 
services in most countries, bringing together government services, NGOs, and the private sector.  
Extension and advisory services are designed to help people break out of poverty by, in the words 
of Davis and Franzel (2018), ‘providing farmers with knowledge and tools about modern 
agricultural practices, linking them to new technology, and providing them greater access to 
finance and market solutions’. Their study concludes that mobile phone-based systems still have a 
role to play in agricultural extension and advisory services and that they do indeed represent a low 
cost per farmer for information dissemination. However, they are not best suited as a primary 
source of information. Agricultural extension and advisory services should employ multiple 
methods in integrated approaches that reinforce messages through various channels. Davis and 
Franzel (2018) suggest that mobile phone systems tend to be most useful where they reinforce 
more conventional face-to-face interventions. However, this assessment appears to focus on the 
role of mobile technology in providing farmers with ‘knowledge’, and less on providing them with 
‘tools’. This section takes a look at emerging services, most of which strengthen the ‘agency’ of 
farmers by enhancing their ability to participate in economic activities, i.e. farming. 
The qualitative research shows that farmers’ top priority was access to financial services, notably 
credit and, to some extent, insurance, which most commonly comes in the form of guaranteed 
price agreements between farmers and buyers. Since the inception of the mNutrition programme, 
new services offering such services have come to market, such as Tulaa, Esoko’s Insyt, eHavo, 
and ACRE Africa.34 It is interesting to note that GSMA also identified access to markets and 
finance as key challenges (Palmer & Darabian, 2017a), but concluded that, in 2014, financial 
solutions were not scalable. Instead, GSMA argued that information-based services would provide 
systems that could subsequently be built on. This has proved to be exactly the case for Tulaa and 
Esoko.  
In the baseline qualitative research, farmers themselves identified information on how to access 
credit as their top information priority. During the qualitative endline research, most of the 
respondents complained that financial limitations were a major barrier preventing them from 
implementing the advice they obtained from VFC. For example, they suffered from a lack of money 
to buy: 
• agrochemicals such as fertilisers and herbicides to apply on their farms regularly, as directed in 
the advice; 
• the safety equipment needed when spraying chemicals; and 
• the fruits they had been advised to eat (such as pineapple), which is also common in their 
village. 
 
34 https://acreafrica.com/ 
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Other products 
Insyt is a data collection tool officially launched by Esoko in 2018. It is now positioned as the front 
end of an integrated system. It provides a means of gathering data, typically for registering users 
onto a programme (including useful features such as identifying duplicates), but then the service 
(content) is delivered to customers by the market information system (the core Esoko information 
messaging platform). Insyt provides analytics (dashboard) and Esoko provides further data 
analysis on a consultancy basis. Esoko has always gathered data on farmers as part of onboarding 
for its agricultural information services, so the Insyt product is the result of a move to 
commercialise that technical capability. Insyt was developed as a platform to complete 
assignments for the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty project (registering 300,000 
farmers), has subsequently gathered data on 200,000 farmers for the Government of Ghana, and 
was also able to collect biometric and spatial data on 200,000 farmers for the government under 
the Planting for Food and Jobs Programme.35  
Insyt is currently using a business-to-business (B2B) model whereby corporate clients (e.g. 
government or NGOs) want a service delivered to a specific target group. Insyt projects are 
typically one to four months in duration and account for around 30% of Esoko customers. However, 
they tend to be more intensive and higher-value projects, so revenues from the two services 
offered by Esoko are reasonably balanced. 
A key feature is that Insyt is integrated with a payment system, so individual farmers can be 
charged, and money transferred directly to Esoko. As a bespoke service, Insyt can also offer 
payment and verification systems. As a B2B product, there is facility for direct payment by 
individual farmers, so at the end of a programme, for example, it was not possible for individual 
farmers who liked the programme to continue using the service. Insyt is available through the App 
Store and Esoko is developing an additional market aimed at use by individual users. 
In principle, each Insyt project offers Esoko an opportunity to build its database of farmers. In the 
Planting for Food project it secured co-ownership of the data, but it does not have rights to data 
from the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty project. Although Esoko retains a copy of the 
data, it would need to secure permission from the Ministry to use it. 
The original vision for Tulaa was to provide services required by farmers throughout the 
agricultural cycle – from procuring agricultural inputs to post-harvest. By aggregating transaction 
records, it would also create a financial profile for unbanked farmers, enabling them to access 
financial services. Tulaa developed an app for registering clients because it was developed before 
Insyt was developed.36  
There are multiple ways of registering on Tulaa. Smallholder farmers can register on the system 
through Channel Partners, a network of 60 local field agents that recruits and supports individual 
farmers, and farmers can also contact the call centre.  
Farmers select the products they want to purchase on the system and can then either save for this 
purchase or can take out a loan from Tulaa’s banking partner (or a mixture of both). Tulaa has 
arrangements in place with a small number of suppliers who offer agricultural inputs at a discount. 
When the time comes to make these purchases, the field agents pick up products from the supplier 
outlet in the district capital and deliver them to farmers (Kenya only). 
 
35 https://esoko.com/esoko-digitising-data-collection-insyt/ 
36 Fasiba (the first incarnation of Tulaa) was developed under a grant from USAID’s Feed the Future in 2016. 
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Tulaa offers flexible savings arrangements in terms of frequency of payments and amounts. If a 
farmer is given credit, a deal is made with an off-taker to buy a certain amount of produce at 
harvest. This is at an attractive price, and has the advantage of being guaranteed. The off-taker 
then pays the money to Tulaa, who returns it to the financial service provider. The system sends 
farmers reminders on their savings plan and offers incentives such as free airtime.  
The system uses a mobile money aggregator that links to the mobile money services of all MNOs. 
MNO sales teams tend to accompany Tulaa staff when they go into the field on marketing 
campaigns, because each farmer needs to set up a mobile money wallet with their own MNO. 
Tulaa then sets up the lay-wallets used for making purchases on the Tulaa platform.  
Farmerline continue to offer services both to individual farmers and to agricultural businesses. 
Individual farmers can access market price information, weather information, and agriculture tips 
through the 399 service. Farmerline has scaled its reach by partnering with MTN Ghana. The 
subscription fee can be paid with airtime or via MTN mobile money. It also offers services that 
connect farmers to markets and that enable farmers to access agricultural inputs (including 
irrigation equipment) and even solar energy. Farmerline also expects to be able to use subscribers’ 
credit history to facilitate access to more sophisticated financial services. The platform is marketed 
to businesses as a data-driven means of improving efficiency and productivity. It offers field and 
farmer monitoring, data analytics, and certification tracking, in addition to all the other 
improvements that farmers can make to their own agricultural practice.  
ACRE Africa is an example of a purely financial services product that has been built on the 
features offered by MNO mobile money services. It enables smallholder farmers to insure their 
crops and livestock against climate-associated risks, such as drought. Although farmers can 
register and make premium contributions on an individual basis, ACRE also works through farmer 
aggregators. In Kenya it has launched a KSH 50 card as something tangible that farmers can ‘buy’. 
They can then top up their account as and when they have spare cash up to two months before the 
harvest is due. Interestingly, 60% of ACRE’s customers are women. If certain threshold climatic 
conditions are met, ACRE pays out to eligible customers using a fixed rate (e.g. KSH 1,500 per 
KSH 50 premium). ACRE is not in itself an insurer, but rather works in partnership with local 
insurance companies and reinsurers. The product is fully integrated with MNOs’ systems, as 
onboarding requires USSD platforms, and the business is based on micro-financial transactions 
facilitated by mobile money services.  
Agrocenta was founded by two ex-Esoko employees, Francis Obirikorang and Michael K. 
Ocansey, in 2015. It has developed two products, both heavily based on financial services: 
• Agrotrade – farmer registrations, inventory management, logistics, and tracking: ‘This is our 
online trading platform responsible for facilitating trade between smallholder farmers and 
consumers or buyers. Over 12,000 farmers are currently signed up on AgroTrade with over 
USD220k worth of commodities traded.’ 
• Agropay – digital payments, micro-lending, and crop insurance: ‘This is our financial inclusion 
platform targeted still at smallholder farmers. We make is super easy for institutions to on-lend 
and disburse funds to a large network of small farmers.’ 
Cowtribe allows farmers to schedule and receive veterinary treatment for livestock and track the 
health statistics of each animal. Farmers pay an initial subscription fee of US$ 5, and then 
Cowtribe charges a commission on any vaccines ordered through the platform. Since launching in 
May 2016, it has expanded services to over 119 communities and 29,000 farmers in Ghana. It 
started providing access to vets who travelled to the farm when needed. This quickly proved not to 
be sustainable because distances in the north (Tamale) are too great – it can take six hours to get 
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to a farm (and six back again). After rethinking the solution, it instead focused on prevention rather 
than cure – delivering vaccinations to farms. 
An innovation that has recently emerged is crowdsourcing of agricultural investment. This is an 
interesting idea because it sources funding from investors, often city dwellers, by appealing to their 
interest in farming (so-called ‘armchair farmers’). One approach is for the company to link investors 
to farmers directly (e.g. Farmcrowdy). In an alternative model, the company raises funds from 
multiple small-scale investors and then invests the capital in farmland owned or managed by the 
company itself. Tsan et al. (2019) estimate that there are now around 30 such crowdfunding 
enterprises in Africa.  
Another addition is products aiming to improve logistics at the bottom of the value chain: 
• Ghalani supply chain management – provides a platform on which farmers can organise 
themselves into groups for deliveries (and bargaining); and 
• TruckR – farmers can use a mobile app to book a truck to take products to market. 
The government in Ghana is taking steps to promote digital systems in support of agriculture. In 
November 2018, Ghana recorded the first ever electronic trading of a commodity by the Ghana 
Commodity Exchange, whose ‘key goal is to link Ghanaian smallholder farmers to agricultural 
and financial markets in Ghana and across the West Africa Region to ensure Ghana farmers 
secure competitive prices for their commodities, as well as supply good quality commodities which 
meet the nutritional needs of the Ghanaian people’.37 The Ghana Commodity Exchange is a 
private company, structured as a public–private partnership, with the Government of Ghana being 
the sole shareholder.  
Emerging trends 
The services outlined above illustrate how emerging mAgri products are tending to integrate 
financial services into a broader range of farmer support services that address different parts of the 
value chain. Note that even transactional services that enable farmers to conduct activities with 
greater ease (e.g. transporting goods to markets through TruckR, or vaccinating their livestock at 
the right time through Cowtribe) take advantage of mobile money payment facilities. This section 
presents just a few examples of emerging mobile technology for agriculture products; a much more 
detailed and comprehensive overview of emerging products is available from Tsan et al. (2019). 
This publication makes a distinction between ICT4Ag products such as Esoko, which were mostly 
information dissemination VAS deployed in partnership with MNOs, and the new landscape of 
D4Ag innovations that use digital technologies and data to transform practices across the 
agricultural value chain. They also categorise D4Ag solutions into the five primary use cases 
described in Table 19.  
It is worth remembering that farmers have no financial history, so they have no risk profile, which 
effectively excludes them from financial services. Furthermore, financial institutions generally 
regard smallholder farmers as high risk because they tend not to use modern agricultural practices 
that are more resilient, e.g. to drought or pests. Some of the emerging services see value in using 
transactional data from a digital platform to create financial profiles that can then enable farmers to 
access financial services.  
  
 
37 https://gcx.com.gh/who_we_are/ 
Mobile phones, nutrition, and agriculture in Ghana: Business modelling endline report 
e-Pact 100 
Table 19:  Categorisation of D4Ag innovations 
Category Definition and link to smallholder 
farming ecosystem  
Examples of solutions  
Advisory and 
information 
services 
Digitally delivered information on 
topics such as agronomic best 
practices, pests and diseases, 
weather, and market prices, as well as 
more sophisticated digital advisory 
services and farm management 
software tailored to the specific farmer, 
farm, or field that enable smallholder 
farmers to make decisions that 
maximise output from their land, 
improve the quality of agricultural 
production, and maximise farm 
revenues and profits via lower costs of 
production, improved ability to identify 
markets, and/or better price realisation 
• Agronomic/livestock management good 
practices  
• Market information systems and services 
(i.e. agriculture input and crop/livestock 
price intelligence)  
• Early warning tools for weather/climate 
advisory or pest/disease control  
• Customised (precision) advisory services at 
the level of farmer, farm, or specific field  
• Participatory platforms (e.g. peer-to-peer 
smallholder communities or curated farmer 
videos)  
• Livestock and farm management software 
Market 
linkages 
Digitally enabled solutions that link 
smallholder farmers to high-quality 
farm inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilisers, 
herbicides/pesticides), production and 
post-harvest machinery, and 
mechanisation services (e.g. irrigation, 
tractors, and cold storage), or off-take 
markets, including agro-dealers, 
wholesalers, retailers, or even end-
consumers. Digital market linkage 
solutions allow smallholder farmers to 
lower their costs of production via 
access to lower-cost and/or higher-
quality inputs, reduce the costs and 
risks of finding and transacting with 
buyers, and ultimately increase their 
yields and incomes 
• Linkages to agri-inputs (e.g. digitally 
enabled input distribution or online input 
marketplaces) 
• Mechanisation linkage platforms (e.g. 
shared economy for mechanisation or pay-
as-you-go irrigation) 
• Linkage to market access (e.g. digitally 
enabled linkages to wholesale buyers) 
• End-to-end integrated market linkage 
models (e.g. digital linkage to both inputs 
and markets)  
• Buyer–seller digital 
marketplaces/exchanges 
Supply chain 
management 
Digital supply chain management 
solutions are B2B services that help 
agribusinesses, cooperatives, nucleus 
farms, input agro-dealers, and other 
smallholder farmer value chain 
intermediaries to manage their 
smallholder relationships in ways that 
lower costs through greater efficiency, 
improve value chain quality through 
better traceability and accountability, 
and ultimately increase smallholder 
farmer yields and incomes by making it 
easier for more commercial players to 
formally engage with large numbers of 
smallholder farmers 
• Traceability solutions (e.g. digital 
sustainability and organic product 
certification tracking)  
• Enterprise resource planning platforms for 
smallholder farmer cooperatives, nucleus 
farms, and agribusiness out-grower 
schemes  
• Digital quality assurance solutions for farm 
inputs and produce  
• Logistics management solutions for post-
harvest cold chains, storage, and transport 
Financial 
access 
Digital financial services relevant for 
smallholder farmers, such as digital 
payments, savings, smallholder credit, 
and agricultural insurance, which 
increase financial access and equip 
smallholder farmers to improve yields 
and incomes and invest in the longer-
term growth of their farms (e.g. via 
better inputs, mechanisation, and 
expansion to new crops). Also includes 
• Smallholder farmer payment solutions (e.g. 
agribusiness to farmer, government to 
farmer, farmer to input supplier, etc.)  
• Digital agri-wallets and commitment savings 
systems  
• Smallholder credit (e.g. digital credit 
assessment/delivery/collection platforms 
and products)  
Mobile phones, nutrition, and agriculture in Ghana: Business modelling endline report 
e-Pact 101 
Source: Tsan et al. (2019). 
Tsan et al. (2019) point out that D4Ag enterprises are increasingly diversifying their business 
models and bundling services from multiple categories. This is interesting as social impact 
investors are coming to the view that start-ups that provide multiple services are likely to be better 
investments. This is partly a consequence of the cost of customer acquisition among smallholder 
farming communities. A user base represents an asset of value, which can then be exploited by 
providing multiple services or products. Emerging opportunities within the value chain is an area 
where GSMA has already done a good deal of research and continues to work with MNOs and 
entrepreneurs through the AgriTech programme.38 
 
 
38 www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/agritech/ 
B2B digitalisation and data analytics 
services for financial institutions that 
enable such institutions to serve 
smallholder farmers at substantially 
lower cost and risk 
• Smallholder insurance (e.g. digitally 
enabled index weather, precipitation, and 
pest insurance)  
• Crowdfunding platforms for smallholder 
farming  
• B2B fintech data analytics intermediaries 
(e.g. digital credit profiles) 
Macro 
agricultural 
intelligence 
Data analytics solutions and digital 
decision support tools that integrate a 
variety of data sources on smallholder 
farmers, farms, and markets and 
convert this information into useful 
country- and value chain-level insights 
and decision tools for government 
policymakers, extension agencies, 
agronomists, agribusinesses, and 
investors 
• Government agriculture sector tracking 
dashboards  
• Agriculture extension system management 
tools  
• Agribusiness and agriculture investor 
national and regional intelligence systems  
• Agronomy/research and development 
agenda-setting digital tools  
• Weather and climate observatories for 
agriculture 
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Annex F VFC in the context of other mNutrition projects 
F.1 Overview of mNutrition projects 
Billings et al., (forthcoming, 2020) conclude that VFC has had little effect on primary nutrition and 
agricultural outcomes: ‘Being offered the VFC service or having used it at least once has minimal 
impacts on household and women’s dietary diversity, agriculture production, or nutrition or farming 
knowledge.’ However, in terms of implementation, VFC has not been the most successful of the 
mAgri projects, so it is important not to judge the viability of the concept deployed under the 
mNutrition programme (i.e. of using mobile technology to support smallholder farmers) solely on 
findings from the study on VFC. The purpose of this section is, therefore, to put the performance 
and structure of VFC into the broader context of other similar products supported through the 
mNutrition programme. Learning points from all six of the agriculture solutions supported under the 
mNutrition initiative are summarised in the GSMA report by Palmer and Darabian (2017a), which 
has been used as the source of much of the detail in this section. This has been supplemented by 
information from the six individual case studies published by GSMA. The six products are: 
• VFC (Vodafone, Ghana) – free calls to members, advice on crops, weather, and market prices 
available in 10 languages via SMS and OBD (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017c). 
• Govi Mithuru (Dialog, Sri Lanka) – agricultural advice on eight crops, nutrition, and home 
gardening, with a focus on reducing chemical inputs (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017d). 
• GP Krishi Sheba (GrameenPhone, Bangladesh) – agricultural advice on 16 crops plus livestock 
via OBD (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017e). 
• M’chikumbe (Airtel, Malawi) – information on 15 crops and Airtel Money via IVR and SMS 
(Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017f). 
• Khushaal Zaminder (Telenor, Pakistan) – messages on agriculture plus livestock and weather 
via OBD, SMS, and IVR (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017b). 
• Site Pyo (Ooredoo, Myanmar) – smartphone app providing access to information on 10 crops 
and weather, supported by SMS reminders (Palmer, T. and Darabian, N. 2017g). 
An overview of the different country contexts is given in Table 20. Table 21 shows that all of the 
MNOs worked in partnership with both a technology partner and content partner, who ‘localised’ 
the content provided by the Global Content Partnership. This was not a trivial task and was closely 
linked to activities carried out by local UX partners – engaging with users was a key feature in 
getting the messages right. Two projects (Sri Lanka and Malawi) went further still by partnering 
with content stylisation companies.  
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Table 20: Countries and programmes at a glance  
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VFC, Ghana 67% 28 46% 22% 42% 38% 1.47 70,000 5% 
Govi Mithuru, 
Dialog Sri Lanka 
69% 21 82% 11% 39% 35% 0.75 252,000 34% 
GP Krishi Sheba, 
GrameenPhone 
Bangladesh 
53% 160 66% 16% 48% 68% 1.77 432,000 24% 
M’chikumbe, 
Airtel Malawi 
26% 17 84% 27% 64% 70% 0.49 90,000 1% 
Khushaal Zamindar, 
Telenor Pakistan 
47% 188 61% 25% 44% 76% 2.15 2,465,000 115% 
Site Pyo, 
Ooredoo Myanmar 
48% 55 66% 48% 70% - 2.97 38,000 18% 
Source: Palmer and Darabian (2017a). 
Table 21: Project partnerships 
 Content partner Content stylisation 
Local 
UX 
Technology 
Call 
centre 
VFC  
(Vodafone, Ghana) 
Esoko n/a Cobalt Esoko Esoko 
Govi Mithuru  
(Dialog, Sri Lanka) 
CABI Sync Solutions - Synapse n/a 
GP Krishi Sheba  
(GrameenPhone, 
Bangladesh) 
winMiaki n/a - SDD Tech Miaki 
M’chikumbe  
(Airtel, Malawi) 
Self-help Africa Roofhouse Revel 
Human 
Network 
International 
(HNI) 
n/a 
Khushaal Zaminder  
(Telenor, Pakistan) 
CABI, Scaling up 
Nutrition, MDF 
Planet Beyond n/a 
Planet 
Beyond 
Abacus 
Site Pyo  
(Ooredoo, Myanmar) 
Miaki n/a n/a 
Revotech, 
IMImobile* 
n/a 
* server hosting and hardware support 
Source:  Authors’ own 
Note that, in addition to these partners, GSMA acted as funding and consultancy partner to all 
projects. 
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F.2 Comparing key aspects of mNutrition products 
Drawing on key issues arising from the study, this section compares aspects of VFC with the other 
projects supported by mNutrition.  
Table 22:  Responsibility for product development 
Product Description 
VFC  
(Vodafone, Ghana) 
VFC was originally set up under the Strategy and Innovation Department 
but was subsequently relocated to mass markets under the Marketing 
Department. Staff turnover meant that it lacked strong product 
management. Although it had cross-functional support within Vodafone, it 
lacked internal UX expertise, relying on the external partners, Cobalt. 
However, without strong product management, insights from UX work 
were hard to implement. 
Govi Mithuru  
(Dialog, Sri Lanka) 
The product was developed by a dedicated team situated within the 
Sustainability Department. Initially, the project was assigned two full-time 
staff – a product manager and a UX lead. However, the team later grew to 
over six members, including a content specialist. 
GP Krishi Sheba  
(GrameenPhone, 
Bangladesh) 
Rather than being treated in the same way as a normal VAS product, 
Krishi Sheba was set up as a special project under the Commercial 
Department of GrameenPhone in Bangladesh. However, like VFC, 
GrameenPhone relied on strategic partnerships to drive product 
development. The product manager and UX lead resided in Win Miaki 
rather than GrameenPhone. Having yet another partner deal with 
technology (SSD Tech) led to problems in prioritising work, even though 
GrameenPhone had a longstanding arrangement with SSD Tech to host 
all of their VAS. 
M’chikumbe  
(Airtel, Malawi) 
Within Airtel Malawi, the product development team was located in the 
Airtel Money Department, although it was set up as a standalone product. 
The team included a product manager, a UX lead, and a part-time VAS 
expert. Like GrameenPhone, Airtel had a longstanding relationship with 
the technology provider, HNI, which was already providing the 3-2-1 VAS. 
Khushaal Zaminder  
(Telenor, Pakistan) 
Khushaal Zaminder originally appears to have been treated as any other 
VAS, established by a small team of two (product manager and UX lead) 
situated in the VAS department. However, once its growth was evident, it 
was restructured in 2015 as a separate business unit with its own director, 
even though, as a free service, it was not generating revenue. The unit 
has subsequently developed additional mAgri products, e.g. an app-based 
agricultural extension service in partnership with provincial government. 
Site Pyo  
(Ooredoo, Myanmar) 
Although Site Pyo was established as a special project within Ooredoo, 
product development appears to have been driven by a third-party 
developer Miaki, which had a team of three (product manager, data 
analyst, and content specialist). 
Source:  Authors’ own 
Krishi Sheba (Bangladesh), Site Pyo (Myanmar), and VFC (Ghana) all relied on strategic partners 
to drive product development. In contrast, in two of the more successful products (Govi Mithuru in 
Sri Lanka and Khushaal Zaminder in Pakistan), the MNO sourced product development expertise 
internally, as did Airtel Malawi (M’chikumbe). This led GSMA to conclude that MNO ownership and 
strong product development teams are key to success when the service is MNO-led. Where 
product development is driven by a strategic partner, the nature of the relationship is key. During 
the inception stages of VFC, communication between the two parties was facilitated by a single 
member of staff who had moved from Esoko to join the team at Vodafone before the project. 
However, after she left relations between the parties started to deteriorate. 
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Note also that the two most successful products included specific provision for stylisation partners 
(Sync Solutions in Sri Lanka and Planet Beyond in Pakistan). GSMA concluded that ‘dynamic, 
informative push messages increase users’ engagement’ (Palmer & Darabian 2017a). For 
example, Khushaal Zamindar’s OBD messages were formatted as conversations between 
household members, rather like a soap opera. When it was suggested that VFC messages be 
stylised in some way, Vodafone said this was Esoko’s responsibility – and Esoko said it did not 
have the resources.  
GSMA has concluded that an agile and user-centric product development process is key to 
success. Esoko stands out from other services in having a long track record of providing 
agricultural information services to smallholder farmers for over 10 years prior to their partnership 
with Vodafone. It had, therefore, well-developed products and processes refined over years of 
experience of working with farmers. On the one hand, this made for an attractive proposition 
because it had experience and systems in place, reducing the capital expenditure required; on the 
other hand, it meant that it was less interesting and appealing for it to engage with UX design 
processes offered to partners through the mNutrition programme. VFC was the first of the projects 
to launch, as a result of having pre-existing systems. However, it subsequently proved to be 
resistant to change. For example, Palmer and Darabian (2017c) describe six specific 
recommendations arising from product iteration workshops, of which four were implemented. Other 
projects were more willing to make changes to products; for example, Dialog in Sri Lanka 
implemented all seven of the recommendations made.  
Table 23:  Top-level leadership for mNutrition projects 
Product Description 
VFC  
(Vodafone, Ghana) 
Vodafone Ghana has had two changes in CEO over the duration of the 
programme. The C-level champion originally driving the project at the 
proposal stage also left. 
Govi Mithuru  
(Dialog, Sri Lanka) 
Expansion of the product team was driven by CEO-level support, which 
was stimulated by evidence of commercial benefit in terms of sales and 
indirect benefits, including increased revenue and improved loyalty. 
GP Krishi Sheba  
(GrameenPhone, 
Bangladesh) 
Turnover at the C-level led to internal changes and delays in 
development of the Krishi Sheba product. 
M’chikumbe  
(Airtel, Malawi) 
The M’chikumbe service is supported by Airtel’s CEO, who regards it 
as a positive factor in establishing customer loyalty, even though it 
does not generate substantial revenues. 
Khushaal Zaminder  
(Telenor, Pakistan) 
Telenor’s CEO was clearly convinced of the commercial viability of the 
agricultural sector as he set up a dedicated business unit to address 
mAgri, based on Khushaal Zaminder. 
Site Pyo  
(Ooredoo, Myanmar) 
No details. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
Vodafone experienced a high degree of staff turnover at all levels (see Section 4.2). The first new 
CEO introduced drastic changes to the VFC business model (although there were multiple factors 
lying behind this decision – see Section 4). The VFC product was paused shortly before the CEO 
changed again. Continuity of vision and leadership is a key factor in driving a new product, and 
was lacking in VFC. GSMA has subsequently identified the importance of this and recently 
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introduced provision for legacy planning as part of its due diligence procedures in ongoing 
programmes.39  
Table 24:  Technology platforms 
Product Description 
VFC  
(Vodafone, Ghana) 
The VFC technology platform was owned and previously developed by 
Esoko, but Vodafone had no previous partnership with Esoko. 
Govi Mithuru  
(Dialog, Sri Lanka) 
The technology partner, Synapse, had a strong relationship with 
Dialog. 
GP Krishi Sheba  
(GrameenPhone, 
Bangladesh) 
The technology partner, SSD, owns the platform, which is used for all 
its VAS. 
M’chikumbe  
(Airtel, Malawi) 
The platform was owned and operated by HNI, and is to be developed 
to handle OBD. HNI previously supported existing services for Airtel. 
Khushaal Zaminder  
(Telenor, Pakistan) 
The platform was owned and operated by Planet Beyond, who had an 
existing relationship with Telenor. 
Site Pyo  
(Ooredoo, Myanmar) 
The system was built and owned by the technology partner, Revotech, 
but technology aspects of the project were managed by Miaki, which 
drove product development. 
 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
Esoko was unique among technical platform partners in providing services to farmers under its 
own brand prior to the partnership with Vodafone. Having developed its platform to match its own 
needs, and having continued to develop its own brand offerings throughout the project, it is 
understandable how Esoko might not have been as flexible in making substantial changes to the 
product and the platform as other partners. In most of the projects, the MNO had good working 
relationships with the content providers prior to the mNutrition project, but this was not the case 
with VFC. 
 
 
39 Personal communication. 
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Table 25:  Customer acquisition 
Product Description 
VFC  
(Vodafone, Ghana) 
Intensive marketing at launch was expensive. It was difficult to devise 
effective incentives for ambassadors, so the idea was dropped. Similarly, 
incentives for field agents to do complex onboarding proved elusive. 
Govi Mithuru  
(Dialog, Sri Lanka) 
At launch, radio marketing and a dedicated field sales channel proved 
expensive and not very effective. Numbers were driven up by target OBD-
based registrations, scratchcard activation, free trials, and field events. It 
also seems to have reached a critical mass of subscribers, at which point 
word of mouth became influential. Marketing expenses remained high, so 
costs were cut by reducing the team, adopting low-cost marketing, and 
strategic partnerships.  
GP Krishi Sheba  
(GrameenPhone, 
Bangladesh) 
On-the-ground marketing by Win Miaki and partner NGOs was expensive. 
Targeted telemarketing was less expensive but still failed to reach scale. 
Numbers were driven up by an SMS/OBD campaign and a free trial 
period. 
M’chikumbe  
(Airtel, Malawi) 
Acquisition costs were high during an initial nationwide launch. Costs rose 
again when rolling out a second campaign marketing revised content. 
Self-registration brought costs down.  
Khushaal Zaminder  
(Telenor, Pakistan) 
Targeted OBD marketing campaign. Rural sales teams raised awareness. 
A pilot of NGO partners raised awareness in 1,000 villages but this was 
found to not be cost-effective and was dropped. Once a critical mass of 
users signed up, word of mouth was the most common means of 
attracting new users.  
Site Pyo  
(Ooredoo, Myanmar) 
An initial low-cost marketing campaign using social media, SMS, and OBD 
resulted in slow growth. Although expensive, roadshows were effective in 
raising awareness and identifying problems. An updated version, with 
simpler registration and profiling, was then promoted through a more 
concerted digital marketing campaign.  
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
Face-to-face contact is highly valued by famers, especially in terms of building trust, but on-the-
ground marketing activities were universally found to be prohibitively expensive. Three projects 
tried working with field partners (NGOs) to facilitate a field presence, but with limited success. 
GrameenPhone in Bangladesh and Telenor in Pakistan found that working with NGOs was still too 
expensive. The detail of these NGOs is not available, nor what activities they were asked to do. 
VFC customers struggled with registration and profiling, and Vodafone struggled to find the right 
set of incentives to ensure that agents did these tasks diligently. It would seem unreasonable to 
expect partner NGOs to do these types of activities significantly more cheaply than agents. 
However, in principle, raising awareness might be something simple that NGOs, cooperatives, etc. 
could do. 
Note that OBD was commonly used as part of low-cost marketing activities that were successful in 
driving up numbers (e.g. Govi Mithuru in Sri Lanka, Krishi Sheba in Bangladesh, Khushaal 
Zaminder in Pakistan, and Site Pyo in Myanmar). However, VFC appears to have been unique in 
specifically targeting new mobile subscribers from rural areas. Given this target market, low-cost 
methods such as OBD/SMS campaigns were not an option.  
VFC was also a complex product. Other products provided farmers with information, typically on 
agriculture, livestock, and weather. The M’chikumbe product in Malawi also provided information 
on the Airtel Money service. Only VFC and M’chikumbe also provided users with market prices. 
However, VFC was more than a VAS – it was a bundle or customer plan, as it provided users with 
access to free calls to other members (through the CUG) and discounted tariffs to other mobile 
users. This raised marketing challenges, as sales agents could sell VFC as a low-cost airtime 
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product rather than as an agricultural VAS. This, in turn, contributed to some confusion over the 
identity of the product, and the monitoring research found that many users were unaware of all of 
the features available with the product. 
Table 26:  Commercial viability 
Product Description 
VFC  
(Vodafone, Ghana) 
The primary mission was to increase the rural base and rural revenue. 
Capital expenditure was low as Esoko had established systems in place. 
Vodafone did not benefit from any substantial economies of scale as Esoko 
was paid a fee per subscriber.40 The subscription fee was dropped to 
accelerate base growth, then reintroduced at a reduced rate. Operational 
breakeven was achieved in 15 months. 
Govi Mithuru  
(Dialog, Sri Lanka) 
The subscription rate of LKR 1 per crop per day was simple to understand, 
even if expensive (US$ 0.16 per crop per month). Direct revenues were, 
therefore, substantial. ARPU was 5% higher among users, and churn was 
marginally lower (by 3%). Operational breakeven was achieved in 18 
months. 
GP Krishi Sheba  
(GrameenPhone, 
Bangladesh) 
Initially offering the product for free was not sustainable, especially given 
that users already tended to have multiple SIMs. A charge of US$ 0.24 per 
month was unaffordable, so this was reduced to US$ 0.16 per month. ARPU 
was improved, as the proportion of users not using their SIM (in 90 days) 
reduced from 17% to 5%. It is expected to pay back the investment in two 
years.  
M’chikumbe  
(Airtel, Malawi) 
The revenue generated is low (based on a subscription fee of only US$ 0.06 
per month after three free calls), but data analysis showed that churn was 
reduced by 70% among users. Although churn in rural markets is low 
(around 1%), Airtel perceived value in M’chikumbe in engendering loyalty.  
Khushaal Zaminder  
(Telenor, Pakistan) 
The service is free so does not generate any direct revenue. Word of mouth 
marketing reduces cost of acquisition. Capital costs were limited by using 
existing technology (Telenor and Planet Beyond). Indirect benefits were 
demonstrated, including a 3.5% increase in ARPU and 42% reduction in 
churn. It ran a successful advertising pilot for a B2B agribusiness customer, 
and plans to generate direct revenue this way. 
Site Pyo  
(Ooredoo, Myanmar) 
As a free service, Site Pyo does not generate direct revenue. It did, 
however, contribute to Ooredoo’s increased reach into rural areas. It also 
yielded indirect benefits: ARPU increased by 14% and there was a 6% 
increase in data use. 
Source:  Authors’ own 
Several MNOs demonstrated the effectiveness of these products in increasing the stickiness of 
customers (reduced churn) and increasing rural revenue (higher ARPU). These metrics are key in 
multi-SIM markets where customers tend to swap SIMs between operators. It has been pointed out 
that churn tends to be low in rural areas, which is consistent with the finding that many rural 
communities have access to only one reliable network. VFC is unique in specifically targeting new 
rural customers not yet on any network, who will tend to generate low ARPU levels. The structure 
was also different in that the product bundled the value-added type of services with airtime, rather 
than offering a VAS (free or subscription) to encourage customers to keep the operator’s SIM as 
their active SIM.  
Changes to the business model and fee subscription rates allegedly left consumers confused 
about the product, which had an effect on levels of trust and adoption rates.  
 
40 The contract included a sliding scale of fees, meaning that Vodafone paid slightly less at higher volumes. 
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Govi Mithuru (Sri Lanka) and Krishi Sheba (Bangladesh) claim to be justified in financial terms 
(breakeven and payback period), whereas free/freemium services such as M’chikumbe (Malawi), 
Khushaal Zaminder (Pakistan), and Site Pyo (Myanmar) were justified in terms of indirect benefits 
(ARPU and churn). The successful piloting of advertising by Khushaal Zaminder illustrates 
potential for monetising a rural customer base, which may become more widely recognised in the 
future. Note that Ghana is the most urbanised of the countries (only 46% of the population is rural), 
and a relatively small proportion of the workforce is engaged in agriculture (42% – only Sri Lanka is 
lower at 39%; see Table 20), so the future potential for monetising an agricultural base may be 
greater in other countries. 
F.3 mNutrition and capacity building 
Even though Vodafone did not invest in procuring UX expertise, it highlighted the work of Cobalt 
and Frog as being of particular value. It said that since the development of VFC, it had contracted 
in this kind of expertise to assist with the development of other products. Dialog in Sri Lanka has 
built on the success of the Govi Mithuri product and is developing an app version. It is employing 
the same product development and UX research methodologies introduced under the mNutrition 
programme, using a mix of in-house and bought-in expertise. Telenor Pakistan went a step further 
in internalising techniques learned through mNutrition. After the product development team showed 
the CEO the UX process, the company set up a dedicated design studio following the layout of 
mNutrition processes. 
The Advanced Analytics team within Telenor’s Business Intelligence team successfully used 
innovative data-modelling techniques to devise improved marketing methods.41 They took a 
sample of 50,000 Khushaal Zaminder users and a sample of 50,000 users from the mass market 
base (i.e. not Khushaal Zaminder users). They then explored a wealth of data available from caller 
records to identify a limited number of variables used in a model to predict whether a user would 
be signed up for the services or not signed up. These variables included details of voice, SMS, 
data, and VAS usage, engagement indicators (e.g. ARPU, churn), and type of handset. They then 
tested the model on a further sample of 20,000 users, split equally between Khushaal Zaminder 
users and non-users. Running the model on the mass base identified a further 1.1 million Telenor 
customers whose behaviour closely matched that of Khushaal Zaminder users. They then 
launched an OBD/SMS marketing campaign targeting these customers, and found the conversion 
rate improved from 1% to over 5%. This contrasts with the blast SMS campaign run by Vodafone, 
sent to the mass subscriber base as a whole, which was part of the marketing push to reach the 
target number of subscribers. Only after the KPI was reached did Vodafone begin analysing the 
VFC customer base to weed out ineligible customers. 
Almost all the products initially had difficulty with the registration and onboarding processes, 
especially around the profiling of farmers and their choice of crops, which tended to require 
multiple data entry. All the products, including VFC, went on to devise some form of single click 
registration that compromised the level of detail gathered. UX research conducted by other 
operators found that it was important for the pathway from registration to accessing data to be a 
short as possible. However, VFC had a two-step registration process (invisible to the user) 
whereby Vodafone passed details of registered customers to Esoko, who then entered them into 
the information dissemination platform. Customers could, therefore, wait up to seven days before 
seeing the kind of information they had paid for. 
 
41 www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/country/pakistan/telenor-pakistan-uses-data-science-and-analytics-to-boost-
mAgri-uptake/ 
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F.4 Customer acquisition rates 
GSMA reports (Palmer and Darabian, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c) show that, as at May 2017, the six 
agri VAS services supported under the mNutrition initiative had registered 5.1 million users. 
Subscriber growth trends for each of the separate projects have been disaggregated from their 
figures, and are presented in Figure 32. Of course, each product has its own development history, 
which may well explain the trends evident in the figures (e.g. changes in marketing strategy, 
product revisions and relaunches, etc.). In this section we look for similarities in the growth profiles 
of each of the products.  
Figure 32:  Subscriber growth trends 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
Although these data are far from complete, trends from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Malawi in 
particular suggest that subscriber numbers initially grow exponentially, but once a certain threshold 
is reached (the point of discontinuity) growth continues but at a slower rate, closer to a straight-line 
profile.  
Inspection of Figure 32 suggests that the point of discontinuity occurs at the end of quarter 5 (note 
that in the case of Ooredoor Myanmar, this represents only four quarters of growth). Exponential 
curves (represented by the following equation) give a reasonable fit to each of these periods of 
initial growth (see Figure 33 and Table 27): 
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𝑁 = 𝑒𝑚.𝑥 
 
Where: 
N = subscriber numbers 
m = exponential coefficient 
x = number of the quarter 
 
Figure 33:  Subscriber growth trends – rapid growth stage 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Table 27:  Exponential curve fit (initial growth period) 
Product Exponential 
coefficient (m) 
Curve fit (R2) 
VFC, Ghana 0.36 0.97 
Govi Mithuru, Dialog Sri Lanka 1.02 0.90 
GP Krishi Sheba, GrameenPhone Bangladesh 1.08 0.94 
M’chikumbe, Airtel Malawi 0.42 0.97 
Khushaal Zamindar, Telenor Pakistan 1.05 0.97 
Site Pyo, Ooredoo Myanmar 1.20 0.96 
Source:  Authors’ own 
 
This table shows that most projects grew at a similar rate (coefficient, m, of roughly 1.0), but two 
products grew at a much slower rate (VFC and M’chikumbe in Malawi) (coefficient, m, of roughly 
0.4).  
Only Khushaal Zaminder in Pakistan has come anywhere near reaching the estimated target 
market (see Table 20), so this is the only programme in which subscriber growth might be 
expected to be restricted by saturating the potential market.  
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Annex G Mobile services and motivation 
G.1 The unwillingness to pay puzzle 
One of the most compelling publications on the benefits of mAgri services is GSMA’s synthesis of 
the six programmes supported through its mNutrition programming (Palmer and Tarabian, 2017a). 
This shows that not only did users of mAgri services access agricultural information through their 
mobile phone but, more importantly, they were more likely to adopt improved agricultural practices, 
something that was evident across all programmes. The numbers of subscribers attracted by some 
programmes is impressive, but especially so for the Khushhaal Zamindar service offered by 
Telenor Pakistan, which reported 2.9 million users, representing nearly half of the potential target 
market.  
Although the VFC in Ghana reached nearly 250,000 subscribers by mid-2017 (Palmer and 
Tarabian, 2017a), numbers have since dropped off and appear to have settled at around 60,000.42 
This fall in numbers is ascribed to the reintroduction of a monthly subscription fee. Toward the end 
of 2016, the GHS 2 per month subscription fee was dropped as part of efforts to reach a target 
number of subscribers. Once this was achieved, a much-reduced fee of GHS 0.5 per month was 
introduced in mid-2017. It is interesting to note that the Pakistan services were offered free of 
charge to subscribers (Palmer and Tarabian, 2017b), being paid for (at least partly) by targeted 
advertising for commercial agricultural inputs companies and by providing extension services on 
behalf of the government.  
The extent of the barrier that the modest fee of GHS 0.5 per month (US$ 0.1 per month) appears 
to present to farmers has puzzled Vodafone. Why are farmers so unwilling to pay for the service, 
even though the information provided is valuable, it offers free calls to other farmers, and 
discounted calls means that it represents one of the lowest cost SIMs on the market?  
G.2 Behaviour change theory and VFC 
It is proposed that the answer lies in motivation, and in behaviour change theory. Achieving 
changed behaviour is a complex process involving multiple actions and requiring people to adapt in 
different ways, usually over extended periods of time. Remember that at this point we are focused 
on the behaviour ‘using an mAgri service’, rather than on adopting any improved agricultural 
practices. Under the B2C subscription model employed by VFC, the decision to sign up (and to re-
subscribe) lies entirely with the farmer him or herself.  
Progression through the trans-theoretical model (illustrated in Figure 34) provides a good starting 
point. This can be described as follows. 
• At the first stage, ‘pre-contemplation’, people have no intention to change their behaviour, 
being either unmotivated or even resistant to change. This can be because they are 
uninformed about the consequences of their current behaviour (i.e. using traditional sources of 
information leading to no improvement in agricultural performance) or are unaware of emerging 
opportunities. This stage is typically characterised by acute awareness of the disadvantages of 
the behaviour in question (e.g. high costs) and an under-awareness of the benefits.  
• At the second stage, ‘contemplation’, people have become more convinced of the benefits of 
change, and have adopted a positive intention to change their behaviour at some point in the 
future. 
 
42 Vodafone, personal communication (November 2018). 
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• In the ‘preparation’ stage, people are making plans to adopt a new behaviour, and may have 
already taken some significant action in the recent past. 
• The ‘action’ stage refers to the time when people make observable changes to their behaviour; 
in this context, it would be to sign up to the VFC service.  
• The ‘maintenance’ stage refers to the period of time during which people may be tempted to 
relapse back to their previous practices, i.e. not to re-subscribe to VFC. 
Figure 34: Trans-theoretical model of behaviour change 
 
Source: Authors’ own (from Prochaska and Velicer (1997)) 
All programmes must engage in some kind of promotional activity in order to inform their target 
markets of a new service; this is a prerequisite for progressing from the pre-contemplation stage. 
Marketing messages typically inform consumers of the benefits of the service (or the 
disadvantages of persisting with their current pattern of behaviour) and any costs (which may be 
interpreted as a disadvantage, or as an advantage if they are lower than the alternatives). Indeed, 
‘consciousness raising’ is one of the processes of change needed to move people through the 
stages detailed above (Prochaska and Velicer, 1997).  
Understanding the factors at work in driving intent to change behaviour (in the contemplation 
stage, and then more firmly established in the preparation stage) and factors that might prevent 
intent materialising in action (or actual changed behaviour) led to the Theory of Reasoned Action 
and its evolution into the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (and others) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1980). The TPB model is based on beliefs held by individuals themselves (attitudes), the strength 
of subjective norms (the strength of social pressures on them), and the extent to which they may 
feel unable to carry out a behaviour (control beliefs) – represented in Figure 35.  
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Figure 35: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
The theory focuses on the individual’s intention to perform a given behaviour: ‘The theory 
postulates that a person’s intention to perform (or not perform) a behaviour is the immediate 
determinant of that action. Barring unforeseen event, people are expected to act in accordance 
with their intentions’ (Ajzen, 1988). Intention is treated as a dependent variable, subject to the 
influence of two independent determinants: 
• The ‘attitudes’ of the individual to the given behaviour, where an attitude is a combination of 
belief about the outcome of performing the behaviour, and the individual’s assessment of the 
value of this outcome; and 
• The ‘subjective norm’, which represents the individual’s perception of social pressures on them 
to perform (or not perform) the behaviour. A subjective norm is a combination of the individual’s 
belief about how a given social referent feels the individual should behave, combined with the 
individual’s assessment of their motivation to comply with the social referent. 
The TPB was developed to address one of the limitations of relying solely on intentions, which is 
that this is not good at predicting behaviours over which people do not have complete volitional 
control. The TPB therefore went on to include perceived behavioural control factors, which explore 
the influence of perceptions of factors that may facilitate or inhibit execution of a given behaviour. 
Perceived behavioural control factors may be considered as two types: the first relates to self-
efficacy and perceptions regarding confidence in one’s ability to execute a behaviour; the second 
relates to resources and perceptions regarding how difficult or easy it might be to execute a 
behaviour given the resources at one’s disposal.  
Only once a consumer is informed of a new service can s/he form beliefs relating to likely 
outcomes associated with using the service. If, at that point, intent to adopt the behaviour remains 
weak, then in order to change behaviour it is necessary to change either attitudes or subjective 
norms (or perceived control beliefs) by changing the underlying beliefs. 
VFC is sold to individual farmers, so intention to sign up is determined by outcome beliefs held by 
the farmer, by social pressures on the farmer to sign up, and by any beliefs held by the farmer that 
s/he simply cannot do it (perceived control beliefs). For the purposes of illustration, the following 
beliefs can be inferred from findings from qualitative research carried out with VFC users (Barnett 
et al., 2018): 
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Outcome beliefs: 
• VFC will teach me more about farming 
• I will increase yields with VFC  
• Information on the correct use of fertilisers / pest control will reduce costs 
• Weather information will reduce crop losses 
• VFC will provide material support and credit 
• The cost of following VFC advice will outweigh the benefits 
Subjective norms: 
• Extension agents would approve of my using VFC 
• Members of my family would approve of my using VFC 
• Other farmers (local) would approve of my using VFC 
Perceived behaviour control: 
• I can’t read (so I won’t be able to understand any information) 
• There is no Vodafone signal where I live / work 
• I won’t be able to get it to work (e.g. I can’t read, I won’t be able to activate the SIM, I don’t 
have a phone, etc.) 
Note that outcome beliefs can be both positive (behaviour leads to beneficial outcomes) or 
negative (behaviour leads to detrimental outcomes), and they can even be false: 
Beliefs reflect the information people have in relation to the performance of a given 
behaviour, but this information is often inaccurate and incomplete; it may rest on faulty or 
irrational premises, be biased by self-serving motives, by fear, anger and other emotions, or 
otherwise fail to reflect reality. (Ajzen, 2011). 
Subjective norms represent social pressure exerted on the farmer by people they respect (key 
social referents). The qualitative research has identified social referents commonly regarded as 
influential in agricultural practice, notably extension agents, but also wider social networks of 
family, friends, and other farmers. These referents are clearly mirrored in findings from the 
quantitative research (Billings et al., 2017), which identified sources of agricultural information (see 
Figure 36).  
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Figure 36: Source of information on crop production, by region  
 
Source: Billings et al., (2017). 
When considering the role of mobile phones in agriculture, Batchelor et al., (2014) also found that 
face-to-face contact with extension workers and peer farmers was crucial to the uptake of 
innovative practice, and proposed an actor-centric model for agricultural information exchange (see 
Figure 37). The positioning of actors on the diagram represents their distance from a small-scale 
farmer, and actors have been distributed among four layers: 
• high-level political economy; 
• supporting structure; 
• professional input into farmer exchanges; and 
• farmer-to-farmer engagement. 
Those actors commonly cited as sources of information are highlighted in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37: Actor-centric model – highlighting social referents 
 
Source: Batchelor et al., (2014). 
At this point, several attitudinal features lead to weak intention to sign up to VFC: 
• poor understanding of the potential benefits of using VFC; 
• misunderstanding of what VFC is and what it provides; 
• a lack of trust in VFC (both in the services to be provided and in the value of services, e.g. 
accuracy of weather information); and 
• weak subjective norms – none of the extension agents interviewed in the qualitative research 
were aware of VFC (Barnett et al., 2018), so farmers could not feel any social pressure from 
extension agents to use the service. 
Remember that at the pre-contemplation stage of the trans-theoretical model, people tend to be 
more acutely aware of disadvantages, i.e. negative outcome beliefs and perceived behavioural 
control beliefs in TPB terminology.  
G.3 An emerging model 
A number of Ghanaian companies are now offering a range of ICT-based services to clients, 
mostly agribusinesses and large-scale farmers, such as mapping of farms, profiling of farmers, 
monitoring, aggregating demand (both for agricultural inputs and for produce), facilitating 
transactions, and enabling access to finance. In this type of B2B business model, the service 
provider typically enters into an agreement with an agricultural input supplier or off-taker that 
wishes to engage with a defined target group of farmers. Agricultural information is usually 
disseminated as part of a wider package of services. For example, an inputs supplier will want 
farmers to be familiar with seed varieties and to know how to use fertilisers and pesticides, and off-
takers will want their suppliers (smallholder farmers) to adopt best farming practices in order to 
increase the quality of produce and yields.  
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In most agreements to date, noting that many of these schemes are still pilots, it appears that the 
clients tend to pay for a package of services that includes information dissemination. Even though 
the partner institution may pay for the service, the farmer still has to sign up for the service to 
receive information and messages via his or her mobile phone. Aside from the cost implications, 
this model would appear to have several benefits from the point of view of a behavioural change 
theory. 
The key advantage is that it increases the locus of social referents relevant to the farmer’s decision 
to adopt the mobile service – see Figure 38.  
Figure 38: Actor-centric model – highlighting an extended circle of social referents 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
This has the potential to affect each of the psychological aspects represented in the TPB in a way 
that strengthens intention. 
Outcome beliefs: 
If agribusiness (or a government ministry) at the high-level decision making layer can feed 
policy down to the layer of the professional, who come into face-to-face contact with the 
farmer, then farmers will have somebody to talk to about the service, making them better 
informed. A key finding from the qualitative research was that personal contact was an 
important factor in building trust in the VFC service, so having a local ‘face’ would enhance 
trust.  
‘Farmers’ main information needs were around finances and in particular how to get access 
to loans and credits for agricultural inputs, followed by the correct use of agrochemicals’ 
(Barnet et al., 2017). Emerging services are responding to needs such as this, and are 
providing more complex products, often based on financial services (recall that Vodafone 
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Cash was only introduced in Ghana in December 2015).43 By promising to meet perceived 
needs, such services may attract farmers to sign up, even in the absence of local contacts 
(i.e. they create strongly positive outcome attitudes).  
Subjective norms: 
There are two elements to the TPB construct: normative belief (e.g. [social referent] would 
approve/disapprove of my executing the behaviour) and motivation to comply (e.g. how 
much to you want to do what [social referent] thinks you should do?). Although by no 
means a TPB study, the qualitative research suggests that farmers hold extension workers 
in high regard, so it is likely that motivation to comply with extension workers would be high. 
Friends, relatives, and peer farmers are also highlighted as key social referents, with whom 
a farmer is likely to have a high motivation to comply. However, given the current 
penetration levels of VFC, few will even be aware of VFC, so the normative belief will be 
weak (how can a spouse approve of signing up for VFC if s/he has never heard of it?). 
Extending the social referents strengthens intent in two ways. First, if the farmer enters into 
some kind of relationship with agribusiness (e.g. accessing credit to buy fertiliser), then the 
number of relevant social referents increases. The farmer is no longer working on his or her 
own, but becomes accountable to a third party (in some small way). The extent of this 
accountability then influences the strength of the farmer’s motivation to comply with this 
social referent.  
Perceived behaviour control: 
There is little anyone can do about network signals, but knowing that a local trader uses a 
mobile service may be enough to encourage a farmer to try it. This may be enough to 
dispel the belief that it does not work. Knowing someone in the agribusiness value chain 
who can provide assistance may help overcome illiteracy restrictions.  
The current models are based on business paying, but if extending the social referents into 
agribusiness actors can be proven to strengthen intent sufficiently, it may even be possible to 
share revenue generation by charging farmers directly (as in the current VFC model). 
G.4 Motivation 
The discussion up to this point has focused on the farmer as an individual and how s/he might 
progress to the action stage of signing up for an agricultural information service. An emerging set 
of agricultural services are incorporating additional actors from the value chain, notably 
agribusiness and finance. Not only do they change the behaviour change dynamics as described 
above, but they also tend to distribute risks and benefits.  
Under the VFC model, all the risk associated with making a subscription and with implementing 
any change in agricultural practice is taken by the individual farmer. In the same way, all the 
benefits realised from any change in practice are enjoyed by the farmer. The motivation for a 
farmer to sign up rests with the farmer (and the service provider). 
When a third party is integrated into the model, then costs, risks, and benefits tend to become 
shared. For example, agricultural inputs supplied on credit may pose a risk to the supplier and/or a 
finance company underwriting the scheme. A good harvest means that increased revenues are 
shared between all parties. The motivation for a farmer to enrol in the scheme is shared between 
 
43 https://www.vodafone.com/news-and-media/vodafone-group-releases/news/mpesa-ghana  
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the service provider, agribusiness partners, and the farmer. By lowering perceived risk barriers 
(outcome attitudes), engaging farmers in a relationship (subjective norms), and endorsing a service 
(perceived behavioural control beliefs), agribusiness actors can ease the progress of farmers to the 
action stage of signing up for mAgri services. 
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Annex H Reflections on the evaluation methodology 
H.1 Distance of stakeholder relationships 
The mNutrition programme has engaged an ambitious range of institutional stakeholders. The 
differing types of relationship within the programme have resulted in differing degrees of 
‘engagement’, which has had implications for the evaluation study.  
For instance, within the programme of work, content partners such as CABI were engaged on a 
conventional contractual basis to deliver materials required. In contrast, mAgri implementing 
partners (i.e. MNOs) were awarded grants. The definition of a grant is that payment is not tied to 
specific deliverables, although the grantor (GSMA) has the right to know that the money is indeed 
being spent as intended and agreed. This can lead to grey areas in terms of the MNOs’ obligations 
to GSMA. For example, grantees were requested to complete a standard financial report drafted by 
GSMA, rather than submit separate accounts (which would have been unnecessarily onerous). 
However, Vodafone struggled to complete these reports comprehensively because they did not 
align with its internal financial processes.  
The nature of these partnership arrangements means that implementing partners have limited and 
varied accountability to GSMA. Consequently, while GSMA offered to broker relationships and the 
exchange of information between implementors and researchers, it is not necessarily in a position 
to enforce compliance.  
Due to the dynamic nature of the industry, implementing partnerships are also continually changing 
and may introduce new partners into the mix that have even less of an obligation to the mNutrition 
project. For example, in addition to VFC, Vodafone offered products in partnership with Viamo and 
Farmerline. Discussions on revising VFC centred on creating a more comprehensive package of 
financial and transactional services, and on consolidating the rural customer base. Even though 
the ideas were not pursued, a resulting product could have replaced Esoko with a competitor as 
content provider. In this scenario, the content provider would then have had no contact with, and 
not benefited from, the mNutrition programme. 
The relationship of the independent study team to the rest of the mNutrition project was not clear to 
implementing partners, while GSMA fully understood the relationship and made every effort to 
assist the independent study. However, implementing partners have often been confused about 
the status of the OPM team and its independence from GSMA, especially when the core 
programme has also included a range of M&E activities (run by another set of institutions). This 
has required extra effort in building trust, and has led to uncertainty over access to sensitive 
information. 
H.2 Timescales 
Any highly rigorous approach involving research into behaviour change takes a long time. 
Timescales are expanded still further when the behaviours relate to agriculture, which involves 
annual cycles. In contrast, long timescales are incompatible with ICT-based projects for a number 
of reasons: 
• Short-term operating horizons: Within the telecoms industry, the time for a VAS to become 
profitable is measured in months, not years (e.g. time for a VAS to recover customer 
acquisition costs should be less than 12 months). Formative evaluation needs a tight feedback 
loop to inform product design and implementation. 
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• Products are rapidly upgraded: Product development has to be agile to fit short-term horizons, 
and technology means changes can be made at low cost. Therefore, independent UX and 
qualitative research are of immediate value (formative); long-term experimental studies 
measure average impact. 
• Rapid staff turnover (particularly within MNOs): This means evaluation requires continual effort 
in relationship building. 
• Short-term institutional memory (particularly within MNOs): For example, Vodafone keep call 
data for only three months, while the VFC financial officer moved on after the end of the 
project. An evaluation that documents relationships, partnerships, and product development 
can add value. 
H.3 Multiple projects 
The mNutrition project has spread resources over a large number of countries and implementing 
projects. To conduct a rigorous study of all projects would be prohibitively expensive, so two 
projects have been selected. The VFC project cannot be regarded as representative of all of the 
mAgri projects supported under the mNutrition programme.  
The project selection was made on the basis of a steer from GSMA, along with a collaborative 
preliminary assessment of the projects. This considered the information available at the inception 
phase, including the maturity of product development discussions, indications of engagement from 
implementing partners, marketing approaches, and the strength of partners. For example, there 
was strong initial interest in the Malawi mHealth project with Airtel, but contractual negotiations 
dragged on, so the decision was taken to adopt the Tanzania project instead. As it happened, a 
subsequent change of CEO at Airtel in Malawi meant that arrangements were actually concluded 
quickly and GSMA state that now Malawi is one of its stronger implementations.  
The ‘crystal ball gazing’ involved in project selection is an area of weakness. For example, while 
VFC appeared to be a good choice because it was one of the earlier projects to roll out, GSMA is 
now of the opinion that it is not one of the better implemented projects.  
The compromise inherent in focusing efforts on the rigorous study of one or two projects means 
that the ability to compare and contrast experiences and performance across all projects in the 
portfolio is lost. GSMA implemented a monitoring, evaluation, and learning system that has 
resulted in a set of comparative case studies, all of which have been published. These studies are 
based on internal M&E data, different to that gathered by the independent evaluation. The 
independent evaluation was intended to be a rigorous impact evaluation for deeper learning. The 
dilemma, then, is that a study comparing multiple projects would be better able to identify ‘critical 
success’ factors, whereas focusing on a single project is appropriate to study impact in detail.  
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Annex I Terms of reference 
Call-down Contract 
 
 
Terms of Reference 
 
PO 6420: External evaluation of mobile phone technology based nutrition and 
agriculture advisory services in Africa and South Asia 
 
Introduction 
 
DFID (Research and Evidence Division) wishes to commission an external impact evaluation of 
mNutrition, a mobile phone technology based nutrition and agricultural advisory service for Africa 
and South Asia. mNutrition is a programme supported by DFID that, through business and science 
partnerships, aims to build sustainable business models for the delivery of mobile phone 
technology based advisory services that are effective in improving nutrition and agricultural 
outcomes. 
mNutrition is primarily designed to use mobile phone based technologies to increase the access of 
rural communities to nutrition and agriculture related information. The initiative aims to improve 
knowledge among rural farming communities especially women and support beneficial behaviour 
change as well as increasing demand for nutrition and agriculture extension services. The 
mNutrition initiative launched in September 2013 will work in 10 countries in Africa (Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia) and four 
countries in South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). The desired impact of 
mNutrition will be improved nutrition, food security and livelihoods of the poor. 
Mobile phone based services have been endorsed by WHO as an effective strategy for behaviour 
change and for driving adherence to anti-retroviral treatment protocols (Horvath, Azman, Kennedy 
and Rutherford 2012). There is currently scant evidence on the impact and cost-effectiveness of 
mobile phone technology based services for nutrition and agriculture and on the sustainability of 
different business models for their provision. A rigorous evaluation of mobile phone technology 
based nutrition services would add significantly to the current evidence base. An external 
evaluation team managed by the Evaluator, independent of the programme delivery mechanism, 
will conduct an assessment of the impact, cost-effectiveness and sustainability of mobile phone 
technology based information and behaviour change messages for nutrition and agriculture. 
Background to mNutrition 
 
Introduction  
Undernutrition is a major challenge to human and economic development globally. It is estimated 
that almost one billion people face hunger and are unable to get enough food to meet their dietary 
needs. Agriculture is a major source of livelihood in many poor countries and the sector has a 
potentially critical role in enhancing health, specifically maternal and child health and nutritional 
status. A well-developed agriculture sector will deliver increased and diversified farm outputs 
(crops, livestock, non-food products) and this may enhance food and nutrition security directly 
through increased access to and consumption of diverse food, or indirectly through greater profits 
to farmers and national wealth. Better nutrition and health of farmers fosters their agricultural and 
economic productivity. Current agricultural and health systems and policies are not meeting current 
and projected future global food, nutrition and health needs. 
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Despite major investment in agricultural and nutrition research and its uptake and application, there 
is significant social and geographic inequality in who benefits from these investments. 
Furthermore, in many developing countries, public extension systems for agriculture, health and 
nutrition are inefficient, have limited capacity and have a poor track record of delivery, especially in 
terms of supporting women and girls and the most marginalised populations (Alston, Wyatt, 
Pardey, Marra and Chan-Kang 2000; Anderson 2007; IFPRI 2010; Van den Berg and Jiggins 
2007). 
Several research and mobile network operators (MNOs) are testing a range of information and 
communication technology (ICT) solutions for improving access to a wide range of information and 
advisory services. Mobile phone based technologies are among the most promising ICT strategies, 
although current initiatives in nutrition are relatively small and fragmented. 
What is mNutrition? 
Enhancing access to the results of nutrition and agricultural research and development is 
potentially critical for improving the nutrition, health and livelihoods of smallholders and rural 
communities. mNutrition will harness the power of mobile phone based technologies and the 
private sector to improve access to information on nutrition, health and agricultural practices 
especially for women and farmers (both male and female). Specifically, mNutrition will initiate new 
partnerships with business and science to deliver a range of services including: 
• An open-access database of nutrition and agriculture messages for use in mobile phone based 
communication (for example, information and behaviour change messages on practices and 
interventions that are known to have a direct impact on nutrition or an indirect impact via for 
example agriculture); 
• A suite of mobile phone based nutrition and agriculture information, extension and registration 
services designed to: improve knowledge and generate beneficial behaviour change in nutrition 
and agriculture; increase demand for nutrition, health and agriculture goods and services; 
register and identify target populations for support; and, using real-time monitoring, support the 
conduct of nutrition risk assessments by community health workers. 
The impacts of mNutrition are expected to include improved nutrition, food security and livelihoods 
of the poor, especially women in 10 countries in Africa (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) and 4 countries in South Asia 
(Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). This impact will result from the increased scale and 
sustainability of mobile phone based nutrition and agricultural-based information services, 
delivered through robust public private partnerships in each country.  
mNutrition has two major outcomes. One outcome will be cost-effective, sustainable business 
models for mobile phone enabled nutrition and agriculture services to 3 million households in 10 
countries in Africa and 4 countries in South Asia that can be replicated in other countries.  Linked 
to this outcome, the second outcome will expect these services to result in new knowledge, 
behaviour change and adoption of new practices in the area of agriculture and nutrition practices 
among the users of these mobile phone based services.   
These outcomes will be achieved through four outputs: 
• Improved access to relevant mobile based health, nutrition and agricultural advisory services 
for 3 million poor people and community health workers across 10 SSA and 4 Asian countries;  
• Launch and scaling of mobile phone based health, nutrition and agricultural advisory services 
targeted to poor people and community health workers; 
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• Generation and dissemination of high quality research and evidence on the impact, cost-
effectiveness and sustainability of mobile phone based advisory services in nutrition and 
agriculture in South Asia and SSA; and 
• Development of locally relevant content for mobile phone technology based agriculture and 
nutrition services meeting demands from users and community health workers.  
In terms of promoting behaviour change and/or adoption of new practices, mNutrition will seek to 
achieve changes in one or more of the following areas: 
• Adoption of new agricultural practices that are nutrition sensitive, improve agricultural 
productivity and utilise post-harvest technologies 
• Changes in nutrition practices in either one or several knowledge domains including improved 
maternal nutrition practices during pregnancies; infant and young child feeding practice; and 
micro-nutrient supplementation to children at risk (i.e. Vitamin A, Zinc and Oral Rehydration 
Solution (ORS)). 
mNutrition has started implementation from September 2013. For the 2 countries selected for the 
impact evaluation (Tanzania and Ghana), mobile network operators and content providers have 
been identified through a competitive process during the first half of 2014. The MNOs and content 
providers started developing and launching their services during the 4th quarter of 2014 and early 
2015. The mobile phone based advisory services are expected to run at least till 3rd quarter of 
2018.  
mNutrition Project Coordination 
DFID support to mNutrition will be channelled to GSMA, as well as directly to this associated 
independent external impact evaluation. GSMA is a global body that represents the interests of 
over 800 mobile operators. GSMA already works with the major mobile operators across Africa, 
(including Airtel, MTN, SafariCom/VodaCom) with a collective mobile footprint of more than 67 
percent of total African connections. GSMA has a number of existing development initiatives, 
including mHealth and mFarmer, that are part of GSMA’s Mobile for Development which brings 
together mobile operator members, the wider mobile industry and the development community to 
drive commercial mobile services for underserved people in emerging markets. GSMA will provide 
technical assistance to mobile phone operators, and support new partnerships with content 
providers to develop and scale up new nutrition and agriculture message services. GSMA will 
ensure sharing of best practices and promote wider replication and uptake of effective business 
models. 
 
Objective and Main Questions 
The objective of this work is to conduct an external evaluation of the impacts and cost-
effectiveness of the nutrition and agriculture advisory services provided by mNutrition compared to 
alternative advisory services available in the two selected countries (Ghana and Tanzania), with 
particular attention paid to gender and poverty issues. The impact assessment is required to 
answer the following questions that relate to impact, cost-effectiveness and commercial viability: 
• What are the impacts and cost-effectiveness of mobile phone based nutrition and agriculture 
services on nutrition, health and livelihood outcomes, especially among women, children and 
the extreme poor? 
• How effective are mobile phone based services in reaching, increasing the knowledge, and 
changing the behaviour, of the specific target groups? 
• Has the process of adapting globally agreed messages to local contexts led to content which is 
relevant to the needs of children, women and poor farmers in their specific context? 
Mobile phones, nutrition, and agriculture in Ghana: Business modelling endline report 
e-Pact 127 
• What factors make mobile phone based services effective in promoting and achieving 
behaviour change (if observed) leading to improved nutrition and livelihood outcomes? 
• How commercially viable are the different business models being employed at country level?  
• What lessons can be learned about best practices in the design and implementation of mobile 
phone based nutrition services to ensure a) behaviour change and b) continued private sector 
engagement in different countries? 
Further evaluation questions related to other aims of mNutrition will be addressed in at least 1 
country (either Ghana and/or Tanzania): 
• Are mobile phone based services a cost-effective way to register and identify at risk 
populations to target with nutrition support? 
• Are mobile phone based services a cost-effective way for community health workers to improve 
the quality and timeliness of data surveillance (a core set of nutrition-related indicators)? 
The content for the mobile phone based advisory services will be based on international best 
practices and widely endorsed protocols (i.e. by the World Health Organisation) and evidence-
based nutrition-sensitive agricultural practices identified by international experts. Through an 
iterative multi-stakeholder process, international and country experts will localise and adapt the 
content to make it relevant to the specific target audience in the 14 countries. The adapted content 
and nature of messages is expected to vary across specific target audiences within and across 
countries. The main purpose of assessing the relevance of the content is not to evaluate the 
overall health and nutrition content but on how this content has been localised and adapted and to 
what extent the needs of the specific target groups within their particular context have been met.  
In assessing the commercial viability, it is recognised that evaluating the sustainability/long-term 
financial viability of the mobile phone based advisory services will be difficult as mobile network 
operators may not be willing to provide this potentially commercially sensitive information. 
Therefore, GSMA will provide support through its access to aggregated confidential financial 
results of the mobile network operators providing the service. GSMA will provide a financial 
summary report on the commercial viability of the business models without compromising the 
commercial sensitivity of the data for the mobile network operators. The evaluator will assess and 
validate commercial sustainability through an analysis of the aggregated information provided by 
GSMA and additional qualitative business analysis approaches. 
The Evaluator has the option of proposing refinements of the existing evaluation questions during 
the inception phase as part of developing the research protocol. These suggestions will be 
considered by the Steering Committee and an independent peer review during the review of the 
research protocol as part of the inception phase.  
Output 
The output of this work will be new and robust evidence on the impact, cost-effectiveness and 
commercial viability of mobile phone based advisory services focusing on nutrition and agriculture 
delivered by public and private partners, and including the development of robust methodological 
approaches to impact assessment of phone based advisory services. 
Recipient  
The primary recipient of this work will be DFID, with the beneficiaries being GSMA, governments, 
international agencies, foundations, MNOs and other private companies and civil society involved 
in policies and programmes in nutrition and agriculture that are aimed at improving nutritional, 
health and agricultural outcomes. The findings of this impact evaluation are intended as global 
public goods.  
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Scope and timeline 
 The scope of this work is to: 
• Develop a research protocol for the external evaluation of mNutrition; 
• Design and undertake an external evaluation of mNutrition in two countries: Ghana and 
Tanzania; 
• Contribute to the communication of the learning agenda, evaluation strategy and evaluation 
results. 
The evaluation will be in two of the 14 mNutrition target countries; Ghana and Tanzania. These 
countries have been selected based on the phased start-up of mNutrition programme activities. 
The focus and approach in the two respective countries will be different allowing for a comparison 
of the effectiveness of approaches applied. In Tanzania, mNutrition will focus on mobile phone 
technology based nutrition and health services and registration and identification of target 
population. In Ghana, the mobile phone technology will focus on nutrition and agriculture sensitive 
services.  
In terms of coverage in number of people being targeted for these services, in total 3 million people 
will be reached through mNutrition; including 2 million for nutrition sensitive agriculture advisory 
messages in 4 Asian and at least 2 African countries and about 1 million beneficiaries for mobile 
phone based nutrition services in 10 countries in SSA.   
The evaluation contract period will be September 2014 to 31st December 2019. The development 
of the research protocol must be completed by month 4 for review and approval by DFID. Full 
details on tasks and deliverables are provided in sections below. 
Statement on the design of the mNutrition evaluation 
The evaluation design is expected to measure the impact, cost-effectiveness and commercial 
viability of mNutrition, using a mixed methods evaluation design and drawing on evidence from two 
case study countries and the M&E system of the programme.  Overall, the proposed design should 
ensure that the evidence from the two case study countries has high internal validity and 
addresses the priority evidence gaps identified in the Business Case. Being able to judge the 
generalisability/replicability of lessons learned from the programme is of equal importance and so a 
credible approach to generalization and external validity will be an important component of the 
overall evaluation design. The final evaluation design and methodology to generate robust 
evidence will be discussed in detail with DFID and GSMA before implementation. 
For assessing cost-effectiveness, the Evaluator will further fine-tune their proposed evaluation 
approach and outline their expectations in terms of data they will require from implementers. A 
theory based evaluation design, using mixed methods for evaluating the impact has been 
proposed.  During the inception phase, the Evaluator will put forward a robust evaluation design for 
the quantitative work, either an experimental or a quasi-experimental method, with a clear outline 
of the strengths and limitations of the proposed method relative to alternatives. During the 
inception phase, the Evaluator is also expected to identify clearly what will be the implications of 
the design for implementers in terms of how the overall programme would be designed and 
implemented and for evidence to be collected in the programme’s monitoring system. The 
Evaluator will also assess the degree to which it is realistic to assess impacts by early 2019 for a 
programme where implementation started mid 2015 and, if there are challenges, how these would 
be managed. 
The Evaluator, in its 6 monthly reports, will be required to provide information to feed into the DFID 
Annual Review and Project Completion Report of mNutrition.  
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Gender and inclusiveness 
The impact evaluation will pay particular attention to gender and other forms of social 
differentiation and poverty issues. From current experiences, it is clear that access to and use of 
mobile services is differentiated along a range of factors, including gender, poverty, geographic 
marginalisation, education and illiteracy levels. Therefore, the impact evaluation will look at and 
analyse differentiated access to and potential utilisation of mobile phone based services for 
improved nutrition and agricultural production. Based on the findings, it will identify opportunities 
and challenges in having an impact on women in general and more specifically the poor and the 
marginalised.    
Tasks 
The Evaluator will perform the following tasks: 
A.  Finalise a coherent and robust evaluation approach and methodology based on their 
proposal (inception phase) 
• Conduct landscape analysis of existing experiences in mobile phone based services for 
nutrition and agriculture based on available publications and grey project documents to identify 
additional critical lessons and priorities for evidence gathering and programme design and 
implementation;  
• Ensure that gender issues and poverty issues are well integrated into the impact evaluation 
design; 
• Develop robust sampling frameworks, core set of indicators and research protocols that allow 
the consistent measurement and comparison of impacts across study countries, taking into 
account differences in business models and programmes as needed; 
• Work closely with mNutrition programme team in GSMA to familiarise them with impact 
assessment methodology, discuss evaluation approaches, identify and agree on data provided 
by programme monitoring system and possible modifications to design;  
• Identify risks to the evaluation meeting its objectives and how these risks will be effectively 
managed;  
• Review existing evaluation questions and if deemed relevant propose refinement of existing 
questions and/or add other questions;  
• Prepare a research protocol, including an updated workplan, project milestones and budget. 
The research protocol will be subject to an independent peer review organised by DFID; and 
• Develop a communication plan.  
B.  Implement and analyse evaluations of impact, cost-effectiveness and commercial 
viability in accordance with established best practices 
• Based upon the agreed evaluation framework, develop and test appropriate evaluation 
instruments which are likely to include data collection forms for households, community health 
workers, service providers including health and agricultural services, content providers and 
private sector stakeholders including mobile network operators. Instruments will involve both 
quantitative and qualitative methods; 
• Register studies on appropriate open access study registries and publish protocols of studies 
where appropriate;  
• Conduct baselines and end-lines, qualitative assessments and business model assessments in 
both of the two impact evaluation countries; 
• Conduct and analyse the evaluations and present findings in two well-structured reports 
addressing the evaluation questions. The reports should follow standard reporting guidelines 
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as defined by, for example, the Equator Network. Primary findings should be clearly presented 
along with a detailed analysis of the underlying reasons why the desired outcomes were/were 
not achieved;  
• The Evaluating Organisation or Consortium may subcontract the administration of surveys and 
data entry, but not the supervision of those tasks, study design, or data analysis; and 
• The country-specific mixed methods evaluation reports, cost effectiveness and business 
models studies and final evaluation report will be subject to an independent peer review 
organised by DFID. 
C. Contribute to the communication of the learning agenda, impact evaluation strategy, and 
evaluation results. 
• Develop a communication plan outlining the main outputs and key audiences;  
• Conduct lessons learnt workshops in each of the 2 impact evaluation countries and key 
dissemination events; and 
• Assist in communicating the results of the evaluation and contribute to the development and 
communication of lessons learnt about mobile phone based extension approaches in nutrition 
and agriculture. 
Deliverables  
The Evaluator will deliver the following outputs44: 
During the design and study inception phase of maximum 4 months: 
• A publishable landscape analysis report highlighting lessons learnt from existing initiatives on 
mobile phone based advisory services related to nutrition and agriculture by month 4; 
• A updated work plan with project milestones and budget by end of month 1 (possibly adjusted 
based on the approved research protocol by month 4); 
• A communication plan outlining the key outputs, audience and timeline for review and approval 
by month 4; and 
• A full research protocol by month 4 for review and approval. The research protocol should be 
registered with appropriate open access study registries; 
Interim reports: 
• 4 biannual progress reports for the External Evaluation as a whole, and for each country 
evaluation, against milestones set out in the workplan;  
 Two desk reviews submitted by June 2016 
 Two Baseline quantitative reports submitted by April 2017 
 Two Baseline qualitative reports submitted by February 2017 
 Two Cost-effectiveness reports 1 submitted by March 2017 
 Two Business Model reports 1 submitted by March 2017 
 Two Mixed Methods Baseline reports completed by September 2017 
 Two Midline qualitative reports submitted by March 2018 
• All survey data collected during the evaluation provided in a suitable format to DFID for public 
release. 
 
44 Exact timeframe of deliverables will be agreed on during the design phase as appropriate. 
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At project’s end: 
• Two Endline quantitative reports submitted by June 2019 
• Two Endline qualitative reports submitted by August 2019 
• Two Cost-effectiveness report 2 submitted by July 2019 
• Two Business Model report 2 submitted by July 2019 
• Two Evaluation reports submitted by October 2019 
• At least 1 article, based on the findings from the country evaluation reports, published in a 
research journal;   
• A shared lesson learnt paper published and at least one presentation highlighting key lessons 
for similar initiatives of promoting mobile based technologies for providing extension services 
and the promotion of uptake of technologies by December 2019. 
Research protocol and all final reports will be independently peer reviewed.  This will be organised 
by DFID. Outputs are expected to be of sufficiently quality so that a synthesis of findings can be 
published in a leading peer-reviewed journal.  
Coordination and reporting requirements  
A mNutrition Advisory Group (AG) will be established for the programme which will a) provide 
technical oversight and b) maximise the effectiveness of the programme.  The Advisory Group will 
meet on a bi-annual basis and comprises of representatives of DFID, NORAD and GSMA 
representatives and independent technical experts. The Evaluator will be managed by DFID on 
behalf of the mNutrition Advisory Group. The Evaluator will work closely with the mNutrition 
programme team in GSMA and its specific country implementing partners. The Evaluator will:  
• Ensure coherence and lesson learning across all pilot impact assessments on the key 
evaluation questions and indicators identified. 
• Incorporate a clear code of ethics; incorporate plans for open access publications and public 
access to data sets.  
The Evaluator will work closely with the mNutrition project management team, in particular in the 
design of the overall evaluation framework and the evaluation plan for the specific project 
components and the countries selected for the evaluation. Collaboration and regular 
communication between Evaluator and mNutrition project management team and implementing 
partners in selected case study countries is crucial as the evaluation design may have implications 
for project implementation and vice versa. The mNutrition project management team will lend 
support in communication as requested by the Evaluator or the Advisory Group. The Evaluator will 
report directly to DFID who will manage the evaluation on behalf of the mNutrition Advisory Group.  
The main point of contact for technical matters is Louise Horner, Livelihoods Adviser and Hugh 
McGhie, Deputy Programme Manager for all other project related issues. The mNutrition Advisory 
Group will be the arbiter of any disputes between the evaluation function and the overall 
programme implementation.  
At the end of each 6 months, the Evaluator will submit a brief report outlining key achievements 
against the agreed deliverables. Pre-agreed funding will then be released provided that 
deliverables have been achieved.         
In addition to the 6 monthly reports outlined above, the Evaluator will provide information to feed 
into the DFID Annual Review of mNutrition. The 6 monthly reports will be a key source of 
information used to undertake the Annual Review and Project Completion Report for the 
programme. These reviews will be led by the Livelihoods Adviser and Deputy Programme 
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Manager, in consultation with the mNutrition AG. All reviews will be made available publicly in line 
with HMG Transparency and Accountability Requirements.   
Mandatory financial reports include an annual forecast of expenditure (the budget) disaggregated 
monthly in accordance with DFID’s financial year April to March.  This should be updated at least 
every quarter and any significant deviations from the forecast notified to DFID immediately.  In 
addition the Evaluator will be required to provide annual audited statements for the duration of the 
contract.   
Contractual Arrangements 
The contract starts in September 2014 and will run till end of December 2019 subject to 
satisfactory performance as determined through DFID’s Annual Review process. Progression is 
subject to the outcome of this review, strong performance and agreement to any revised work 
plans or budgets (if revisions are deemed appropriate).   
A formal break clause in the contract is included at the end of the inception period. Progression to 
the implementation phase will be dependent on strong performance by the Evaluator during the 
inception period and delivery of all inception outputs, including a revised proposal for 
implementation period.  Costs for implementation are expected to remain in line with what has 
been agreed upon for this contract, with costs such as fee rates fixed for contract duration.  DFID 
reserves the right to terminate the contract after the inception phase if it cannot reach agreement 
on the activities, staffing, budget and timelines for the implementation phase.   
DFID reserves the right to scale back or discontinue this assignment at any point (in line with our 
Terms and Conditions) if it is not achieving the results anticipated. The Evaluator will be 
remunerated on a milestone payment basis. DFID has agreed an output based payment plan for 
this contract, where payment will be explicitly linked to the Evaluator’s performance and effective 
delivery of programme outputs as set out in the ToR and approved workplan. The payment plan for 
the implementation phase will be finalised during the inception period.  
Open Access  
The Evaluator will comply with DFID’s Enhanced and Open Access Policy. Where appropriate the 
costs of complying with out open access policy should be clearly identified within your commercial 
proposal.  
Branding 
The public has an expectation and right to know what is funded with public money.  It is expected 
that all research outputs will acknowledge DFID support in a way that is clear, explicit and which 
fully complies with DFID Branding Guidance.  This will include ensuring that all publications 
acknowledge DFID’s support.  If press releases on work which arises wholly or mainly from the 
project are planned this should be in collaboration with DFID’s Communications Department.      
Duty of Care 
The Evaluator is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 
2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including 
appropriate security arrangements. The Evaluator is responsible for the provision of suitable 
security arrangements for their domestic and business property.  DFID will share available 
information with the Evaluator on security status and developments in-country where appropriate.  
The Evaluator is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their 
Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive 
briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Evaluator 
must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.  
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The Evaluator has confirmed that:  
• The Evaluator fully accepts responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.  
• The Evaluator understands the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to 
develop an effective risk plan.  
• The Evaluator has the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the 
life of the contract.  
 
 
 
